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Abstract  
This thesis investigates the relationship between regime and everyday dynamics of 
sectarianism, comparing the two Arab Gulf countries of Kuwait and Bahrain. Both case 
studies are viewed through the central theme of an “informal civil society” and its 
subsequent impact on sectarian politics in both countries. In Bahrain, the state has 
forwarded a sectarian narrative of the post-2011 conflict while at the grassroots level, 
concerted efforts have been made to bridge relations between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims. In Kuwait, meanwhile, there are indications of a reverse trajectory coming to 
fruition; while the regime denies a sectarian image of the state, posing as a neutral 
arbitrator between various political blocs, at the communal level, people across the 
political and social spectrum are defining themselves through the lens of sectarian 
identities that have become increasingly salient across several platforms. What is 
discernable in both countries is the complex and dynamic nature of sectarianism at 
work, where it is at one and the same time amplified and negated. 
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Introduction 
This thesis explores the interconnect between informal civil society and the issue of 
sectarianism, with a focus on the impact this has on the trajectory of inter-communal 
relations in two Gulf States – Bahrain and Kuwait. The research conducted for this 
thesis observes how sectarianism is being played out and articulated at the communal 
level, by looking at how grassroots activism in the form of civil society has sought to 
approach sectarian discourses that have become increasingly salient in recent years, 
namely following the 2011 Arab uprisings.  
 
The principal rationale driving this research is the desire to move beyond the 
conventional wisdom that the sole catalysts for sectarianism are state-centric or driven 
by a pursuit for regional hegemony; in the idea that sectarianism and inter-communal 
tensions are either driven exclusively by the state or centered around the weakness 
of the state which then enables localised identities to become more prevalent or that 
sectarian articulations can simply be reduced to the enduring geopolitical struggle 
between regional countries, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran.1 Not to dismiss such top-
down approaches, these accounts do not however provide an explanation as to why 
sectarianism is still being utilised or at least becoming increasingly salient where the 
state is seemingly robust and by and large resilient to internal pressures for reforms, 
which is applicable in the context of Kuwait.  
 
This research will therefore seek to complement existing scholarship by presenting a 
more holistic and multifaceted understanding of the top-down and bottom-up 
pressures that influence sectarian relations and to provide an account for the various 
ways in which the state can utilise sectarian narratives to extend its authoritarian reach 
but to also demonstrate how these narratives are actively countered or promulgated 
at the grassroots level. In addition, this thesis distinguishes itself by departing from 
conventional notions of civil society, to introduce what can be defined as an informal 
civil society, shifting from an organisational-institutional conception to a spatial 
understanding of civil society, whereby these informal spaces have, in some capacity, 
                                                          
1 Gause, Gregory F, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, 
No. 11, July 2014.  
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showcased an aptitude to be increasingly expedient by acquiring a role in redefining 
the trajectory of sectarian relations, and the potential to provide openings to forge 
cross-denominational coalitions where sectarian cleavages have often been 
instrumentalised by the authoritarian state and have long served as an impediment to 
cross-communal mobilisation.  
 
Despite the ongoing predicament within academic scholarship as to how to accurately 
define sectarianism2, it has simply been defined by the Oxford dictionary as an 
“excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, especially in religion.”3 But to 
understand what informal civil society comprises of, it would be conducive to look at a 
working definition of civil society more broadly. Civil society can be loosely defined as 
the "aggregate of non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest 
interests and will of citizens; individuals and organizations in a society which are 
independent of the government".4  
 
The simplest and most pertinent definition of “informal civil society” in turn is that it is 
a space (be it physical or virtual) whereby it has the potential capacity to make or 
influence significant political decisions outside the remit of the formal institutions of 
government and established Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). As Tun-Jen and 
Womack noted, some of the prevalent features throughout informal civil society can 
potentially signify “a surprisingly beneficial function in policy change; it can introduce 
new perspectives, provide information not filtered upward via bureaucratic channels 
or media outlets, incubates new proposals, and most importantly, allows the core 
leader at the centre to credibly inject new issues into the political arena.”5 Again, the 
presence of an informal civil society can be incorporated into the broader umbrella of 
                                                          
2 Hadad, Fanar, ‘Sectarianism’ and Its Discontents in the Study of the Middle East, Middle East Journal 71, (2017) 
pp. 363-382. 
3 Sectarianism. Oxforddictionaries.com. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sectarianism (accessed: 
June 14, 2017) 
4 Civil society. Dictionary.com. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. HarperCollins 
Publishers. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/civil-society (accessed: June 16, 2017). 
5  Cheng, Tun-Jen, and Brantly Womack. "General Reflections on Informal Politics in East Asia." Asian Survey 36, 
no. 3 (March 1996): 320-37. March 1996. Accessed May 17, 2015. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2645695. 
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civil society, defined here as a “society considered as a community of citizens that are 
linked by common interests and collective activity.”6  
 
With that in mind, it is first important to consider the unique demography of both 
countries, as the demographic outlook in Bahrain and Kuwait provides a picture for 
how both states have dealt with their respective populations based on denomination 
and the rationale for the discourse they have sought to propagate when it comes to 
sectarianism. Where Bahrain has advocated an assertively sectarian stance, whereby 
the al-Khalifa regime employed a strategy of promoting divisive sectarian policies, 
including discrimination within the workforce, education and social security systems, 
electoral district gerrymandering and attempts at utilising citizenship for purposes of 
demographic engineering, as they recognised that cross-sectarian civic or political 
cooperation is the biggest internal threat to regime survival 7, the Kuwaiti state, on the 
other hand has, at least in recent years, touted a fairly neutral line and tried to 
downplay sectarian sensibilities in light of key events. In particular the Emir and Crown 
Prince’s response following the 2011 Arab uprisings and more specifically the 2015 
Imam Sadeq Mosque bombing. The first attack of its kind by ISIS on Kuwaiti soil, the 
Emir and Crown Prince both offered their condolences at the funeral of the victims and 
pledged to rebuild the mosque whilst the Parliamentary Speaker called for unity and 
solidarity between Sunnis and Shias.8 
 
Therefore, it is important to recognise that both countries have sizeable Sunni and 
Shia populations with the notable distinction being that in Bahrain there is a Sunni 
minority in the form of the Al Khalifa monarchy that is holding onto power and is 
effectively propped up by their GCC neighbours, in the form of Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. Whereas in Kuwait there is a Sunni majority with a Sunni head of state. In terms 
of the demographic breakdown and at the time of the last census conducted in 2010, 
Bahrain's 1.2 million population were made up of 568,000 Bahrainis and 666,000 non-
                                                          
6 Civil Society. Oxforddictionaries.com. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/civil_society (accessed: 
June 16, 2017).  
7 Moore-Gilbert, Kylie, Sectarian Divide and Rule in Bahrain: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? Middle East Institute, 
https://www.mei.edu/content/map/sectarian-divide-and-rule-bahrain-self-fulfilling-prophecy , (accessed: June 
14, 2017) 
8 Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), "KUNA : Gov't honour Kuwaiti mosque blast victims as martyrs while bomber's 
driver is caught – Society – 28/06/2015". (accessed: June 27 2016)  
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nationals. Shia Bahrainis make up the majority of the population with two main ethnic 
groups: Ajam and Baharna. Most Shia Bahrainis in the country are Baharna, while the 
Ajam are ethnic Persian Shias, who have large communities in Muharraq and the 
capital, Manama.9 
 
Sunni Bahrainis are mostly urbanised Arabs (or al Arab) or Huwala. Urban Arabs in 
the country are mostly descended from Sunni Arabs from various parts of the Arabian 
Peninsula. They constitute the most influential ethnic group in the country with 
members of this group holding most senior positions in the Bahraini government. The 
Huwala are descended from Sunni Iranians and Sunni Arabs. With regards to many 
official estimates, religious affiliation in Bahrain currently stands at approximately 70% 
Shia Muslim, with the remaining 30% being principally Sunni Muslim, alongside 
various other minority faiths.10 However, due to policies such as the influx of 
naturalised migrant workers having a lasting impact on the sectarian demographic of 
the country, a more accurate reading would range closer to 55% Shia, and 45% Sunni 
respectively.  
 
In Kuwait, meanwhile, it has been estimated that in 2016 the population was around 
3.7 million. Expatriates account for about 70% of Kuwait's population, including 1.1 
million Arab expatriates and 1.4 million Asian expatriates. There are several native 
groups in Kuwait, including Arabs from Najd, Iraq, Bahrain and eastern Arabia, as well 
as ethnic Persians. The Baharna ethnic group is the indigenous people of Bahrain and 
the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, while the Najdis are Sunni Arabs from Najd in 
central Arabia. The clear majority of these native Kuwaiti communities are Muslim, 
with around 70% coming from the Sunni community and 30% being Shia.11  
 
Again, part of the rationale for observing these two case studies is that these countries 
have not been exempt from the cross-winds of sectarian polarisation within the Persian 
Gulf and the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, particularly in the 
                                                          
9 World Population Review. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bahrain-population/. (accessed: June 
15, 2017) 
10 Ibid. 
11 World Population Review. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kuwait-population/.  (accessed: June 
15, 2017) 
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wake of the 2003 Iraq War and more recently in the case of the 2011 Arab uprisings 
with the perceived “sectarianisation” of the Syrian conflict, and of course events in 
Bahrain, which was one of several countries to be engulfed by protests.12 
 
On the surface, and in the context of Bahrain, dominant regime-led narratives during 
the Arab uprisings via the state’s instrumentalising of sectarian rhetoric and policies 
are perceived to have practically facilitated a conflict along sectarian lines, with inter-
communal divisions being particularly discernable in the events that followed the 
February 14th 2011 protest movement and the subsequent crackdown by state security 
forces. On the other hand, initial impressions of Kuwait would signal a more stable 
political outlook, with the incumbent Emir often being portrayed as a neutral arbitrator 
between the various political-sectarian blocs and the country viewed as relatively 
immune to major protests, at least prior to the 2011 Arab uprisings which then gained 
notable traction between 2011-2013; in turn, the conventional wisdom would still imply 
that inter-communal relations in Kuwait are far more cordial than in other parts of the 
Middle East, notably in Syria, Iraq and Bahrain itself. 
  
These observations, however, cannot be sustained when domestic politics in both 
countries are viewed more scrupulously and once the emergence of an informal civic 
sector is taken into consideration. Indeed, the analysis of informal civil society will 
demonstrate a far less clear-cut picture of the current dynamic of state-societal and 
inter-communal relations in Bahrain and Kuwait, where informal civic spaces can 
occupy a role in which they can be equally culpable in exacerbating sectarian tensions, 
or they can serve as a model to undermining sectarian narratives, be they promulgated 
within the remit of the state or at the grassroots level. Why there is comparative merit 
in focusing on Bahrain and Kuwait therefore, is that the apparent difference in 
sectarian contestation in both countries is in part played out within the informal sector. 
By focusing on the role of informal civil society, this can change the commonly held 
perception that sectarian discourse can only be perpetuated (Bahrain) or countered 
by state elites (Kuwait). The influence of informal spaces in their ability to produce 
alternative discourses and counter state-sponsored narratives at the communal level 
                                                          
12 The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), The Gulf ’s Escalating Sectarianism, POMEPS Briefings 
28, (2016). 
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indicates that the sectarian undercurrent is in fact more pronounced in Kuwait than it 
is in the Bahraini context, despite both regimes adopting different approaches in 
dealing with their respective communities. In this context, the assumption that the 
ramifications of sectarianism and the trajectory of inter-communal relations being 
solely dependent on the strategies of the state ought to be revised. 
 
To understand the dynamics of sectarianism in both countries, exploring the role of 
informal spaces is significant for several reasons. First, informal political spaces have 
showcased their influence and political utility at various points in both Bahraini and 
Kuwaiti society, namely because they cannot be discredited in the way that formal 
civic actors have in recent times, which often act as an echo chamber for the ruling 
authorities to dominate and co-opt opposition movements and activities. A strategy 
more commonly known as state corporatism.13 Informal spaces, meanwhile, can in 
many cases circumvent the authoritarian state’s scope for interference, by operating 
within the private sphere and often go unchecked by state ministries that monitor 
CSOs. Likewise, such spaces have at times been utilised as an outpost for political 
mobilisation, and with it, inter-sectarian mobilisation. A pertinent example of which can 
be seen in the case of the Bahraini Majlis, an informal space usually located in the 
private confines of an individual’s home or community centre which has long occupied 
a prominent position in facilitating cross-communal movements in Bahrain’s modern 
history. This will become evident within findings from the empirical data. 
 
1.1 Research Questions and Objectives 
As highlighted above, this thesis seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature 
on sectarianism and the dynamics of inter-communal relations, as well as ongoing 
debates surrounding the role of civil society in the Gulf region. This will be done by 
assessing the role of traditional and emerging spaces that make up informal civil 
society, and whether they have become increasingly influential in creating a viable 
space for grassroots activism following the Arab uprisings. Secondly, it will gauge 
whether these informal spaces have given rise to sectarian discourse by providing a 
                                                          
13 Hertog, Steffen, “The New Corporatism in Saudi Arabia: Limits of Formal Politics” in Constitutional Reform and 
Political Participation in the Gulf, eds. Khalaf, Abdulhadi and Luciani, Giacomo, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, UAE, 
2006. 
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platform to vocalise divisive or hate-fueled rhetoric or whether individuals, be they 
prominent political figures, human rights activists or members of the public who have 
sought to downplay polarising narratives based on religious affiliation. The positive or 
counterproductive role each informal space occupies is often dependent on the type 
of space that is being analysed, as the thesis will observe various spaces that make 
up informal civil society in both countries. Finally, the thesis aims to expand on 
previous preliminary research conducted on civil society in the Gulf states, by forming 
a comparison between the various traditional and contemporary forms of informal 
spaces and moreover by establishing the linkages between their capacity for social 
and political mobilisation and the rising inter-communal tensions that have become 
pervasive within Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 
With that in mind, it is important to identify the central focus of this research, which is 
primarily concerned with the mode/s of expressions and the dynamics of informal civil 
society within Kuwait and Bahrain. There are three interrelated themes that will hereby 
be of interest when it comes to dissecting the empirical data that emerges out of the 
research topic. Firstly, the formation and response of the traditional, well-established 
informal space – such as the Kuwaiti diwaniyya or the Bahraini majlis, to the increasing 
salience of sectarian expressions in official state policies and state-dominated 
discourse. Secondly, the emergence and popularity of alternative modes of civil 
society that operate outside the recognised remit of formal CSOs, such as unaffiliated 
youth movements, non-registered human rights organisations, cultural exhibitions, 
workshops. In addition to his, observing their responses to the Arab uprisings and the 
increasing visibility of sectarian sentiment in the public space, namely through 
traditional and more recently social media platforms e.g. Facebook and Twitter, where 
polarising opinions are arguably more accessible to a broader audience. Thirdly, the 
relationship between informal spaces and formal civil society, how do they compare, 
and what are the key variables that distinguish them regarding their capacity to 
harmonise inter-communal relations and form cross-cutting opposition alliances 
towards the state.  
 
Following on from the research objectives spelled out above, and specifying the 
central themes of informal political spaces and sectarian relations, this thesis will 
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address the following two key research questions: To what extent have traditional and 
emerging informal political spaces/networks either mitigated or perpetuated sectarian 
sentiment in Kuwait and Bahrain, and if so, what are their reasons for carrying out 
such functions?  
 
This overarching research question will then serve as the foundation for the rest of the 
thesis, which shall be complemented by a series of sub-questions that will aid in 
addressing the research objectives. For example, how autonomous are informal 
political spaces from the state authorities and to what extent do they impact on formal 
politics in Kuwait and Bahrain? Do informal political spaces serve as a reflection of 
pre-existing or changing social attitudes between communities in Kuwait and Bahrain? 
Are cross-sectarian initiatives more apparent or visible in the traditional or emerging 
informal spaces? Or are they prominent in both depending on the context? How 
influential are informal political spaces in forming cross-denominational coalition ties 
or in initiating domestic reform programs, particularly those that have an impact on 
inter-communal relations? Have emerging spaces replaced the function of the 
traditional diwaniyya or majlis when it comes to dealing with issues pertaining to 
sectarianism? Finally, how are informal groups affected or influenced by the policies 
and actions taken by the authorities and other established CSOs when it comes to the 
issue of sectarianism? 
 
By incorporating informal political spaces as a central theme in understanding the 
dynamics of sectarianism in Bahrain and Kuwait, this thesis asserts that the 
instrumentalisation of sectarianism and the impact that it has had on inter-communal 
relations cannot be viewed solely through a top-down lens, which purports that it is all 
orchestrated by the state. Rather, the inclusion of an informal civic sector illustrates 
that there is a reciprocal relationship where sectarian tensions can be both 
exacerbated or mitigated, both at the state and communal levels. Indeed, what 
emerges from the findings of this thesis is that despite the Kuwaiti and Bahraini state 
adopting different containment strategies in trying to manage sectarianism, - with 
Bahrain taking a more assertively divisive approach, whilst the Kuwaiti state appears 
to take a seemingly reconciliatory position on the surface -  there are in fact diverging 
trajectories taking place in both contexts. Whereby communal tensions are surfacing 
15 
 
in Kuwait, with polarising opinions in both Sunni and Shi’i communities gaining more 
traction in the public sphere, whereas Bahraini communities are recuperating from the 
initial ruptures manufactured by the state in its response to the 2011 uprisings, with 
promising signs that there is scope for communal reconciliation and grassroots 
activism based on mutual concerns, such as Bahrain’s current housing crisis and the 
economic impact of migrant labour. All this, despite the regime’s approach which 
attempts to maintain inter-communal hostilities as a containment strategy. 
 
Albeit with few exceptions, what has become apparent is that Kuwait finds itself facing 
a bottom-up pressure whereby sectarian sentiment has become more pervasive 
across society and can be largely attributed to regional events in places like Syria, Iraq 
and Bahrain which have come to resonate in the domestic political sphere, despite 
their being a law in place that criminalises sectarian hate speech.14 Furthermore, the 
role of social media in providing a platform for traditionally marginal voices, from 
outspoken clerics to religious media channels that often provoke sectarian sensitivities 
has seen itself being reverberated in some of these informal spaces which altogether 
has only exacerbated sectarian tensions and can now be witnessed at the 
parliamentary level, as despite a positive legacy of regime-minority relations, this did 
not deter seven Shia parliamentarians in April 2015 to criticise the Kuwaiti state’s 
participation in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen on the grounds that it violates Kuwait’s 
constitutional prohibition on offensive war.15  
 
It is often perceived therefore that sectarianism has been getting gradually worse in 
the Gulf, but many analysts generally conceive of this solely as an international 
process and negate domestic or communal factors that have given rise to it.16 In 
Bahrain on the other hand, although there is a strong presence of regime-sponsored 
discourse in the public eye, particularly in its portrayal of the Shi’i community, the 
emergence and transformation of new and traditional informal spaces would indicate 
there are concerted bottom-up efforts towards rapprochement between Sunni and Shi’i 
                                                          
14 Matthiesen, Toby, The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), The Gulf ’s Escalating Sectarianism, 
POMEPS Briefings 28, (2016), p. 35. 
15 Colgan, Jeff, The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), The Gulf ’s Escalating Sectarianism, 
POMEPS Briefings 28, (2016), p. 43. 
16 Ibid.  
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denominations. This is done by utilising those very spaces to challenge some of the 
misconceptions produced by regime narratives at the grassroots level and to shed light 
and emphasise the mutual concerns that both Sunni and Shia communities are facing 
within Bahrain. 
 
1.2 Originality and Contribution  
Overall this research aims to contribute to the existing scholarship on two fronts. 
Firstly, it will contribute empirically by offering a comparative study of informal civil 
society and the dynamics of inter-communal relations in Kuwait and Bahrain. This will 
be the first of its kind as the research will draw parallels concerning the status of civil 
society between two Gulf states in what could only be considered as contrasting 
political scenarios following the 2011 Arab uprisings; one being situated in a country 
that was relatively immune to any major protests (Kuwait) and another still engulfed in 
daily protests until today (Bahrain).  
 
What is most significant to note, is not only do these two countries warrant an 
investigation on their own merit, but what is worthwhile with regards to this research 
is the comparison between the two countries, as Bahrain and Kuwait are two cases 
that are paradigmatic for how sectarianism is dealt with differently by the authorities in 
both countries yet both have a renowned informal civic sector. This is key to the 
rationale as to why these two countries have been selected and no other Gulf states, 
which shall be further justified in the following section on research design and 
methodology.  
 
Furthermore, this research will make a theoretical contribution, by demonstrating how 
existing debates surrounding civil society in the Middle East, particularly following the 
2011 Arab uprisings, needs to reconsider and ultimately prioritise the undertheorised 
aspects of informal civic activism, as the research will aim to highlight how informal 
political spaces have made their mark on civil society in the Gulf. By observing informal 
spaces under the wider rubric of civil society, the author maintains this research is 
treading on new ground as it aims to prove how not only do they have the capacity to 
influence local/domestic politics by way of downplaying or exacerbating sectarianism 
within communities in certain contexts, but to put forth the argument that unlike formal 
17 
 
civil society networks that prop up authoritarian rule, informal spaces are effectively 
filling the vacuum of recognised political opposition. In this context, it will be interesting 
to explore the extent to which these spaces can oppose or express 
concerns/grievances regarding policies at the institutional level.     
As alluded to, this thesis shall offer a new theoretical perspective on informal spaces 
and link them to the broader issue of sectarian politics. This will become evident 
throughout the theory chapter which incorporates pre-existing approaches to civil 
society from developmental studies such as the Rights-Based approach and the Multi-
Dimensional framework. These approaches will enable to pinpoint the various features 
of informal civil society and how the transition from an organisation-institutional 
concept to an arena-spatial understanding of civil society is more conducive to 
assessing what bearing they could have on sectarian relations and the ways in which 
they could be influencing sectarian discourse. In comparison to formal CSOs which 
can only serve to repeat state mantra and ultimately have much less agency. By 
incorporating an expanded definition of civil society, this thesis is providing an 
alternative means to which social and political mobilisation can be understood in the 
MENA context. Moreover, by exploring the utility of informal spaces, this offers a way 
in which civil society can be viewed in relation to the impact it has on sectarian relations 
as well as the way in which the state approaches the issue of sectarianism. As 
mentioned in the case of Yasir Habib, the state had to react to and ultimately appease 
protestors which ultimately led to the revoking of his citizenship and not the other way 
around with the state orchestrating such policies, which would be the case in Bahrain. 
All the more significant then, that the media outlets and space offered to such 
polarising voices as well as the counter-protestors in response, signals a need to look 
at the informal spaces that formulate discussions concerning Sunni and Shi’i 
communities.  
 
Secondly, this research will offer an empirical contribution to studies on civil society in 
the Gulf, by highlighting how the sectarianisation of politics has shaped and influenced 
informal civil society, and vice-versa how the discourse on sectarianism is being 
influenced by informal spaces. This will be examined in relation to the ideological state 
apparatus (or ISA) implemented by the authorities and whether those spaces are 
emulating or undermining such narratives. It is pertinent more than ever to observe 
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such spaces as the growing salience of sectarian identities and conflicts around the 
region is increasingly gaining traction within public consciousness. It becomes 
imperative, therefore, to observe informal spaces given their greater sense of 
autonomy to speak openly compared to their more formal counterparts. The informal 
sector can therefore be regarded as an ideal indicator of understanding how 
sectarianism is being perceived at the grassroots level and between communities. 
  
More broadly speaking, this thesis seeks to explore two principal research themes that 
are at the forefront of emerging debates within extant scholarship on MENA (Middle 
East and North Africa) politics. The first of these themes concerns the more 
established commentary and debates regarding the agency and utility of civil society 
actors in the MENA, particularly in undercutting or circumventing authoritarian modes 
of governance, particularly in the context of the Gulf region. The other theme concerns 
the emerging body of scholarship on sectarianism, sectarian relations and the 
perceived salience of transnational sectarian identities in recent decades and how the 
dynamics and expressions of state-societal relations are constructed by ostensibly 
sectarian policymaking as a regime survival strategy, and to what extent that then 
influences the trajectory of inter-communal relations.  
 
With sectarianism often being attributed to scholarship on identity politics, ethnic 
conflict and International Relations Theories, and discourse on civil society grounded 
in the literature on democratisation and authoritarianism, it is apparent that seldom 
have these two areas of research ever been observed in relation to one another. 
Moreover, the recent scholarship that does exist on sectarianism has only been 
explored through the lens of instutionalised politics, but it is yet to be seen how 
sectarianism and sectarian relations is influenced by the informal sector. The 
significance of observing such spaces is to show how them being insulated from the 
state offers the scope to reinvent prevalent sectarian narratives and discourses, for 
example by the state, or by social media platforms.  
 
This thesis is therefore positioned at the intersection of two core research themes 
which are civil society’s engagement with and approaches to sectarian discourse in 
Bahrain and Kuwait. In doing so, this research shall be able to re-examine some of the 
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normative assumptions and claims posited by previous scholars as the empirical focus 
of this thesis will be on the relatively undertheorised notion of informal civil society. 
  
It is also important to recognise that to showcase the thesis’s contribution to existing 
scholarship, it is necessary to first problematise the issue within current discourse 
surrounding the formation of sectarian identity and its political expediency for Gulf 
States to use as a containment strategy. With that in mind, it would be conducive to 
review how sectarianism has in the past been theorised in the context of the Middle 
East. Firstly, there are advocates of the orientalist and primordialist depictions of 
sectarianism which can be noted for instance within the works of Islamic historians 
such as Bernard Lewis. Lewis attributes religious schisms within the MENA to Islamic 
societies throughout history having acquired a prolonged and well-documented 
experience with religious sectarianism, and corroborates this claim by highlighting how 
Islam was politicised from its very beginnings. In addition, Lewis promoted a view 
which held sectarian identity as a permanent and historically rooted quality that has 
always been at the focal point of Middle Eastern politics.17 This narrative becomes 
particularly significant to this body of research when Lewis concludes that “Shi’ism 
essentially became the expression in religious terms of opposition to the state and the 
established order, acceptance of which meant conformity to Sunni or mainstream 
Islamic doctrine.”18  
 
Contrasting this narrative, are critical theorists who have sought to demystify the 
Orientalist conception of denominational identity constantly being at the forefront of 
politics in Muslim-majority societies, one of whom is Augustus Richard Norton in his 
volume, The Shi’ite Threat Revisited. Norton plays down the Orientalist stance of 
presupposed sectarian divisions and with it the ancient origins of Islamic schisms 
impacting politics, by emphasising that merely less than a century ago, sectarian 
affiliation was neither a particularly important marker of faith nor an important basis for 
political action. In other words, religious denominations did not qualify to being a pre-
requisite in the formation of political affiliations even within the relatively recent history 
                                                          
17 Lewis, Bernard, The Arabs in History, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 
18 Ibid, p.73.  
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of the Middle East.19 On the contrary, scholars such as Norton and others, Shmuel 
Bar for example20 have claimed there were several initiatives towards ‘taqarub’, or 
what is known as rapprochement, between faith communities in previous eras and in 
more recent times under a unifying political ideology. In this context, the advent of 
nationalism and Pan-Arabism following the emergence of the post-colonial state would 
appear to be most applicable. Norton therefore concludes that the “assumption of an 
unbridgeable gulf between the sects is a contemporary prejudice.”21 
 
It appears that the main contention between both accounts pertains to when and how 
inter-communal tensions became a prevalent factor in response to the broader subject 
of political reform. Likewise, more recent scholarship on sectarian politics in the Gulf 
would attest to Norton’s thesis, highlighting specific turning points in which 
sectarianism became prominent across the region. Frederic Wehrey, author of 
‘Sectarian Politics in the Gulf’, for instance, pinpoints to the 2003 U.S-led invasion of 
Iraq as well as the domestic and regional implications of the 2010-11 Arab uprisings 
as key turning points in determining the rise of more pronounced sectarian identities 
and with it, ensuing conflicts in the region being perceived through sectarian 
nomenclature.22 The ‘politics of sectarianism’ – an expression to describe how 
sectarian differences are exploited primarily for political gains, can be intrinsically 
linked back to the institutional weaknesses within Gulf States, in that they are having 
to resort to accentuating sectarian tensions in an attempt to deflect criticism or 
perceived hostility towards the state.23  
 
According to Wehrey, sectarian identity has assumed greater prominence and visibility 
at various points in modern history. Elites have instrumentalised it, and ordinary 
citizens have defined themselves by it, at the expense of excluding other affinities that 
could potentially aid in undermining state-led narratives and policies.  In this regard, 
                                                          
19 Norton, Augustus Richard, The Shi’ite Threat Revisited, Current History, December 2007. 
20 Bar, Shmuel, Sunnis and Shiites: Between Rapprochement and Conflict, Hudson Institute, 
https://www.hudson.org/research/9842-sunnis-and-shiites-between-rapprochement-and-conflict , (accessed: 
May 22, 2016) 
21 Norton, Augustus Richard, The Shi’ite Threat Revisited, Current History, December 2007, p.436. 
22 Wehrey, Frederic M. Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings. Columbia 
University Press, 2014. 
23 Ibid. 
21 
 
sectarianism is therefore solely viewed as a symptom of longstanding deficits in Gulf 
governance and the unequal distribution of political and social capital.24 
 
As mentioned above, scholars dealing with International Relations theory as well as 
recent media discourse would point to key events such as Iraq War of 2003, the Arab 
Uprisings of 2010-11 and, prior to that, the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a way of 
understanding both the salience of sectarian identities and the exacerbating of 
sectarian tensions, and with it the emergence of Pan-Islamism and the subsequent 
impact Islamist politics would come to have on a transnational scale, as Jeff Colgan 
notes, “The last decade has deepened the sectarian divide, but it was politically 
activated much earlier, in a contest between rival narratives of legitimacy. In the 1960s 
and 70s, the Saudi government wanted to use pan-Islamism to counter Nasser’s pan-
Arabism. When oil revenues boomed following 1973, the Gulf monarchies poured 
money into mosques and organizations like the World Muslim League. The influx of 
oil money came just at the wrong moment, when leaders and elites were looking for 
ways to politicize Islam. The Saudis later regretted that strategy after the Iranian 
revolution took pan-Islamism in a new anti-royalist direction.”25 Again, these claims are 
used to explain how geo-political rivalries, such as in the case of Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, have only served to amplify sectarian sentiment and hostilities via proxy 
warfare.26  
 
Like the 2003 Iraq War, and to a lesser extent the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, 
Syria’s internecine conflict following the 2011 Arab uprisings, and more recently the 
GCC-led intervention in Yemen have enabled Gulf ruling monarchs, media 
commentators, religious clerics, parliamentarians and activists to invoke and amplify 
Sunni-Shi’i identities, often for objectives that are rooted in power politics and 
hegemony-seeking.  
 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Colgan, Jeff, The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), The Gulf ’s Escalating Sectarianism, 
POMEPS Briefings 28, (2016), p. 42. 
26 Al-Jazeera,  Reality Check: The myth of a Sunni-Shia War,  
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2015/11/reality-check-myth-sunni-shia-war-
151121105751227.html , (accessed: May 8, 2016) 
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Not to refute or discount this explanation outright, it does however have its historical 
inconsistencies when cross-examined with the selected case studies of Kuwait and 
Bahrain. Despite sectarianism not being perceived as a salient identity marker, what 
becomes apparent in the context of these Gulf States, is that ostensibly sectarian 
policies and ‘banal’, or loosely defined as everyday societal sectarianism was, and 
continued to be, a lived reality for decades prior to the Iranian Revolution, even in an 
era of supposed religious rapprochement where inter-sect marriages between Sunni 
and Shi’i communities were once considered to be more commonplace for example. 
This will become evident from the empirical data when informed research respondents 
for this thesis document policies of naturalisation up until the present day in Bahrain 
but also from the 60s and 70s in Kuwait which granted Saudi citizens dual nationality 
and would ultimately alter the demographic make-up of the country, or gerrymandering 
policies to change electoral boundaries in past and recent elections as well as other 
isolated incidents, e.g. the imposition of specific levies on religious communities in 
Bahrain throughout the 1920s. These moments are all testament to a neglected 
account of history in the region. 
 
Not to pander to primordialist accounts or wholly complement the existing IR laden 
narratives that place extensive emphasis on how sectarianism is utilised by regime 
elites, this thesis will therefore depart from both by affording agency to domestic non-
state actors operating within informal civil society/political spaces that are overlooked 
by extant scholarship. As such, it aims to provide the potential scope for an alternative 
account of how sectarianism has been instrumentalised in Kuwait and Bahrain. This 
is not to discount existing top-down narratives of how sectarianism is utilised by 
authoritarian regimes, but rather to demonstrate, how the regime’s use of the 
Ideological state apparatus (ISA) – that is, the tools at the state’s disposal to propagate 
government-sponsored narratives pertaining to sectarianism, as well as the 
performative functions of informal civil society indicate that there is a reciprocal 
relationship and at times self-serving function in the dissemination of sectarian rhetoric 
at the discursive level, which overall influences the trajectory of sectarian relations.  
 
By specifically addressing how sectarianism plays out at the grassroots level vis-à-vis 
informal civil society, this research will be able to complement existing commentary on 
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civil society and to identify possible openings in domestic politics and more crucially, 
cross-communal political participation in the Gulf that could potentially serve as an 
existential threat to the states in question.  
Given that events in the region are constantly being framed through a sectarian lens, 
it would be suffice to say that research into informal political spaces is more pertinent 
than ever, as it will offer an indication as to where regime narratives gain traction and 
can even garner support for its policies or on the other hand fails to resonate with its 
citizens and can ultimately lead to a backlash. This will demonstrate whether informal 
civil society has marked its influence over institutional actors in a bid to curtail and/or 
arbitrate on matters pertaining to inter-communal tension or on the contrary whether 
they augment the fraying co-operation and the perceived trust deficit between 
denominations.  
 
In addition, it is important to acknowledge why informal spaces ought to be researched 
in the first place. Their analysis will not only complement existing scholarship on civil 
society within the MENA, but it is crucial to understand their role particularly in the post 
Arab Spring era. More recently, some of these spaces have acquired the ability to 
inject new ideas for reform into the public realm, and to act as an intermediary force 
between formal CSO actors and local communities. In that respect, it would be 
valuable to understand whether these informal spaces are now vying to fill the vacuum 
of active political opposition which in the context of both Bahrain and Kuwait, has been 
curtailed and largely suppressed through various legal and extra-legal means which 
shall be detailed in the background chapter.  
 
This research will therefore contribute to extant scholarship by shedding light on 
alternative modes of activism which not only counter an ineffective and largely co-
opted formal civil society sector, but to also assess whether the Kuwaiti and Bahraini 
governments themselves are implementing any proposals or initiatives that originated 
from amongst the informal space itself. If there is evidence of this taking place, then 
current understandings of civil society in the MENA will need to acknowledge the 
collective impact informal civil society can potentially have on domestic politics and 
ultimately towards reform processes in both countries. If not, it will likewise be just as 
significant to understand what is inhibiting the informal spaces from being effective in 
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pushing through reforms and facilitating cross-communal coalitions that can challenge 
the existing state apparatus or whether they too, are falling into the same trappings as 
formal civil society.  
Furthermore, by addressing the role of both the traditional informal spaces, such as 
the diwaniyyat and majalis, as well as the upcoming youth societies and pop-up 
workshops/exhibitions, this research will be able to shed light on whether they have 
served to amplify the most polarising voices to an extent that they could even radicalise 
segments of both communities’ youth, or alternatively provide political activists with 
another means of cross-sectarian networking that circumvent governmental efforts to 
control or limit such activities gaining momentum.  
 
In addition, it is important to note that little has been documented on the relationship 
between formal civil society organisations (CSOs) and informal spaces and how they 
can be incorporated under the broader umbrella of civil society actors. This thesis will 
therefore offer a theoretical contribution by providing an alternative outlook as to how 
civil society can be studied within Bahrain and Kuwait. Moreover, by linking these 
spaces to the prevailing issue of sectarianism, this thesis will focus on the domestic 
implications of instituionalised sectarianism and its impact on inter-communal 
relations, as opposed to complementing existing debates which have often sought to 
analyse sectarianism by conflating the issue with broader politics pertaining to 
international relations and institutional politics. 
  
To add further credence to the originality of this research, Asef Bayat’s Uncivil Society: 
The Politics of the ‘informal’ People, quite accurately pinpoints to the ‘belittled’ or 
‘ignored’ forms of un-institutionalised social activities that have dominated developing 
countries. In addition, he points out the significance of informal spaces in contributing 
to the debate on civil society and how these modes of participation can in fact be more 
constructive in airing social grievances of certain sectors of Kuwaiti and Bahraini 
society compared to their institutionalised and ‘apolitical’ counterpart. Again, this point 
bares importance with respect to the sectarian dimension, in addressing the question 
of how sectarian sentiment is possibly shaping the views and current issues being 
circulated throughout the broad spectrum of informal political spaces and vice-versa.  
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Bayat goes on to argue that without intending to downgrade the value of ‘civility’, the 
reductionism of the debates on ‘civil society’ and how civil society discourse is 
traditionally perceived to be Eurocentric, has ultimately construed civil society in 
relational terms to the state. This, if anything, is having a counter-productive effect on 
modes of political participation in the developing world, as Bayat claims the dismissal 
of informal spaces in the extant literature on civil society not only excludes but scorns 
modes of struggles and expression, which, in some societies like those in the Middle 
East, are more extensive and effective than conventional institutions outside the 
state.27  
 
Another observer of informal political spaces is Mary-Ann Tetreault within the chapter 
Bottom-up Democratisation of Kuwait from the book Stories of Democracy: Politics 
and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. She argues that rather than a process of top-
down liberalisation, which is seen to be customary in other Arab monarchies; Kuwaiti 
reform has taken a divergent path, despite the royal family not taking an interest in 
reform. She adds that the concept of indigenous democratisation has been greatly 
neglected in academic and popular literature because many analysts simply do not 
see its presence. Tetreault specifically cites the country’s diwaniyyat as being the 
quintessential institution of civil society, given that it occupies a special political space 
because the traditional location of diwaniyyat being in the home insulates it from state 
intervention.  
 
However, where this research will fit into this relatively scarce body of literature on 
informal politics and expand on Tetreault’s findings is in analysing the way in which 
these spaces have developed over time and by looking at the evolution of the 
diwaniyya in some cases into muntadas (political forums) where the thesis will assess 
to what extent they are still cut off from state meddling or whether the emergence of 
the increasingly transparent and politicised diwaniyya mark the starting point in a 
period of state-recognised opposition within Kuwait and Bahrain. In addition to this, as 
Tetreault was specifically referring to the Kuwaiti context, this research will also be the 
first of its kind to physically conduct field research on Bahraini informal political spaces 
and form a comparative study of both case designs.   
                                                          
27 Bayat, Asef, Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the ‘Informal’ People, London, Routledge, 1997.  
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Another note to add is that, in contradistinction to Bayat and Tetreault’s observations, 
this research will look to observe the gradual evolution of traditional spaces and on 
what grounds did the contemporary spaces form. Therefore, the research will look in 
depth into the nature and role of these political arenas and assess the exact turning 
points as to when and why they became politically active and moreover how these 
‘informal’ affiliations would become a pivotal factor in the ongoing debate concerning 
the salience of sectarianism and sectarian attitudes within the Kuwaiti and Bahraini 
public sphere. By bringing informal political spaces into the framework, particularly in 
the wake of the Arab uprisings, this will be able to present a challenge to the 
conventional wisdom on Gulf civil society being relatively quiescent when it comes to 
political activism.  
 
Simultaneously, the rise of social media in organising demonstrations and meetings 
has paved the way for youth societies/networks to establish themselves within the 
arena of ‘free-form or informal activism’.28 Kinninmont and Sirri suggest that many 
young people, not only within the MENA but throughout the globalised world, cease to 
see relevance of state-based politics, or state-orientated activism, and are no longer 
finding meaning in opportunities for traditional modes of affiliation and participation.29  
 
As a result, debates have emerged regarding the issue of youth disengagement from 
political and civil life, as evidenced by conventional measures such as low voter 
turnout and reduced membership in associations. However, many critics are now 
pointing to new modes of participation exemplified by anti-corporate globalisation 
movements and growth of virtual communities. It has become more common to look 
at spectacular examples of new activism amongst youth as evidence of a generational 
shift towards unstructured and postmodern politics.30  
 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 Kinninmont, Jane, and Omar Sirri. Bahrain: Civil Society and Political Imagination. London: Chatham House, 
MENA Programme, 2014. 
30 Harris, Anita, Wyn, Johanna, & Younes, Salem, Beyond Apathetic or Activist Youth: ‘Ordinary’ young people 
and contemporary forms of participation, Nordic Journal of Youth Research, Sage Publications, 2010, Vol 18, No. 
1, p.10.   
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To summarise, the research will therefore look at how youth societies and networks 
utilise social media as an opening to engage in domestic politics and how the 
accessibility of such platforms has paved the way for a new brand of social activism 
that appeals particularly to younger generations, who in recent times perceive 
themselves to be politically and economically marginalised. The research will also 
probe further into who exactly comprises of these networks and will delve into some 
of the ideological motivations of emerging spaces that are specifically catering for 
youth.  
 
As mentioned, the research will distinguish itself by incorporating informal spaces into 
broader civil society discourse, offer a comparative study by assessing their utility in 
the context of Bahrain and Kuwait where they are becoming an increasingly 
predominant feature of civic life, and evidence its originality by exploring their 
interaction with pressing issues of the day that have served to impede effective political 
participation and reforms. In this case, it is the issue of sectarianism and the ways in 
which they have approached the topic and how it has manifested in physical terms. 
 
1.3 Research Design and Methodology  
One of the primary justifications for the selected case studies is that both Bahrain and 
Kuwait share a similar case design in many ways and are therefore applicable to the 
research aims and objectives. Both GCC states are in relatively close geographic 
proximity, both countries have a similar political model in that they are constitutional 
monarchies or emirates with Sunni monarchs as the heads of state. Both possess 
similar laws and implement similar extra-legal measures pertaining to grassroots 
activism, this will be evident in the background chapter which focuses on both nations’ 
handling of CSOs. Both countries are also home to sizeable Sunni and Shi’i 
communities which makes the discussion on the sectarian dynamic and its interaction 
with civil society actors all the more pertinent. However, despite the similarities in case 
design, there are two notable distinctions which made observing these two countries 
even more important, and that is, acknowledging the different sectarian demography, 
with Bahrain having a Shia majority, whilst Kuwait holds a majority Sunni population. 
In addition to the various types of informal spaces operating in both countries, these 
factors will shed light on some key distinctions in the way state-societal relations 
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function in both countries and more importantly how authorities and local communities 
utilise and respond to events or policies that are construed in sectarian terms.  
 
Kuwait is an intriguing case study to explore as it has had a rather notable and 
prolonged relationship with the traditional diwaniyya, and moreover the political 
transformation the space has undergone in recent years following the specific turning 
points within Kuwaiti and MENA history, referring back to key events that have 
previously marred inter-communal relations including the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraq 
war of 2003 and the recent Arab uprisings of 2011. Bahrain also constitutes an 
important case study in the wake of the Arab revolts that took their toll on the country 
itself, as the legitimate demands of protest movements seems to underscore prevalent 
sectarian influences that are both pro- and anti- constitutional reform. Therefore, 
Bahrain is an intriguing case to see what impact informal political spaces are having 
on inter-communal relations. In addition to this, little has yet been written on Bahrain’s 
own informal political spaces, the long existence of their own version of the diwanniya 
known more broadly in the Gulf as majalis, which the research will aim to investigate 
the possible reasons as to why they may not be as prominent as their Kuwaiti 
counterpart, within academic literature.  
 
Another important factor that had to be taken into consideration is the feasibility or the 
scope of the research project itself, and in particular, the omission of other GCC states 
from this study. To clarify this point, it should be noted that the author is aware of the 
development of informal spaces within Saudi Arabia, which likewise boasts a similar 
tradition of having its own and intellectual salons, despite these spaces operating 
within a political environment that is narrowly circumscribed.31 In addition, because 
research conditions are comparatively so much more difficult in Saudi Arabia, the 
country was not included in further analysis as it simply would not be feasible in terms 
of obtaining viable contacts and furthermore, state authorities in Saudi Arabia can be 
somewhat scrupulous in terms of visa entry when it comes to external researchers 
and this could cause further complications to the quality of research that could 
                                                          
31 Matthiesen, Toby, Diwaniyyas, Intellectual Salons, and the Limits of Civil Society, Middle East Institute, 
https://www.mei.edu/content/diwaniyyat-intellectual-salons-and-limits-civil-society?print (accessed: August 
14, 2015). 
29 
 
potentially be obtained were the author unable to access certain areas of the country 
for instance.  
Such logistical issues were also part of the rationale as to why the other GCC states 
were not selected as case studies. Comparing six states would be both time 
consuming and labour intensive in terms of practically carrying out fieldwork in each 
country as well as transcribing the data. A comparison of the two states therefore, was 
seen to be much more feasible and again applicable to the research aims and 
objectives that were initially set.  
 
In terms of data, the thesis draws on a range of primary and secondary sources 
ranging from scholarly contributions that specifically deal with theory surrounding the 
central themes of informal political spaces, civil society and sectarianism. This also 
includes looking at more subject specific books within the context of Kuwait and 
Bahrain and cross-referencing scholars with regards to central themes of the research, 
as well as touching upon informal society in a broader, global context to draw some 
parallels in observation. 
 
In terms of secondary sources, this research has utilised a plethora of scholarly works 
pertaining to the chosen research themes, typical bodies of scholarship include those 
working on civil society in the Middle East and International Relations (I.R.) 
approaches to sectarianism. This is supplemented by a host of policy papers and 
reports from various think tanks including the likes of Brookings Institute, Chatham 
House, Carnegie Endowment and the Middle East Institute. They have sought to 
project the future trajectory of state-societal relations in GCC states and the role civil 
society may occupy within these countries.  
 
The research project was conducted via direct and indirect (in the form of online 
discussions) contact with research respondents. The primary research comprised of 
fifteen interviews in Bahrain (four majalis, two informed outside observers, eight 
youth/human rights societies, and a civil society group.) and twelve interviews in 
Kuwait (eight various diwaniyyat and four informed outside observers). This research 
took place over the duration of six weeks across Bahrain and Kuwait throughout May 
and June 2014, with follow-up interviews online in 2015. The number of research 
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participants altogether ranged from approximately 30-40 research participants in total, 
and this number was adequate enough in terms of elaborating upon the information 
obtained from the interviews whilst being able to detect anomalies.32 
 
In terms of primary sources, the method of inquiry was based on qualitative research; 
therefore, the nature of the field work was conducted in the form of semi-structured in-
depth interviewing and focus groups. This is important from an epistemological 
standpoint as the research is pertaining to abstract concepts such as sentiment and 
attitudes of individual participants and therefore qualitative analysis would be more 
conducive than quantitative. By applying both secondary and primary sources in the 
form of scholarly discourse, policy papers/media reports as well as the empirical data 
itself would altogether aid in corroborating the findings and observations that have 
emerged from this study. 
 
As little prior research has been done on this subject, the author decided to take an 
inductive approach to the research, having a tentative hypothesis in mind, but 
consciously acknowledging that these preliminary ideas would be subject to change 
and would enable the researcher to formulate concrete theories and observations 
following the transcription of the data.  
 
The justifications for using semi-structured interviewing are therefore several. For one, 
by having set questions, whilst having the ability to alter or probe further into questions, 
the chances are better to develop a positive rapport between interviewer and 
interviewee throughout the conversation, which often enables the participant to feel 
more comfortable in disclosing relevant information.33 It also produces better quality 
responses, in that the participant can talk in detail and disclose the meanings behind 
a certain action and is able to speak with little direction from the interviewer. This 
essentially opens the conversation to ideas/thoughts/events that have not been 
considered by the author prior to the interview. In addition, complex questions and 
issues can be discussed or clarified, as the interviewer can probe into areas suggested 
by the respondent’s answers, extracting information that had either not occurred to the 
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interviewer or of which the interviewer had no prior knowledge.34 Another potential 
issue that was mitigated by applying semi-structured focused interviews is the matter 
of pre-judgement. With having only a few carefully selected ‘set-questions’, the 
interviewer is not pre-judging what is and what is not important or relevant information. 
  
In terms of focus groups, it was important to opt for focus groups as oppose to 
employing participant observations. When observing group discussions, there were 
several advantages that focus groups could offer which participant observations are 
unable to achieve. The most apparent factor in focus groups is the authoritative role 
of the moderator; this ensured that the group conversation could retain its research 
focus, whilst simultaneously encouraging participant engagement without one 
individual dominating the meeting. Why this is important to bear in mind, is that when 
it comes to group observation, one issue that may have arose is that research 
participants may be discussing a topic that is unrelated to the questions that were 
intended to be addressed. However, by using focus groups instead, this enabled to 
determine the course of the conversation and to retain its focus on the topic of 
sectarianism and inter-communal relations.  
 
Another advantage of focus group settings was the ability of group participants to 
interact with one another. This entails that when the participants were stimulated to 
discuss a certain issue, the group dynamics could generate new thinking about a topic 
which can then result in a much more in-depth discussion.35 Likewise, the dynamic 
nature of the methodology means the moderator could modify the topics, which are 
prepared before the session to make the topic more suitable for the purpose. 
 
Another factor which was important particularly when discussing more contentious 
topics, was the ability to utilise non-verbal communication as a researcher input. 
Therefore the expression, the attitude of an individual, the intensity of the conversation 
itself etc could be perceived by the researcher, which can modify the moderator’s 
decision and can be counted in the research result. Finally, because every participant 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
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was under observation by the moderator and everybody knew the process was being 
recorded, it became somewhat easier to make participants fully engage even during 
non-discussion time.  
 
Why focus groups were important to this research were for its emphasis on insights 
rather than rules. In that a focus group can provide trustworthy data that also lead to 
important insights about human behaviours by allowing all participants to say anything 
they would like in front of the whole group. Meanwhile, researchers listen not only for 
the content of discussions but observe something beyond talking, such as tone and 
emotions which help them to learn or confirm not only the facts but the meaning behind 
those facts.36  
 
The notable distinction between the focus groups and the interviews carried out was 
that the former took place within the informal space itself (be it the dewanniya or 
majlis). Therefore, the focus group took the form of a group discussion, typical of any 
conversation taking place within those spaces, where participants could agree, 
disagree or interject other research participants. What distinguishes these focus group 
discussions from ethnographic observations for example, was in the fact that the 
researcher was dictating the questions to research participants who would then 
discuss the questions amongst themselves. This would differ from the more 
conventional interviews with informed outside observers as it would take place on a 
one-to-one basis with semi-structured questions forming the basis of the interview.  
 
The rationale for omitting formal CSOs from the data gathering was in the admission 
that many of the participants, be it in the form of focus group discussions or outside 
observers, were already active members of recognised associations. Therefore, this 
potential issue is mitigated as many of the participants could already speak 
authoritatively on the issue of formal civil society. Furthermore, and linking to the 
broader thesis, the presence of such research participants showcases the cross-
fertilisation that is taking place between formal and informal civil society, and how 
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these informal spaces can be viewed as socially and politically expedient, depending 
on the time and context.  
 
In terms of the time frame for analysis, the research observes informal spaces in 
parallel with key moments in the modern history of sectarianism within the Gulf. 
Although spaces such as the diwaniyyat have been around since time immemorial in 
the traditional respect, the research explores how informal spaces operated in relation 
to sectarian ruptures both domestically and on a regional level. The research will aim 
to start from the 1980s when inspired by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, many Khaleeji 
(people from the Gulf) Shi’ites sought to increase political mobilisation and demanded 
further social freedoms from their respective governments to alleviate their status as 
a disenfranchised minority/majority. The research also looked at the impact the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait had on informal spaces in the 1990s, and more recently from 2003 
onwards. This timeframe was set with a view to assess what steps or measures 
informal spaces have made in the last decade in order to curtail or exacerbate 
sectarian tension between religious communities within the Gulf.  
 
The author would like to note that this thesis has addressed all the ethical issues within 
the ethical review application and likewise within the risk assessment which have been 
submitted to the faculty wherein both were accepted, the safety and wellbeing of both 
research participants and the author were considered in both these applications.  
Risks that had to be addressed were namely concerning data storage and 
confidentiality of research participants. All research interviews were safeguarded by 
being carefully uploaded onto the universities’ security-encrypted N-Drive server and 
confidentiality of the research participants was ensured by anonymising the identities 
of all research participants. The data was transcribed manually from a Dictaphone and 
then analysed either via Word Document or more often in written paper format for sake 
of practicalities, as it enabled the author to make instant comments in response to 
relevant observations or comments by the research participants. This information was 
then organised into key common themes (e.g. location of space, scope of autonomy, 
the role of the state, the role of media etc) that were extrapolated from the data and 
would go on to form the basis of each section that made up the empirical chapters. 
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
The thesis itself is organised into eight chapters, including the introduction. Chapter 2 
reviews the existing bodies of literature pertaining to the research at hand. These 
include extant literature on civil society in GCC states, the literature on civil society in 
the MENA region more broadly, and scholarship on the emergence and role of informal 
societal spaces and groupings in the Gulf region. The literature review serves as a 
reflection of the ongoing academic debates pertaining to civil society in the MENA 
region. It focuses on certain theories that have developed and subsequently shaped 
understandings of the role of civil society, the propensity towards authoritarian rule 
and how civil society is utilised in that respect, and the proliferation of sub- and supra-
state identities due to key turning points in recent years, most notably what entailed 
the 2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Arab uprisings. 
 
Chapter 3 then proposes theoretical lenses through which it is possible to explore the 
research questions posed and the empirical data gathered. These lenses combine the 
notion of the Ideological State Apparatus and incorporates elements of theory 
grounded in developmental studies; the rights-based approach (RBA) and the multi-
dimensional framework which are centred on the utility of space/location and the 
discussions that arise from those spaces themselves. Again, this approach departs 
from traditional notions of civil society, which have too often focused on organisations. 
By applying these frameworks, this provided the research with a means to broaden 
the perceived requisites as to what can be treated as civil society. 
 
Following on from this, Chapter 4 provides further insights into the nature and role of 
Kuwaiti and Bahrain informal spaces, how they compare to one another, the various 
types of informal spaces that exist in both countries, and where they fit within the 
broader context of civil society. It also explores the dynamics of state-societal relations 
and their impact on formal civil organisations as well as the legal framework that formal 
CSOs operate in, in contrast to informal political spaces. 
 
The background chapter is then followed by three empirical chapters which seek to 
offer a snapshot of the various ways in which informal civil society functions in its 
approach to sectarian relations in both Bahrain and Kuwait. The key themes that arose 
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from the empirical data collated by the author are 1) the location of such spaces, 2) 
the activities research participants partake in and 3) what those spaces represent to 
people who actively participate within them. Chapter 5 incorporates these themes by 
focusing on the operationalisation of the informal space and with it, the emphasis on 
locality and the specific activities partaken within the informal space itself. 
 
Taking a top-down perspective, Chapter 6 then explores the prevailing sectarian 
narratives that have been perpetuated at the state level and in wider society, and to 
examine how the Kuwaiti and Bahraini regimes have sought to reinforce their own 
ISA’s through several themes that emerged from the empirical data. Those themes 
being the impact and role external/regional events are having at a domestic level and 
the role that education and media have played in public discourse. 
 
Chapter 7 is the final empirical chapter which explores the traditional and emerging 
informal spaces under the broader rubric of civil society within Kuwait and Bahrain and 
linking it back to theoretical contributions by assessing whether informal spaces can 
be positioned within this broader framework or whether informal civil society should be 
defined as something completely distinct from traditional civil society organisations in 
the Gulf. More pertinent to the research aims and objectives, this chapter sets out to 
examine at what juncture informal spaces could be influencing sectarian discourse, 
and what active steps are being taken at the grassroots more broadly in addressing 
the increasingly pertinent issue of sectarianism in both countries.  
 
Finally, a conclusion that brings together the key observations and arguments that can 
be taken away from the research collated while conducting fieldwork in Kuwait and 
Bahrain and assessing whether there is scope for further analysis into informal civil 
society in the Middle East. 
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2. Literature Review 
Given that this thesis is concerned with the role of informal political spaces and the 
relationship/impact it has on inter-communal relations, this chapter will set out to 
review the existing bodies of literature pertaining to the study at hand. These include 
1) the extant civil society literature on GCC states, 2) The literature on civil society in 
the MENA region more broadly, and 3) scholarship on the emergence and role of 
informal societal spaces and groupings in the Arab world/Gulf region.  
 
What becomes apparent throughout existing scholarship on these chosen themes, is 
that there is an extensive coverage of formal civil society in general, and this has been 
debated and observed namely through the lens of democratisation; with the notion 
that civil society can act as a conduit to bring about democratic change and reforms 
within the MENA region and the other scholarly body being centred around 
authoritarian resilience, which takes a look at the mechanisms at the state’s disposal 
to co-opt and render civil society ineffective and can even buttress authoritarian rule. 
Considering these debates, what is evident is that there has been little reference made 
to the existence and emergence of an informal civil society, not at least in the 
commentary on civil society in the MENA region or more specifically within the Gulf 
States. Furthermore, what has been presented, has rarely, if ever, addressed civil 
society vis-à-vis inter-communal relations or the issue of sectarianism and the 
formation of sectarian articulations.  
 
Conversely, examining the literature on sectarianism, the debates are often framed 
via primordialist or instrumentalist approaches, with the former body dominated by 
orientalist scholars who forward the idea of sectarianism being an impermeable 
feature of societies in the Middle East, alluding to the idea that sectarian expressions 
and contestations are almost a self-fulfilled prophecy or an inevitable reality. Whereas 
in an attempt to demystify sectarianism, advocates of the instrumentalist approach, 
often posited by International Relations (I.R) scholars, take a top-down perspective on 
sectarianism by presenting contemporary points of rapprochement and division as 
evidence to suggest that inter-communal tensions are in fact a contemporary prejudice 
born of out greater power machinations and can be reconciled as oppose to being 
perceived as some unbridgeable gulf.  
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With that in mind, this research has identified a gap within existing debates by looking 
to identify civil society’s engagement and interaction with sectarianism and sectarian 
discourse, something which neither approach has sought to observe. Furthermore, by 
shedding light on the relationship between civil society and sectarianism, this will 
account for the bottom-up forces that can potentially influence and contribute to the 
trajectory and perception of sectarian relations in certain contexts, in this case, Bahrain 
and Kuwait, which has been explored by focusing on the agency of informal civic 
spaces. 
 
Firstly, it is important to observe some of the classical works that have investigated 
state formation in Bahrain and Kuwait and how it informs some of the key research 
themes for this thesis. One of which is how sectarian dynamics has impacted the 
trajectory of inter-communal perceptions over the course of the states’ founding. F I 
Khuri in his seminal 1980 work on Tribe and State in Bahrain, documents how the 
modern state of Bahrain had been built on the military submission of the native Arab 
Shia Baharna population. This was carried out by a coalition of Sunni tribes from the 
centre of the Arabian Peninsula, Najd, by the end of the 18th Century. Khuri describes 
how Sunni conquerors who monopolised political and economic power imposed a 
quasi-feudal system of exploitation on the Bahraini peasantry.37 In more recent times, 
the lack of formal recruitment procedures in the public sector reinforced the feeling 
that a small clique controlled the country, as employment was largely obtained through 
personal contacts.38 This facilitated the monopolisation of entire sectors of the 
bureaucracy by one family, social or ethnic network with top positions being largely 
held by those with close ties to the ruling family.  
 
In terms of the historical context of civic activism within the Gulf, Rumaihi documents 
important labour movements that were influential for political mobilisation in Bahrain. 
This movement emerged from the first great strike of 1938, organised by the Bahraini 
workers of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO). During this strike the labor 
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State. Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1980, p. 35.  
38 Ibid, p. 123. 
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leaders connected with the merchant community who had launched an initiative to 
demand the establishment of a legislative body. The merchants, in their nascent 
struggle for power sharing, were amenable to the incorporation of some of the specific 
demands of Bahraini BAPCO workers into their agenda. While the term did not appear 
as such, Bahrainisation, or the idea that Bahrainis should be given priority over 
foreigners for employment, became a core demand of political mobilisation.39 This 
mobilisation led to the creation of a trade union, the Bahrain Labor Federation (October 
1955) with 6000 members, and the drafting of labor legislation subsequently submitted 
to the rulers.40  
 
Within the Kuwaiti context, scholars such as Farah al-Nakib who has documented 
public spaces from 1938 – 2012 within Kuwait, makes specific reference to the semi-
private spaces of the diwanniyat and other CSOs in giving form to the discursive public 
sphere. Furthermore, al-Nakib highlights how since the beginnings of associational life 
in Kuwait stemming from the 1940s, social and voluntary clubs were overshadowing 
the impact that dewanniyat once traditionally occupied. 
“From the late 1940s onwards, newspapers and civil society organizations 
emerged as ‘new mediated forms of social exchange’ in Kuwait that became 
prominent tools of opposition. Technically classified as social or sports clubs, 
voluntary associations were hubs of political activity during the 1950s nationalist 
movement (al haraka al-qawmiyya)…The relocation of the townspeople to new 
residential areas after 1950 also meant that diwanniyat gradually ceased to be 
a feature of the city center. Suburbanized diwanniyat continued to be important 
spaces of expression and debate, but their role as bases of political 
participation, organization and opposition was overshadowed by the new social 
clubs, whose headquarters were in the city center. It was in clubs rather than in 
diwanniyat that the ‘young reformist movement’ met to discuss social and 
political issues.”41  
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However, both diwanniyat and civil society organisations still served as a form of 
political commons, as a place for open discussion and debate over what power is 
doing and how best to oppose its reach. After their relocation outside the city center, 
civil society organizations became similar to diwanniyat in that they straddled ‘the 
public–private divide’. Both were semi-public spaces in the otherwise privatised world 
of the suburbs; yet both were semi-private despite being technically open to the 
public.42 
 
2.1 Civil Society Literature on the MENA Region  
When it comes to broader discussions on the status of civil society, the existing 
scholarship concerning civil society within the Gulf, and more broadly the Middle East, 
has given rise to two ongoing debates. The first of those seeks to assess the chances 
of an Arab civil society living up to its name, by forming a space that leads to 
democratisation, and has been intrinsically linked to political change. The second, 
which in part underpins the first discussion, centres on what constitutes ‘civil society’; 
an important question for those who seek to identify and emphasise the cultural 
component that is said to be impeding on a functioning civil society coming to the 
fore.43  
 
Proponents of Eurocentric conceptualisations of civil society, most notably western 
liberal definitions, have long maintained that civil society requires a functional 
relationship with the state, moreover it requires a legally mandated autonomy involving 
rights guaranteed by the state. It should also be noted that commentators such as 
Gellner44 and Shils45 posit the view that civil society should be based on strictly 
voluntary associations between state and citizenry and not on any ethnic or religious 
considerations. However, the issue with applying this notion is that it simply has not 
proven to be the case in the context of Bahrain and Kuwait or for the MENA region 
more broadly, which then raises the question of whether civil society in the Middle East 
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ought to be treated differently by incorporating an expanded definition of the term that 
is not construed solely in relational terms to the state. This offers further justification 
to consider the informal sector as a more authentic mode of associational life, as it 
does not face the same restrictions that recognised CSOs often encounter when 
dealing with the relevant ministries that monitor their activities.  
 
Therefore, when approaching the relevant academic discourse on civil society in the 
Gulf States and more broadly within the MENA region, it is important to note three key 
approaches that have been used to promote the various positions taken up by scholars 
in the field. These positions all relate back to broader discussions concerning what 
exactly constitutes civil society, what is its designated role and function and to what 
extent are CSOs in the Arab world effective in bringing about democratic reform. The 
various bodies of literature that have emerged out of the topic on civil society (e.g. be 
it civil society and democratisation, civil society and authoritarian survival, civil society 
and rentierism, monarchical exceptionalism). These bodies of literature can be 
understood via three approaches: Cultural, institutional and strategic.  
 
With regards to the discourse on authoritarianism and to explain the salient correlation 
between regime type and regime persistence, particularly within Arab monarchies 
including the GCC states, several analysts have pointed to culture, institutions and the 
strategies employed by these regimes or a combination of these factors to explain how 
these absolute monarchies have managed to maintain power.  The cultural approach 
for example, has long maintained that Arab kingships enjoy traditional religious and 
tribal legitimacy which induces exceptionally loyal support from its citizens.46 The Gulf 
States have grown accustomed to employing a range of cultural norms and premises 
to their advantage, whether it is Islam, nationalist sentiment or patrimonialism. 
Scholars who propose this approach have argued that such prevalent features in the 
region have been influential in enabling authoritarian governments to retain evocative 
and emotional links with a broad spectrum of society.  
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Arising out of the literature on civil society and democratisation, the cultural component 
seeks to distance itself from socio-economic factors and focus on observing the 
cultural prerequisites to democratisation. Offering the case of Yemen, the work of 
Carapico incorporates the prevalent stereotype that there is something inherent in 
Arab/Islamic culture that prevents the emergence of a viable civil society.47 Carapico 
comes to this conclusion vis-à-vis the Yemeni case, as the conditions are said to be 
too ‘primitive’ and ‘primordial’ to warrant any hopes for an effective civil society to 
flourish, advancing the view that ‘mechanisms rooted within Yemeni culture as well as 
forms imported from abroad are put to various uses in struggles to improve both 
welfare and freedom.’48 Furthermore, Carapico illustrates that when political openings 
do emerge i.e. in the context of regime change, civic activity is inhibited once more in 
the wake of repression; by which the state is dependent on co-opting civil society for 
its own survival. ‘Each period of repression yielded a new regime needful of civic-state 
building efforts to fortify itself.’49  
 
What renders civil society in the Arab world to be all but futile (according to advocates 
of the cultural approach) is premised in the assertion that patriarchal and tribal 
mentality acts as an impediment to the development of pluralist values.50 In addition, 
this not only makes Arab citizens prone to accept patrimonial norms, but perhaps more 
crucially it effectively undermines efforts to foster a sense of national unity, which has 
been posited by several scholars over the years as a key prerequisite to achieving 
successful democratisation.51 However it must be emphasised that these observations 
are premised on a liberal/institutional conceptualisation of civil society, and has not 
incorporated or taken into account the alternative modes of civic activities and 
participatory politics that is characteristic of informal civil society. 
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Expanding on this view and pertaining closer to the interests and objectives of this 
research, recent observers such as Posusney, makes an interesting observation in 
singling out ethnic divisions, and namely sectarianism as an impediment to 
democratisation and ultimately the emergence of an effective civil society. ‘Indeed, the 
ethnic divisions that are complicating the US effort to democratise Iraq have led 
numerous pundits to view sectarianism as the main barrier to democratisation in the 
region as a whole.’52 Scholars such as Michael Herb have also corroborated with 
Posusney in that ethnic divisions pose a salient barrier to the development of 
parliamentarianism in several Arab monarchies. ‘In Jordan’, he observes, ‘sectarian 
divisions in society are reflected in malapportioned electoral districts, which weakens 
the legitimacy of the legislature itself. One reason for the very limited powers that the 
Bahraini ruling family grants to the country’s parliament is that the royalty is Sunni, 
whereas the country’s majority population is Shi’ite.’53 
 
Although Herb et al do not claim sectarian divisions to be a necessary or a sufficient 
condition to impede on democratic processes, they do concede to it emerging as a 
contributing factor to the robust presence of authoritarian rule in the region.  
 
Examining this phenomenon more closely within the Bahraini context, Jane 
Kinninmont and Omar Sirri illustrate the impact recent events (namely the conflicts in 
Syria and Iraq) are having both domestically and across the region. The report 
highlights how political groupings formed across sectarian lines throughout the region 
have hampered the effective functioning of civil society. They do however 
acknowledge the prominent role that youth groups (both in Bahrain and across the 
MENA region) have played in bringing about change.54  
 
They cite government repression and political polarisation as the chief causes for 
Bahrain’s civil society to be damaged and divided in recent years, as the 2011/2012 
uprising and the subsequent crackdown on pro-democracy protestors had proven to 
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be socially divisive. However, they do believe there is scope for change, as many 
Bahraini citizens can envisage the political conflict from multiple perspectives and 
have friends and relatives across the political divide. However, those seeking political 
reconciliation through effective dialogue would be inhibited by government restrictions 
on civil society effectively silencing any credible opposition and the media, which like 
other neighbouring countries, is state-regulated and critical voices are few and far 
between.55  
 
This is telling in Kinninmont and Sirri’s observations that there is a strong desire for 
genuine or perceivably more authentic forms of civic activism that can mobilise people 
and counter prevailing sectarian narratives, particularly from youth groups who are 
looking to circumvent the mechanisms that are utilised by the state. ‘Today’s younger 
generation activists and civil society movements are increasingly interconnected with 
international NGOs, trade unions and campaigners. However, the strong sectarian 
narrative pushed by other governments in the Arab region against the Bahraini 
opposition has left both the formal opposition and civil society groups critical of the 
government with only a limited number of regional allies.’56    
 
One interesting point the authors do raise regarding the existing limitations on civil 
society is that there are Bahraini activists and civil society groups trying to move 
beyond the political and sectarian interpretation of how conflicts in the region have 
evolved. It must be noted, however, that many anti-sectarian activists are deeply 
demoralised to see how inclusive projects or shows of solidarity in Bahrain can make 
any difference when sectarian violence in the region has become so pronounced 
(namely in Syria and Iraq). This is evidenced in a case back in 2011, where efforts to 
organise a joint Bahraini and Syrian protest demonstrations that were to march on the 
two countries’ neighbouring embassies foundered because of political polarisation 
along sectarian lines. In general, both in Bahrain and elsewhere in the region many of 
the civil society groups and idealistic young activists who played a key role in protests 
in 2011 are struggling not only with a loss of morale but also with a sense of 
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powerlessness. This is true especially of those who want to avoid sectarianism and 
eschew violence but see the region on the whole moving in the wrong direction.57 Once 
again, this could be the case for registered youth societies, but has not necessarily 
included the work of young activists and spaces that operate outside the confines of 
the state and are able to mobilise on a consistent basis.  
 
In the context of Kuwait, cultural approaches to the study of civil society has been 
centred around debates on the notion of citizenship. Longva posits the view that 
‘citizenship’ rather than being treated as some abstract institution that comes with a 
string of rights and responsibilities attached to it, is a relationship between individual 
and state, a complexity mediated by ideas of authority, legitimacy and allegiance. 
Longva argues that these ideas are rooted in cultural constructs that are subject to 
social circumstances and historical variations. In the case of Kuwait, both Longva and 
Tetreault, not only clarify the distinction between European and Kuwaiti 
conceptualisations of citizenship, but also the ‘complexities and variations…in the way 
the different groups in Kuwaiti society understand the concept.’58        
 
Tetreault expands on this distinction between hadhar (urban) and badu (tribal) 
conceptualisations of citizenship. ‘Urban Kuwaitis share a cultural understanding of 
citizenship very similar to that of Europeans…While Kuwaiti hadhar experience 
citizenship in the context of modernity with its emphasis on equality and autonomy, 
significant numbers of tribally oriented Kuwaitis remain part of the old imagining. They 
are subjects of a ruler, personally tied to him by two-way vertical bonds of status and 
obligation.’59   
 
Longva also notes that in contrast to hadhar, the tribes in Kuwait understand 
nationality and citizenship in the sense of taba’iyya, which can be translated as 
“following” or “allegiance” to a leader, in this case Kuwait’s ruling family, Al-Sabah. The 
jidhr or “root verb” of taba’iyya means, among other things, to walk behind someone, 
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to be subordinate to, to be under someone’s command. The concept is evidently built 
on a notion of hierarchy and vertical allegiance, as oppose to the idea of similarity and 
horizontal solidarity more commonplace amongst urban Kuwaitis.60   
 
Why these distinctive conceptualisations of citizenship within Kuwait are significant 
when trying to understand the cultural factors that have arguably impeded on 
associational life, is that the Al-Sabah monarchy (alongside several other regimes 
where a strong tribal/traditionalist element prevails) have utilised this latter model to 
shore up both their own legitimacy and the nation-building exercise. Again, this feeds 
into an earlier point as to the patrimonial ties that are said to prioritise allegiance to the 
ruling family, hence why some observers, like Longva and Tetreault who put forward 
these cultural explanations, conclude that citizens within these absolute monarchies 
are by and large apathetic to any form of civic activism.61 
However, cultural explanations of civil society and the persistence of authoritarian rule 
have been largely contested throughout several bodies of literature. On the role of 
Islam for instance, Nonneman demonstrates how much of the extant scholarship on 
political Islam has corroborated in establishing that, in terms of political implications, 
there are many Islams; that there is nothing in the faith that is intrinsically incompatible 
with democracy, a political participation more broadly, and that there is both 
authoritarian and pluralist trends in past and present Islamic socio-political and legal 
theory as well as practice.62 This is evidenced in the works of Kramer63 and Ayubi64.  
 
Likewise, within the literature on monarchical exceptionalism, Yom and Gause present 
a scathing rebuttal of the culturalist approach. ‘Cultural arguments recycle old 
orientalist logic, are patently unfalsifiable, and ignore the historical reality that powerful 
ruling elites (including those in the Gulf) owe much of their modern power to colonial 
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machinations rather than indigenous forces.’65 Following on from this logic, they argue 
that such explanations do not hold up under close scrutiny, citing the example of 
Bahrain as a near successful attempt at a social revolution and mass mobilisation were 
it not for intervention from GCC forces spearheaded by the Saudis who came into 
Bahrain to prop up the Al Khalifa monarchy.    
 
Another approach to the study of civil society in the MENA region and in particular the 
dynamics of state-societal relations, is the institutional perspective. Unlike the cultural 
approach, which argues that loyalty to the state stems from traditional religious and 
tribal legitimacy, the discourse on institutions contends that because monarchs 
organisationally stand above everyday politics and possess the ability to skilfully 
intervene in the political system (i.e. amending the constitution) to spearhead 
controlled reforms that defuse public discontent. Dynasticism (a particular feature of 
Kuwait and Bahrain) wherein royal blood relatives monopolise key state offices, aids 
in keeping the regime intact.66 It must be noted that although they do not advocate the 
institutional approach themselves, observers such as Yom and Gause do think it holds 
more credibility when compared to the cultural factors that are said to impede civil 
society, in that monarchs in liberalised monarchies often outmanoeuvre opposition by 
offering limited democratic openings.67  
 
More broadly in reference to the democracy debate on the MENA region as a whole, 
Eva Bellin, one of several scholars who focuses on institutions, has also repudiated 
the seemingly orientalist logic, noting that other world cultures, notably Catholicism 
and Confucianism have at different times been accused of incompatibility with 
democracy. Nevertheless she observes, ‘these cultural endowments have not 
prevented countries in Latin America, Southern Europe or East Asia from 
democratising.’68 Bellin, who rejects both cultural and socio-economic prerequisites to 
understanding the absence of democratic structures, rather she attributes the 
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robustness of authoritarian regimes to the presence of institutional factors, in particular 
those that strengthen the coercive apparatuses of these governments.  
 
Although it must be stressed that she does recognise rentier income to be salient, in 
that it contributes to the ability of authoritarian incumbents to maintain extensive and 
effective security agencies. Bellin also maintains that fiscal health is essential for 
rewarding those individuals who comprise the state’s coercive apparatus, whilst the 
MENA region on the whole is distinguished by the markedly high proportion of 
government expenditure devoted to security.69  
 
Other advocates of the institutional perspective like Longohr highlight the futility of 
CSOs as vehicles for change. She argues that in terms of NGOs, these have negative 
ramifications for Arab democratisation, as NGOs single-issue focus and dependence 
on foreign funding render them unable to mobilise and maintain widespread support.70 
Longohr’s position has been corroborated by other scholars such as Carothers, who 
came to the conclusion that in terms of scholarly and policy analysis on 
democratisation in the region, it is more important to focus less on the role of NGOs 
and more on the importance of developing viable political parties.71  
 
It becomes evident that these analysts feel it is imperative to look beyond the 
traditional confines of civil society that has been often cited as ineffective and 
redundant, particularly within the democratisation literature, that has demonstrated 
civil society to not only be susceptible to government interference but as mentioned in 
the background chapter when discussing the impediments of formal civil society, it can 
also serve to reinforce the strength of government institutions by acting as a form of 
state corporatism. This again could signify the need to observe more casual or fluid 
spaces that are more transparent in the way they function, by operating within the 
private sphere. 
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In addition to this, they argue that the reason the promotion of civil society, economic 
development and sanctions have not led to political reform in the Arab world is that 
none of these variables address the real obstacles to facilitating change in the region, 
which according to such scholars, are flawed institutions. According to Cook, 
institutions are the organisations, arrangements, laws, decrees and regulations that 
constitute the political rules of the game in any given society. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, Arab states in fact boast a considerable number of institutions, the problem 
however is not the number but the nature by which these institutions operate.  
 
Across the Arab world, and likewise within Gulf States, these institutions are tailored 
to ensure the authoritarian character of the regimes. Rather than guarantee rights or 
give citizens a voice, Arab political institutions are inclined to restrict political 
participation, limit individual freedoms and vest overwhelming powers in the executive 
branch of government. As of yet, discourse on Arab reform seems to have achieved 
little with regards to institutional change. Minor modifications have been made in some 
parts, but these are often viewed as token reforms again to temporarily quell dissent. 
Cook offers the example of Bahrain in 2002, when it initiated an experiment in political 
liberalisation, however this was soon to be undermined as authorities clamped down 
on CSOs in the country, including the closing down of Bahrain’s leading human rights 
organisation and jailed its leader. This is also the case in Qatar where despite the 
promulgation of a new constitution in September 2004 saw greater political liberties, it 
simultaneously enshrined the absolute power of the emir and his family.72  
 
Other readers such as Kazziha, who focuses on political liberalisation in the Middle 
East, combines both cultural and institutional variables to highlight the nature of 
political consciousness in the Arab world, where he claims it derives mainly from the 
education system, mass communication and the media. Unlike in the West, the 
prevalent education systems in the Middle East did not provide a breeding ground for 
the growth of democracy. Instead creating a political consciousness which features 
combinations of submissiveness, narrowness and dogmatism.73 With regards to mass 
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communication and media, TV remains to be the most important medium, as these 
were state-controlled for many years until the proliferation of satellite TV channels.  
 
Again, this is one area that existing commentary has failed to address within the 
context of civil society in the Gulf region, as mass communication and media outlets 
traditionally constitute an integral part of civil society. The role of media particularly 
within the authoritarian context is integral in addressing some of the primary objectives 
of this research, as it serves as a reflection of how individual CSOs and civil society 
more broadly view and manage issues pertaining to sectarianism and sectarian 
relations. Especially within the Arab world, where regional mass media outlets play 
such a pivotal role in determining public opinion.74 It will also become evident further 
on in the data analysis sections of this research, how much of an influential role both 
these outlets and social media plays within informal civic spaces. 
 
Coming back to the discourse on institutions, one explanation for the ineffectiveness 
of civil society therefore comes from the need to reform state institutions. Berman, 
highlighting the Egyptian case makes an interesting assertion, in that the growth of 
civil society should not be considered as an indisputable good, but rather a politically 
neutral multiplier – neither inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’ but dependant for its effects on 
the wider political environment and the values of those who control it.  
 
Those addressing the need to reform institutions do believe, however, that the benefits 
of associationalism according to civil society advocates (particularly notable in the 
1990s with scholars such as Norton and Ibrahim), providing individuals with political 
and social skills, creating bonds among citizens, facilitating mobilisation, decreasing 
barriers to collective action, training activists and leaders do clearly exist. However, 
where they differ is that these strategies can of course facilitate antidemocratic as well 
as democratic trends. Where this research will therefore seek to expand on previous 
observations, is by viewing the emerging informal spaces and to see whether they 
have been able to effectively replace existing civic societies that have been co-opted 
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by the state, and to shift the debate away from democratisation to sectarianism which 
as previously alluded to has seldom been discussed in existing literature.  
 
For Berman and others, if civil society is promoted in the context of weak, illegitimate 
states, Western donors may find themselves unwilling or indirectly furthering the cause 
of revolutionary movements, rather than assisting in a benign process of democratic 
development.75 Therefore, it goes to show that advocates of this approach sought to 
move away from strengthening civil society itself and rather focus on developing more 
effective and responsive political institutions, which should in turn open up the 
prospects for a better functioning civil society. This stands in contrast to earlier 
scholars in the 1990s, like Norton and Ibrahim, who called for more endorsement of 
civil society which as shown may only have a limited impact and could perhaps even 
serve to exacerbate political instability and violence.  
 
Within the literature on authoritarian survival, Norton would find himself asking a 
decade on why regimes in the region are so resistant to reform. As well as 
acknowledging other scholarship on authoritarian survival, his analysis on the external 
perspective would contradict earlier advocates of the cultural approach to 
understanding the inevitable flaws within Arab civil society. Kazemi and Norton, find 
that the root of some of the Middle East’s problems can be traced back to crises 
associated with its emergence from the nineteenth and twentieth century Western 
colonialism and other forms of external domination following the Second World War. 
International forces, actors and groups have historically played important roles in the 
politics of the region, none more so than in the Gulf where Western allies have 
repeatedly offered impunity to these regimes as a result of vested security and 
economic interests. The vast oil and gas resources of Middle East and its vital role in 
the economy of the industrialised world have transformed the region into a centre of 
great economic importance to the outside world. This indigenous wealth has had the 
unintended consequence of exacerbating both political and economic problems in the 
region. They go on to speculate about the economic potential of the region if serious 
conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli disputes were resolved.  
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For Kazemi and Norton, the notion that Muslims or Arabs are unwilling to embrace 
democracy for deeply-seated cultural reasons simply does not weigh up, citing earlier 
work to show that they have been quite adept at forming political parties, interest 
groups and building effective coalitions. What makes these associations redundant, is 
the political economy of the contemporary gulf state, found within rentier literature, 
which they believe to be most compelling argument for the absence of social reform, 
the ineffectiveness of recognised CSOs and consequently the robustness of 
authoritarianism.76   
 
Following on from this, the most sophisticated response to understanding the 
limitations on existing civil society and where this research aims to expand on, is via 
the strategic explanation, or what can be most commonly described to as political-
economy approaches. Such arguments originally arose in the 1980s to explain the 
deviation of the region’s wealthiest oil exporters from the correlation between countries 
with high per capita wealth and democracy. Civil society in several of the GCC (Gulf 
Co-operation Council) states utilise oil revenues as a major source of their economy 
and this enhances the state’s ability to influence civil society, particularly with regard 
to funding, as the relevant state ministry often acts as the sole donor to registered 
CSOs. Within the Gulf States, the governments are the main resource for funding such 
organisations that operate as partners to the governments; consequently, civil society 
can hardly become autonomous from the government or the source of funding and the 
controller as well.77   
 
According to early theorists proposing this view, oil revenues allow the state to 
undercut existing social groups and pre-empt the formation of new ones. Those 
revenues allow the state to lavishly provide resources, ranging from employment to 
housing and welfare that other social groups once provided or would come to provide 
in the absence of such wealthy states. More importantly, these revenues give the state 
the power to weaken social groups by co-opting them collectively or by fragmenting 
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them through selective co-optation of key members. This is the key premise by which 
rentier literature argues that oil revenues enable the state to weaken civil society.78 
 
For Crystal, this enables us to understand why societal pressures for change might be 
muted and why governments might be able to contain even those muted pressures. It 
must also be noted that this was prior to several liberalisation programs in the early 
2000s, Gulf monarchs had shown considerable antipathy to organised groups, even 
groups with seemingly apolitical motivations. They have gone to some lengths to 
prevent, pre-empt or remove a variety of social organisations.79 However, Crystal 
notes that organised and independent groups with interests that demand to be 
accounted are present in the Gulf, actively petitioning the rulers. Something that is 
demonstrated within the discourse in more recent years.  
 
As illustrated, some of the scepticism surrounding the utility of civil society in achieving 
democratic and social reforms had even been apparent within the discourse from the 
1990s, during a time when, as previously mentioned, civil society was viewed 
propitiously. Even within the context of Kuwait, Hicks and al-Najjar, had noted how 
civil society institutions in Kuwait had developed in a political environment of controlled 
pluralism. They claim that there is a direct correlation between increase in oil revenues 
and the Al-Sabah’s family influence, as the state would go on to take up primarily 
distributive functions and had no need to raise revenues from the population through 
taxation. The government permitted opposition movements to organise and express 
their opinions within professional associations, religious groups and cultural societies. 
However, the state maintained the power to suppress any group that went ‘too far’ in 
its criticisms and demands.80 
 
Moving on to the broader scholarship on monarchical exceptionalism, advocates of 
the strategic approach to civil society suggest that what makes these states unique 
are the ways in which they penetrate their societies to implement policies and their 
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ability to safeguard their societies against pressures from regional and international 
systems.81 Following this logic, the Gulf States are a case in point; oil wealth has 
undoubtedly served to buffer the external pressures on regimes’ political capacity. The 
ruling monarchs can justify their existence and convey support for their legitimacy by 
ensuring that oil wealth benefits the indigenous population. Rentier politics has 
featured within the discourse on authoritarian survival, as it is thought by several 
scholars as being antithetical to democracy as these polities usually utilise their wealth 
to effectively bribe their society and to acquire the support of some people to enhance 
their control over the state.82 
 
Expanding on this idea of monarchical exceptionalism, Yom and Gause, offer a 
strategic explanation or political economy approach that links the historical legacy of 
domestic choices with a permissive international environment. They offer three key 
arguments, one of which incorporates and expands on the earlier rentier literature to 
explain the persistence of Arab monarchies, which in turn can be utilised to explain 
the state of civil society more recently within the GCC. One of those arguments is that 
the monarchies have a record of mobilising cross-cutting coalitions of popular support, 
coalitions that have assisted in forestalling mass opposition and to bolster the ruling 
family against whatever opposition emerged.83  
 
The second key argument which incorporates past rentier theories is the irrefutable 
fact that despite the claim that rentier politics does not feature as much compared to 
previous decades, it is evident that these states still reap ample rents from oil and 
foreign aid, allowing them to pay for welfare and development initiatives that are 
designed to alleviate public discord. Finally, the last argument, which is the claim that 
has arguably received least attention throughout existing discourse pertaining to civil 
society and Gulf states, in that when all else fails, these kingdoms have continued to 
benefit from the backing of foreign patrons who assist these monarchies though 
diplomatic assurances, economic grants and most notably within the context of 
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Bahrain, military interventions.84 It must be noted that the US administration had 
played a pivotal role in offering international impunity to these absolute monarchies. 
 
According to Yom and Gause, explanations for regimes of an exceptional type need 
not abide by essentialist logic suggesting that some innate feature such as cultural 
inheritance or institutional destiny predetermines long-term outcomes. They go onto 
re-assert that prospects for popular revolutions in the Arab kingdoms will remain 
minimal, so long as their leaders continue to maintain broad-based coalitions, secure 
access to hydrocarbon rents and enjoy ample support from foreign patrons.85  
Those scholars who advocate the strategic approach cite the example of Bahrain to 
critique past assertions made about institutions by pointing to the practice of 
dynasticism which can have serious destabilising consequences. In the Gulf, ruling 
houses have many branches in which relatives of the monarchy occupy the top 
positions in the bureaucracy, the security forces and the economy. This tactic is to 
maintain regime unity and aims to reduce prospects for political reform by trapping the 
monarchy between interests of relatives and popular pressures for change. Making it 
all the more difficult for established civil society associations to call for more senior 
political openings to be available to people outside the King’s family.  
 
Moving on toward foreign assistance, it must be acknowledged that although the 
rentier state still applies to several of the GCC states, including Kuwait, it does not 
however necessarily hold up in the context of Bahrain and Oman that are running 
deficits. It is therefore much more dependent on foreign patrons to maintain its 
position. As Gause and Yom mention it is cross-cutting coalitions, hydrocarbon wealth 
and foreign allies which are said to be the roots of their exceptionalism. It should also 
be recognised that not all kingdoms possess all three factors, but each of those states 
possess two, except for Bahrain that possesses one, which makes it more vulnerable 
to unrest and instability, in which the 2011 uprising itself in Bahrain is testament to 
this.86 
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One question this raises in both case studies is whether civil society and informal 
networks/groupings have been utilised by the Gulf monarchies to co-opt and maintain 
control over. One reason as to why Kuwait has witnessed limited demands for change 
in comparison to Bahrain is that there is a cross-cutting coalition comprising of the 
ruling family, Sunni merchants, Shia minority, who had showcased their loyalty to the 
Kuwaiti monarchy following the Gulf war, and tribal communities that the Kuwaiti 
monarchy has co-opted in recent years to their advantage. Whereas the same cannot 
be said in the case of Bahrain, as the disparity between power and support base 
seems to be ostensive and largely manifests along sectarian lines.  
 
How this research therefore aims to contribute to existing literature and to the strategic 
explanations for monarchical exceptionalism, is to find out how CSOs have responded 
to this trend and whether they themselves operate along sectarian lines. This means 
looking at whether their interests, the issues they raise and the activities and advocacy 
work they do revolves around sectarianism, whether it be organising initiatives 
primarily along sectarian lines or to highlighting socio-economic disparities between 
communities, anything that makes sectarianism a more salient marker of identity to 
rally around. This could then provide some insights as to what may have caused 
alternative modes of civic activism to go underground, i.e. in the form of informal 
spaces which operate in the private sphere. Be it the desire of some informal spaces 
to work exclusively in the interest of the sect it claims to represent, so to amplify 
sectarian identities and discourses, or on the other hand to counter the sectarian 
composition and single-issue agendas of certain advocacy groups that may have 
become prevalent within the formal civil society structure. 
 
Coming onto the post-Arab spring context, analysts such as Seeberg explain how 
much of existing literature on social movements has focused heavily on causes that 
might explain the uprising and consequences for strategic relations between Arab and 
international states. However, relatively few analyses have dealt with the new wave of 
political participation and mobilisation within a broader context of civil society and 
regional organisations that culminated into the Arab spring uprisings.87  The idea that 
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there must be scope for change or potential with Arab CSOs if they were at least able 
to, in part, orchestrate the 2011 uprisings.  
 
With the emphasis on popular mobilisation in understanding civil society, Seeberg 
corroborates his findings with earlier scholars such as Wiktorowicz, who had noted 
that in principle, there is always the possibility for a democratising pressure from 
below.88 Despite the early optimism, Seeberg still acknowledges this to be a premature 
observation, in that much of the Middle East, civil society still does not act as a conduit 
for freedom; instead it further extends the state’s social control over its citizens.89 
 
However, taking the Arab uprisings into account, Seeberg does not refute the potential 
for change in the foreseeable future, as earlier signs of political and civic mobilisation 
were present in the previous years building up to 2011. This is evidenced in the work 
of other scholars such as Bayat, who argues that from the mid-2000s, new modes of 
mobilisation started to be seen in Arab societies and that those societies/activists 
developed new forms of protest or ‘dissent, mostly in the form of civic campaigns, 
boycotting, youth civic engagement, cyber-activism and protest art.’90  According to 
Bayat, surveillance from the state in fact forced civic activism into the institutional 
realm such as college campuses, schools, mosques and NGOs. As a result, public 
debates concerning human rights and democratisation started appearing more 
frequently. What is particularly interesting concerning this research is Bayat’s 
observations of youth voluntarism being on the rise, often with dimensions related to 
Islamism in a new form which Bayat phrases as post-Islamism.91  
 
The importance of popular mobilisation is none more evident than in the case study of 
Bahrain. Scholars have questioned the conventional wisdom surrounding Middle 
Eastern exceptionalism, highlighting the fact that Saudi Arabia had to send troops to 
prop up their Bahraini ally not because it was militarily threatened by an external 
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power, as would so often be the case previously in the MENA context, but rather 
because it was directly threatened by social protests which were orchestrated by 
segments of civil society.92 
 
Moving on from the existing debates pertaining to civil society in the Gulf States and 
wider MENA region, the following section will now be dedicated to another central 
theme within this research, which is to observe the emerging discourse surrounding 
informal groupings/spaces more broadly and the commentary on informal civil society 
within the MENA region. 
  
2.2 Research on ‘Informal’ Civil Society  
This section will explore the various bodies of scholarship that has sought to identify 
alternative conceptions of civil society. Regarding this research, it should be noted that 
due to its focus on Bahrain and Kuwait, the findings that come out of this thesis should, 
(as posited by scholars cited in this section), be put into broader perspective, and 
treated as a study of the workings of civil society in the non-Western context. This is 
done by shedding light on the debates in the studies on ethnic conflict and its 
relationship to civil society in the developing world.  
 
This body of literature goes on to emphasise that it is the purposes of activity as 
oppose to organisations or associations themselves which should be the means test 
for civic life. As the literature seeks to undermine the prevailing notion that a vital pre-
requisite to civil society is that it has a formalised structure, i.e. that it be a recognised 
association, that it is registered as a CSO, and has an internal bureaucracy when it 
comes to issues of membership, organising activities etc. Instead, it aims to showcase 
that the lack of effective and expedient civic organisations, does not necessarily 
negate the presence of authentic civic activities taking place. Something which existing 
scholarship on civil society in the Middle East has often overlooked. All in all, this 
section is a testament to the fact that literature on informal civil society is relatively 
scarce compared to the commentary on state-recognised associations. Furthermore, 
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it is also evidence that civil society more broadly has not been discussed in relation to 
sectarianism and how it can play a part in influencing inter-communal relations.  
 
Several debates within studies of globalisation and ethnic conflict and its relationship 
to civil society have given rise to the concept of informal spaces. These debates 
typically revolve around their compatibility with common perceptions of civil society as 
well as in the functions and roles they perform in society and politics. The purpose of 
this section is to identify the debate about whether informal spaces can be considered 
to be a constituent of wider civil society. The other purpose, and more pertinent to the 
research objectives, is to identify the types of studies that have commented on the 
issue of informal civil society in the Arab world.  
 
When looking at the discourse on civil society and globalisation for example, it does 
concede that institutionalised structures are typically associated with civil society and 
the public sphere, when discussing civil society within a Western liberal context. It 
does not however, suffice in explaining the various forms of participatory politics and 
the nature of civil society in postcolonial contexts, where the historical relationship 
between state and society, a false duality in itself, has been one of stark inequality.93 
In addition to this, when we are addressing civil society in the Gulf this is of course 
within the wider context of civil society in the non-Western world, and so this too would 
encompass patron-client relations as well as tribal and ethnic systems.94 This ties into 
the need as to why it is significant to look at the relationship between existing CSOs 
and the prevailing, if not increasing, prominence of sectarian identities and how civil 
society has contributed to these supra-state identities within localised contexts, 
something which existing scholarship has yet to address. 
 
Again, looking more broadly, the existing debates pertaining to informal civil society 
stem from certain queries with regards to its conceptualisation, the modes of 
operations and the overall expediency of informal spaces. Previous literature on civil 
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society and ethnic conflict within the context of developing societies has raised the 
question as to whether non-associational (informal) groups/spaces can also be 
categorised as civic or part of civil society.95 Concerned with Indian politics, Varshney 
for example, has suggested, that only by systematic empirical investigations of the 
associational and non-associational forms of civic life can we determine whether the 
functions and norms attributed to civil society in the normative literature exist as more 
than simple theoretical propositions. From an empirical perspective, whether such 
engagement is conducted solely in associations or in traditional sites of social 
gatherings depends on the degree to which urbanisation and economic development 
is apparent. According to Varshney, cities tend to have more formal associations, 
whilst villages/rural areas make do with informal sites and meetings.96  
 
An example of non-associational life can be seen in ‘street-corner activity’, which can 
be considered an authentic civic form if more organised and institutionalised civic sites 
are not available. The point being is not that formal associations bear little importance 
in this regard, rather the utility of formal associations remains central to any initiatives 
towards democratisation. However, it must be acknowledged that in social and cultural 
environments that differ to those of Europe and North America, it is the purposes of 
activity rather than the forms of organisation itself that should be the critical test of civic 
life. This outlook could present a more favourable picture of both formal and informal 
civil society depending on the context in which those spaces are located. This is 
particularly striking, as it intrinsically links back to the discourse on civil society and 
authoritarian survival, in the fact that formal associations are either banned or severely 
impeded by the relevant social ministries precisely because of their activities as 
oppose to their presence.97  
 
Again, in response to Eurocentric conceptualisations of civil society, larger studies in 
the non-Western context particularly on ethnic conflict, would also indicate that ethnic 
and religious associations do combine ascription and choice. Weiner, as far back as 
in the 1970s, for instance, documents how ethnic associations can perform many 
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‘modern’ functions.98 These include practices such as participating in democratic 
politics as well as establishing financial schemes to encourage members of the ethnic 
kinsmen into modern occupations and modern occupation. In addition, a similar 
objection can be forwarded with respect to the presupposed requirement that 
associations be of a formal nature. As within much of the developing world, especially 
in rural communities, formal associations do not often exist. That is not to suggest, 
however, that civic interconnections or activities are absent.  
 
It goes to show, that advocates of informal spaces and their incorporation within the 
broader spectrum of civil society can be accounted for so long as they connect 
individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity and facilitate the exchanging of views on 
matters of public concern – be it economic, political, cultural or social issues.99  
 
Moving on to discussions on informal spaces within the Middle Eastern context, it must 
be said that the literature is relatively scarce when compared to the existing bodies of 
literature dedicated to formal civil society. However, over the years there has been 
some commentaries made specifically on diwaniyyat and majalis within the context of 
democratisation, but most recently these spaces have received little attention within 
academic scholarship and moreover there has been no mention of its relationship with 
sectarianism and inter-communal relations.  
 
However, it should be noted that scholars such as Varshney, Huwaidi and Shehata, 
believe informal networks may have its limitations as to their utility yet they maintain 
an optimistic view that these spaces could be perceived as an alternative response in 
creating a more effective civil society by facilitating grass-roots activism. In addition, 
they go on to specifically outline informal spaces as the greatest potential force for 
democratic transition as they serve as a reflection of the underlying civic culture that 
is prevalent (to some degree) across the region. ‘Informal social groups, such as 
mutual-aid networks, cooperative societies, recreational clubs and youth leagues – 
These casual organisations are more communally orientated than other CSOs and 
draw a stronger following from the poor. Indeed, the UNDP views them as the richest 
                                                          
98 Weiner, M, Sons of the Soil: Migration and ethnic conflict in India, 1978. 
99 Varshney, A, “Ethnic conflict and civil society”, World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3, (2001) 362-398 
61 
 
source of civic activity in the Arab world, guiding citizens with an invisible social 
hand.’100  
 
However, studies arising from the discourse on civil society and globalisation once 
again have sought to move away from addressing the perceived benefits informal 
actors may occupy when formal civil society is not present or active, which 
democratisation literature often centres its commentary around. Scholars such as 
Bayat, have been critical of the attention given to the notion of civil society, which 
according to him tends to belittle or even ignore the wide spectrum of un-
institutionalised and hybrid social activities that possess a prominent yet 
simultaneously tacit role both in the Middle East and the wider developing world.  
 
As mentioned, there is more than one, single conceptualisation of civil society and 
more significantly perhaps; are the other means of partaking in associational life that 
do not coincide with the institutional-formal realm. Again, criticising the existing 
debates in democratisation literature, Bayat suggests that the reductionism prevalent 
within formal civil society discourse has ultimately excluded and even scorned modes 
of struggles (which in the context of the Middle East) are arguably more extensive and 
effective than conventional institutions outside the state. Observers such as Bayat and 
Varshney sought to examine the dynamics of free-form or casual activism, which tends 
to characterise the politics of ‘informal people’. This is the view that ordinary, everyday 
practices conducted by ordinary folk can in fact engender significant social changes.101 
It is inevitable therefore that such simple and everyday practices are bound to shift 
within the realm of politics. 
 
This position is also corroborated by Rothstein, who emphasises the importance of 
socialisation processes, in that our perceptions and norms are in relation to our 
societal institutions and begin to be formed/conceptualised from a young age. Ranging 
from parents, family, tribe, the wider social environment, perceptions and collective 
memories of whom to trust are internalised, hence why it is important to draw attention 
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to this aspect of informal political spaces, as it ought to be expected that citizens living 
within historically authoritarian structures that they are to develop their trust and values 
from such informal processes102 i.e. congregations/gatherings between people who 
trust each other, and can open up on any particular issue and most importantly, are 
less dependent on the state.  
 
Participants who engage in such collective action e.g. via informal gatherings such as 
, public and online forums, youth societies etc., only realise their actions to be politically 
motivated when challenged by state authorities who impede on their advances. 
Therefore, rather than acting through the formal channels of protest or publicity, these 
informal spaces take it upon themselves to fulfil their needs, albeit individually, without 
the assistance or more appropriately the intervention of formally recognised 
organisations and in a discrete manner. This is also known as ‘quiet encroachment’.103 
 
Looking at the existing scholarship on democratisation and political participation, it 
should be acknowledged that informal spaces such as diwanniyat and majalis had 
been cited since the late 1980’s as one of the various ways in which dissent in GCC 
states can be voiced. Although at that stage it was still viewed to be circumscribed and 
severely restricted.104 From the 1990s onwards, however, and particularly within the 
Kuwaiti context, scholars had started to see the advantages of alternative spaces like 
the , as from time to time, the Kuwaiti government had lost patience with constraints 
on its authority and dissolved parliament on several occasions. The emir ruled by 
decree from 1976-1981 and again between the years of 1986-1992, however absence 
of the assembly left the government with no outlet to obtain popular feedback on its 
policies. Scholars such as Hicks and Al-Najjar had noticed that with the national 
assembly dissolved and formal associations coming under increasing pressure, 
Kuwaitis had turned to traditional home-based meetings (i.e. the diwaniyya) to voice 
their concerns. Hicks and Al-Najjar highlight in this context the positive impact the 
diwaniyya had beyond the legislative reach of the government, as they had proven to 
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be effective forums for campaigning for the restitution of the national assembly, 
showcasing the contemporary utility of a traditional informal space.105  
 
Within earlier literature on democratisation, the documenting of diwaniyyat offered an 
alternative platform to practically defunct CSOs by which political activities were 
restored and grievances could be heard. This would also highlight their importance 
until today, particularly when it comes to forming political opinions and consensus, a 
prime example being between a prospective MP and their constituent who would 
frequent such spaces in order to garner support for their party. However, as Hicks and 
Al-Najjar note, that is not to say the more formal associations have not previously 
played a significant role at key junctures within Kuwaiti politics, a prime example being 
during 1990 occupation of Kuwait and with the collapse of the government, leaders 
and activists from professional, religious associations and co-operative societies 
formed the backbone of popular resistance to the Iraqi occupation.106   
 
Moving to more recent discussions on informal spaces within the Bahraini context, 
scholars have sought to highlight how informal discussions with diverse young 
Bahraini people suggest there are many options for a political settlement that could 
provide not only a large degree of stability but also at least some measure of 
meaningful change. For instance, Kinninmont and Sirri cite one of the arguments from 
the strategic approach as a key limitation of Bahrain’s formal civil society at present, 
highlighting how many locals in Bahrain feel disempowered by what they presume are 
the machinations of larger international powers.107  
 
Moreover, what makes this paper particularly interesting is that it signals a shift in the 
way civil society is being reported on within the democratisation literature, as it uses a 
broad definition of civil society to refer to citizens’ engagement in associational life, 
whether though formal CSOs or informally. Again, it is this informal aspect of 
associational life in Bahrain that is both recognised/acknowledged by existing 
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discourse but has been under-researched relative to more formal organisations, and 
despite the paper’s acknowledgement of informal spaces it has yet to offer more in-
depth detail on them. As Kinninmont and Sirri specifically mention majalis, the Bahraini 
counterpart to the Kuwaiti diwaniyyat be it with slightly varying functions, however they 
offer little more than identifying those spaces, as opposed to mentioning their purpose 
and their social and political utility within the Kuwaiti and Bahraini political landscape. 
They merely mention those spaces as part and parcel of Bahrain’s illustrious history 
with active and vibrant civil society, yet they fail to mention how effective they are and 
in what ways could they be effective in the foreseeable future.108  
 
The scarcity of existing discourse specifically referring to informal spaces such as 
Kuwaiti has been noted more recently by Redman109 who points to earlier commentary 
made by Antoun, who criticised Norton’s earlier work on Civil Society in the Middle 
East for its omission of any substantive discussion about the diwaniyyat. Antoun 
further criticises contributors within the field of civil society for their lack of serious 
consideration of informal institutions, asserting that ‘many authors (in these volumes) 
allude to patron-client relations, religious networks, sects, tribes, ethnic groups, 
groupings based on social type and the diwaniyya, without giving them any 
attention.’110  
 
With regards to discussions around such informal spaces being incorporated within 
the wider framework of civil society, Redman corroborates with Tetreault, in that these 
guestrooms occupy what can appropriately be described as an intermediate spaces 
between the social world of household intimacy and the wider, unrestricted 
community.111 Likewise Delmas posits the view that Kuwait’s diwaniyyat are presumed 
to reside somewhere beyond the privacy of the home (this of course being relevant 
specifically to public/MP) yet it still remains insulated from state meddling.112 
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With ideas around acting as an intermediary between the state, society and home, it 
could be said that these spaces do encompass wider notions of civil society as ‘most 
agree in describing civil society as an area of friendships, clubs, churches, business 
associations, unions and other voluntary associations that mediate between the vast 
expense of social life between the household and the state. This associational sphere 
is seen as the place where citizens learn habits of free assembly, dialogue and social 
initiative.’113  
 
Even as recent as 2015, discourse on associational life, in this case Saudi Arabia, has 
noted ‘how since the 1990s, civil society has been seen more as an informal process 
of associations and activities than as a concept that requires an enabling political 
structure, and this is the case in the Middle East.’114 However despite this recognition, 
informal discussions, spaces/groupings are still dismissed when it comes to 
addressing the political expediency of those spaces and in what ways they could be 
seen to facilitate civil society more broadly.  
 
As alluded to previously, the commentary that has been made on informal civil society 
within the Middle East (most notably from the democratisation literature) has only 
offered a summary explanation of those spaces and in many cases have been viewed 
as part of broader civil society. In addition, despite its incorporation into more recent 
literature this has also left gaps in that these spaces have not been treated in the same 
way formal/institutionalised organisations have, which is to distinguish them outright 
and to assess their effectiveness.  
 
Despite the literature addressing informal spaces in detail being few and far between, 
latest studies looking beyond the Arab revolts have sought to examine how the civil 
society landscape in the region has been conceptualised in the past and proposes a 
new typology for MENA civil society actors.  
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From the context of democratisation in a post Arab spring era, Anders Hardig creates 
a typology in order to structure comparisons between disparate cases of civil society 
efforts and bring to the forefront issues of authenticity and legitimacy. These 
challenges emanating not only from an oppressive state, but from within civil society 
itself. The question Hardig seeks to ask is how best scholars can study the dynamics 
of “bottom up” pressures for democratisation, given the diverse and complex make up 
of civil society.115  
 
From the theoretical perspective, Hardig incorporates the work of Gramsci, in that civil 
society ought to be conceptualised as a space as oppose to a community, where civil 
society should not be confined to the realm of non-state actors, but the site where 
‘cultural hegemony’ is exerted by the state.116 Gramsci understood that states do not 
simply rule by coercion, rather there has to be a level of consent involved. In this 
respect, dominant groups exercise cultural hegemony through civil society. However 
civil society is also the location where counter movements challenging the authenticity 
and legitimacy of the status quo are launched.117 At any given time, there are a number 
of alternative ‘narratives of reality’ espoused through informal venues (in the MENA 
context – various Islamist narratives, secular-liberal narratives, anti-globalisation 
narratives etc.). State actors (as alluded to earlier in years building up to 2011 Arab 
revolts as noted by Bayat) respond to these challenges not necessarily through 
coercion, but also through entering the realm of civil society and engaging with CSOs 
both through contention and co-operation.  
 
From the democratisation perspective, Hardig therefore asserts that if you want to 
understand how political participation is broadened, civil society needs to be known 
not as a club or association with members, but more broadly as a space where diverse 
actors engage both through contention and co-operation.118 Hardig goes on to use 
Arabic terminology for civil society in order to introduce this typology. ‘Al-mujtama al-
ahli’ and ‘al-mujtama al-madani’ – the term ‘ahli’ implying kinship or indigenous, and 
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this category of civil society includes faith and community based associational forms 
that can be said to have deeper social roots and longer history in the region. (Pertinent 
examples in context of this research could include the Kuwaiti diwaniyya and the 
Bahraini Matam – a space not too different from a mosque where religious rites take 
place but would be likened more to a cultural centre.) The second term ‘madani’ 
implies a civic orientation and is more akin to Western-liberal conceptualisation of civil 
society, such as formal NGOs.119 
 
This typology is based on a fundamental distinction between ‘indigenous’ and ‘civic’ 
civil societies, while recognising that members of each share the same realm of activity 
and are not necessarily in opposition with each other. One example could be someone 
who is a member of a registered CSO but also happens to attend diwaniyyat or majalis. 
What is particularly striking, is how Hardig notes that both emerging and traditional 
informal networks can be both ‘ahli’ or ‘madani’ and share one common theme in that 
they operate outside formal organisational structures. Hardig offers the examples of 
unemployed yet highly educated university students who were instrumental in both 
Tunisia and Egypt’s 2011 revolts. There is also a growing number of informal 
associations, active in various sectors such as poverty alleviation, advocacy and 
community organising. These informal associations are often critical of established 
CSO actors, who they merely view as development professionals (or opportunists) and 
are too dependent on foreign funding.120 
 
For Hardig, informal associations potentially represent a new or as he phrases 
‘organic’ civic segment of MENA civil society, a socially rooted civic movement wary 
of the global development industry, which is why these spaces tend to be found on the 
indigenous or ‘ahli’ side of the typology.121 This typology showcases the vibrancy and 
(contrary to conventional wisdom throughout several bodies of literature) the strength 
of civil society as an arena for oppositional politics, but it also brings to the forefront 
the challenges that emanate from within civil society itself, as opposed to merely citing 
the difficulties operating within an authoritarian context, as much of the existing 
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scholarship tends to do. Therefore, taking seriously the scholarly framing of civil 
society as a realm of contention, populated by formal and informal actors, means 
having to establish an analytical construct that emphasises the specific ways in which 
efforts are made to broaden the space for political participation.122  
Where this research will seek to expand on Hardig’s typology, is to move the debate 
away from political participation as such and address the increasingly prominent issue 
of sectarian relations within Kuwait and Bahrain, and how informal associations have 
impacted on inter-communal relations and how these spaces have reacted to state 
policies toward both denominations.  
 
This brings forth the next section, as this research seeks to contribute to the relatively 
scarce literature on informal civil society in two principal ways. Primarily it will offer 
empirical insights into the political expediency of informal political spaces in Kuwait 
and Bahrain. Moreover, what sets this research apart from existing discourse is by 
focusing on the potential impact they have on inter-communal relations, particularly in 
light of the proliferation and increasing portrayal of sectarian identities following the 
events of the 2011 Arab uprisings. 
 
2.3 Scholarship on Sectarianism and Civil Society  
As this thesis is intimately concerned with the inter-connect between informal civil 
society and sectarianism, a closer look at the extant literature on this theme is 
warranted. Overall, a review of the extant literature reveals that what has emerged out 
of the contexts in which sectarianism has been studied, is primarily concerned with 
regional/transnational manifestations and causes that have instigated power shifts 
within the region due to the increasingly distinctive marker of sectarian identities. In 
addition to this, very little on the domestic level connect between civil society and 
sectarianism is available.  
 
This section will therefore look at several approaches and in what context has 
sectarianism been discussed. In a recent paper on sectarian identity politics, Helle 
Malmvig typified the ongoing issues surrounding the three prominent approaches to 
sectarianism, those being primoridalism, instrumentalism and historical sociology. The 
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principal issue being is that all three approaches have a propensity to explain away 
sectarianism by reducing the phenomenon to factors that are exterior to sectarian 
identity politics itself. With that in mind, these approaches have yet to provide an 
explanatory focus in terms of what sectarianism means, how it becomes a source of 
conflict and what makes it distinct and effective compared to other identity and 
ideational claims.123 
 
The primordial approach can be seen most visibly across media coverage, and has 
also featured within policy analysis and diplomatic circles. Primoridalism is premised 
on the idea that sectarianism lay at the heart of conflicts in the Middle East, with the 
Sunni-Shia conflict being viewed as an ancient and ongoing struggle. Sectarian 
identities are therefore perceived to be primary or natural and presumably played out 
between two clearly defined religious sects. Leaving little analysis for the study of 
overlapping or inter-sectarian identities, and although primordialists do acknowledge 
that sectarianism has varied historically, and therefore is not a constant in Middle East 
politics, this is largely interpreted as a type of overlay or repression that have kept 
latent sectarian identities under the radar.124  
 
In contrast, instrumentalists are deeply sceptical about using a sectarian framework to 
explain the causes of the region’s present struggles and rivalries. Sectarian identities 
are primarily seen as superficial political constructs, open to manipulation and 
exploitation by political elites, who use sectarian fear-mongering to garner vested 
patron-client relationships, as gateways to mass mobilisation, or as powerful levers in 
regional rivalries. To understand why sectarianism has risen over the last decades, 
instrumentalists primarily look to the way that authoritarian states have exacerbated 
sectarian divisions both domestically and regionally in order to prop up their regimes 
and remain in power.125  
 
Precisely because sectarianism is exacerbated by, and plays into the hands of 
authoritarian regimes, instrumentalists are wary that the primordialist approach may 
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lead to dangerous political prescriptions, including that which is inclined towards 
solutions involving the heavy hand of the state to suppress the supposedly inevitable 
violence between sectarian communities.126 Moreover, instrumentalists rightly point 
out that the primordialist approach often neglects the multiple crosscutting divisions, 
alliances and overlapping identities within the so-called Sunni and Shia camps. For 
instance, by analysing the Saudi-Iranian rivalry as a struggle driven by sectarian 
motivations, it is difficult to explain the alliance between Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and 
Iran, as well as the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Indeed, both Iran and 
Saudi Arabia have crossed the sectarian fault line when seeking regional allies. 
Similarly to the logic in the domestic arena, Saudi Arabia may use sectarianism 
regionally to mobilise local clients in conflict zones, or as a way to discredit Iran.127 
Instrumentalists importantly point to the power and politics involved in sectarian 
identity politics, and to the analytical and political consequences of operating with an 
underlying assumption of essentialist identities. However, to instrumentalists, 
sectarianism is precisely an “ism”, a form of ideology up for grasp alongside other 
ideologies in the region. The conflation of ideology and identity is however problematic 
for several reasons.  
 
In contrast to the primordialist, who implicitly assumes sectarianism to be a deep 
structure overlaid by power, instrumentalists see material power as a deep structure 
that moves sectarianism. This implies that sectarianism is removed from the equation 
and can be instead explained away.128 Sectarianism is therefore assumed to be just 
another ideology cynically used by power-holders, but with this conclusion comes 
several discrepancies. One of which is that it does not account for sectarian identity 
politics having become increasingly prominent over the last decade, or what has made 
it become salient compared to other regional ideologies. In other words, given that 
instrumentalists presume sectarianism is a mere expression of continuous universal 
power struggles, they are less focused on the particularities of sectarian identity 
formations or what it means to make sectarian claims.129  
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On the other hand, advocates of the historical sociology approach who, like the 
instrumentalist, are still adopting a state-centric position but shifting its focus from a 
mechanism of the authoritarian state to arguing that it is foremost the gradual 
weakening of state structures, the army, the policy force and the ability to deliver 
protection and services that creates the conditions of possibilities for sectarianism.130  
To scholars inspired by historical sociology, the rise of sectarian identity politics is thus 
primarily a question of sufficient strong state structures (or the lack thereof) at the 
domestic level, prompting communities either to seek protection with sub-state actors 
or regional patrons. In contrast to instrumentalists, historical sociologists do, to a 
certain extent, analyse these identities as different from ideologies. Sectarian identities 
are seen as more entrenched than mere ideology and more difficult to change or 
reverse once they have become established in popular discourse and practices. 
However, as in the case of instrumentalists, sectarian identity itself is withdrawn from 
the explanation by making it a function of something else. Sectarian identifications 
constitute a type of fall-back position ready to be used in situations of heightened 
insecurity and state collapse, in which individuals or groups, out of rational self-
interest, seek safety, goods, and order. However, as in the case of the instrumentalist 
approach, sectarianism is implicitly presumed to be a tool for self-preservation and a 
form of passive undercurrent available to sub-state elites when state structures 
collapse.131 
 
Regarding the literature on post-colonialism, scholars such as Makdisi, notes how 
ta’iffiya’ or sectarianism, was a symptom of shortcomings of the relatively new Middle 
Eastern nation-state and operates as a countervailing force in the push for national 
identities to manifest. ‘Sectarianism is a neologism born in the age of nationalism to 
signify the antithesis of nation; its meaning is predicated on and constructed against a 
territorially-bounded liberal nation-state. In Lebanon, sectarianism is as modern and 
authentic as the nation-state. In fact, the two cannot be dissociated.’132   
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It is in this respect that much of the existing scholarship surrounding sectarianism has 
been written in the context of post-colonialism. Observers like Makdisi, note how 
sectarianism within the Middle Eastern context followed on from the advent of colonial 
modernity, as many of the new Arab states were confronted with the issue of defining 
the nation, this was problematic more so as many subjects of past empires had not 
been accustomed to the nation-state. With the notable exception of Egypt and Iran, 
the new-found nations had to invent their historical legacy, with many citizens turning 
towards religious identity as the most discernible marker of identity. This has even 
proven to be the case in the secular states of the Levant, ‘Even though Lebanon is not 
an Islamic state, its society is a mirror image of the sectarian tension among various 
religious groups.’133   
 
More recently, scholars such as Marechal and Zemni, have framed the discussions 
surrounding sectarian relations around the idea of transnationalism and how regional 
actors vying for influence utilise and play on sectarian identities in the region to their 
advantage, namely in the hope of establishing client states.134 Following from this, it 
becomes evident therefore that much of the discourse around Middle Eastern 
sectarianism is often in relation to Iranian and Saudi foreign policy. Arguably 
commencing with the advent of Pan-Islamism in the form of the 1979 Iranian 
revolution, much of the discussions (particularly in Middle Eastern scholarship) had 
initially connected sectarianism with the ‘Iranian threat’ to regional Sunni powers which 
was none more exemplified than in the case of the Iran-Iraq war 1980-88. However, 
more recently, scholarship on sectarianism (through the lens of securitisation and 
authoritarian survival) have also focused on government policies of some Arab Gulf 
states, namely Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in stoking sectarian sentiment.135 Analysts 
such as Hammond, for instance, note how there was a counter-Sunni mobilisation of 
sorts in the wake of what many had perceived as Iran exporting a revolutionary brand 
of Shi’ism.  
 
                                                          
133 Kumaraswamy, P R, “Who am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East”, MERIA, Vol 10, No 1, 2006, 64. 
134 Marechal, Brigitte, and Sami Zemni. The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia Relationships: Doctrine, Transnationalism, 
Intellectuals and the Media. London: Hurst &, 2013.  
135 Wehrey, Frederic M. Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2014.  
73 
 
As one particular incident that remains relatively elusive in the course of sectarian 
relations is the Wahhabi revolt that occurred in the same year as the Iranian revolution, 
also recognised as the al-Sahwa or the awakening. Hammond describes how the 
seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979 by a group of Wahhabi zealots inevitably brought 
about the making of a neo-Wahhabism (or sometimes described as neo-Salafism) akin 
to the puritanism of al-Wahhabiya that now expressed the political concern of Sunni 
Islamists in the Arab context.136  
 
With regards to the existing discourse on sectarianism, this development was a key 
determining factor in the trajectory of inter-sect relations in that it set the precedent for 
a new wave of revolutionary Islamic activism and would create fears for the Saudi 
monarchy, who saw their own political fate coming under intense scrutiny following the 
ousting of Iran’s Shah, hence a process of religious assimilation to appease domestic 
Islamists was to become the appropriate course of action. Such a rationale is key to 
discourse on transnationalism, as this set the stage for both Iran and Saudi Arabia to 
exert their influence across the region, which includes the state ideologies they 
promote. This is particularly the case for Saudi Arabia, which has been reported by 
government officials and academics as having invested millions of its petrodollars into 
funding religious seminaries and other initiatives around the Muslim world.137  
 
However, some of the discourse on nationalism has sought to downplay the role 
sectarianism has played across the region, particularly in its criticism of the claim that 
religion can easily counterweigh nationalist sentiment, with the popularity of Pan-
Islamic thought. As Terhalle remarks, for instance, ‘Nationalism has proven capable 
of outweighing religion where the Shias’ loyalty to the state is concerned. From 1981-
1988, Shi’i Iraqi fighters fought a remorseless war against Iran. Then, after the 1992 
Gulf War, Iran remained neutral while the Iraqi Shia rose up against Saddam and were 
massacred. These two event illustrate the strength of nationalism. It divided Iran and 
Iraq decisively and is entrenched in the memories of both countries. During the war 
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between Iran and Iraq, the latter’s nationalism appealed more to Shia Iraqi soldiers 
than did Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric.’138 
 
However, as most of the literature deals with sectarianism in regard to the 
transnational influence it currently occupies within the Arab world, the direct 
relationship between civil society and sectarianism has seldom been mentioned in any 
theoretical and or empirical regional literature to date. The literature that does exist in 
this field and mostly in the Lebanese context has argued that there is a recursive 
relation between sectarian elites and civil society actors. With sectarian elites aiming 
to pursue their political and socioeconomic interests at the expense of civil society 
organisations (CSOs), whereas on the other side, civil society actors instrumentalise 
the sectarian political system and its resources to advance their own organisational or 
personal advantage. These mutually reinforcing dynamics enable sectarian elites to 
penetrate, besiege or co-opt CSOs as well as extend their clientelist networks to CSOs 
that should otherwise be leading efforts to establish cross-sectarian affiliations and 
modes of political mobilisation or those that expressly seek to challenge the sectarian 
system.139  
 
However, as opposed to looking specifically at the Lebanese context and by focusing 
on Kuwait and Bahrain, this thesis will seek to specifically address the under-theorised 
relationship between sectarianism and the role played by civil society actors, which, 
until now, has insufficiently been examined both across the Middle East and the Gulf 
in particular. This research will aim to demonstrate how political events, both 
domestically and throughout the region, have impacted the way in which informal 
political spaces conduct themselves and moreover whether they have the ability to 
mitigate or perpetuate sectarian sentiment as securitising/de-securitising actors. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
As mentioned in the introduction, this literature review has sought to examine the 
various bodies of literature pertaining to civil society in Gulf States by clustering them 
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into various approaches, cultural, institutional and strategic. These factors or 
explanations for the state of civil society in the region, highlight how civil society and 
its application particularly in the MENA region remains a contested notion.  
This research however will seek to expand on the strategic explanation for civil society, 
as the criticism of dynasticism and the essentialist logic that arise from cultural or 
institutional factors, renders the strategic or political-economy approach to be the most 
sophisticated explanation as to the limitations on civil society and the robustness of 
authoritarian powers, whilst leaving scope for research to be conducted on emerging 
political spaces.  
 
With regards to the debates evolving on informal civil society, much of the discourse 
has been centred around its conceptualisation, as several bodies of discourse, from 
civil society and globalisation to Eurocentric conceptualisations of civil society have 
contested as to what constitutes civil society and whether non-institutional, informal 
spaces can be classified as such. Whilst acknowledging the limited reference to 
informal associations in past discourse, the latest scholarship looking beyond the Arab 
revolts is starting to take notice of informal spaces as a need to re-evaluate pre-
conceived notions of what civil society entails in the Middle East. A typology of the 
various spaces in associational life is therefore required in order to understand the 
latest phenomenon of popular mobilisation across the region.  
 
Nevertheless, it is sufficed to say that little attention has been given to these spaces 
when observing civil society in the region more broadly, hence the need to look at the 
political efficacy of these spaces and the interconnect they have with the rising trend 
of sectarian identities.  
 
When it comes to the discourse on sectarianism, even Malmvig acknowledges that 
despite the three major approaches lending themselves to understanding the existing 
regional order in the Middle East, they have yet to provide an account for why everyday 
local sectarian practices take place, and in different settings. It is here where it is 
76 
 
argued that more anthropological approaches maybe conducive to explore in 
understanding sectarian identity politics.140  
 
Furthermore, and in relation to this research, neither instrumentalists nor the historical 
sociologists approaches can provide adequate explanations as to why, in the context 
of Kuwait for example, there are bottom-up pressures that utilise or play on sectarian 
expressions/rhetoric/articulations, given that the state has demonstrated, at least in 
recent times, that it is not actively seeking to exploit sectarian divisions, at least not to 
the level of its GCC counterparts, namely Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. A pertinent 
example of Kuwait’s more measured response can be epitomised in the events 
following the January 2 attacks on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran in 2016. Kuwait did 
temporarily recall its ambassador following the event, however unlike the Saudi 
administration, it did not sever diplomatic ties with Iran.  
“Instead, by taking limited action, Kuwait kept the door open for improved ties 
with Iran…The government’s interest in not antagonizing Kuwait’s Shiite 
minority was likely another factor in the decision.”141 
 
Likewise, the historical sociologist approach is not applicable because the state is by 
and large stable compared to most of its neighbours. Conversely, where there is a 
rather assertive top-down instrumentalising of sectarianism, as is the case in Bahrain, 
it does not explain why there are grassroots movements that are looking to mobilise 
via cross-denominational coalitions.  It is for that reason, that sectarianism ought to be 
studied in the context of civil society, and more specifically, the informal spaces that 
are looking to redefine sectarian relations by presenting an alternative outlook and 
presenting new discourses that could fly in the face of state-sponsored narratives on 
sectarianism.  
 
However, a larger unanswered question looms as to what extent civil society itself has 
contributed to such narratives, much of the existing literature makes the assumption 
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that it has attempted to draw bridges between denominations, however has its failure 
(at least in terms of formal civil society) in being effective been a result of civil society 
being drawn along sectarian lines itself. This is particularly pertinent to Islamist 
associations and their respective youth societies which will be elucidated further on in 
this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Theorising on Informal Politics, Civil Society and Sectarianism  
This chapter develops a comprehensive theoretical framework through which it will be 
possible to explore the research questions posed and the empirical data gathered. 
When reviewing the existing literature on civil society, what was apparent was a need 
for a theoretical approach that was more inclusive than traditional conceptualisations 
of civil society. The rationale behind incorporating elements of the rights-based 
approach (RBA) and multi-dimensional framework is grounded in its focus on the 
space/location and the discussions that arise from those spaces themselves. As 
oppose to traditional notions of civil society, which have often focused on 
organisations. Applying these frameworks will broaden the perceived requisites to 
what can be treated as civil society, particularly in the context of both case studies 
where traditional CSOs have often been co-opted by the state; regarded as ineffective 
and redundant by earlier scholarship. 
 
Where RBA links to the central research theme of sectarianism, is in the precedence 
it gives to civic spaces complying with a universally recognised notion of human rights 
and the significance it places on capacity building. This is particularly important when 
approaching inter-communal relations as the discourse on rights, namely questions 
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pertaining to religious pluralism and cultural rights are central to existing debates on 
the nature of sectarian relations in both Kuwait and Bahrain. Likewise capacity-
building, whereby the process of developing and strengthening the skills, interests, 
abilities and processes that both organisations and communities need in order to 
survive, adapt and thrive in a fast-changing world. This will serve to demonstrate or 
rather assess how effective these emerging informal spaces are in tackling 
contemporary issues. One of which, is the pressing problem of sectarian identities and 
the perceived polarisation of communities where political instability is felt.  
 
When addressing the multi-dimensional approach, there are several sub-dimensions 
that are intrinsically linked to dealing with sectarian relations. Namely, those 
concerning the environmental factors in which civil society operates, under what 
conditions does civil society function in Bahrain and Kuwait and moreover its emphasis 
on interrelations within society. This will be factored into the research when measuring 
the impact or social utility of these informal spaces, particularly in dealing with 
sectarian relations.   
 
The emphasis on environmental factors in which informal civil society operates shall 
directly feed into the model that will be applied when analysing sectarianism in both 
countries, which will be grounded in Althusser’s ideological state apparatus or ISA. 
Distinguishing itself from the repressive state apparatus or CSA (which shall be 
discussed further on), ISA rather focuses on the institutions that are utilised by the 
state which tacitly disseminate an ideological narrative that serves to cement its 
hegemony over citizens. Prime examples of such institutions propagating an ISA 
would be state-run or state-regulated media outlets, the education system and 
government clergy/religious ministries. By operating through various mediums such 
as media and education, it will be beneficial to observe the rhetoric applied by state 
institutions and to assess how this sentiment could be reflective throughout society 
itself. 
 
This eclectic theoretical approach, incorporating elements of various models, will 
ultimately make way for more informal, ephemeral arenas to enter wider civil society 
debates. Whilst altogether shifting the discussion on the role of civil society away from 
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democratisation/authoritarianism to other increasingly pressing issues within Kuwait 
and Bahrain, such as the politics of sectarianism and the forming of transnational 
identities that have arisen from recent events across the region. 
  
3.1 Rights-Based (RBA) and Multi-Dimensional Approaches to Civil Society  
As previously mentioned, a key approach to broadening civil society in order to 
incorporate informal spaces is to observe the rights-based approach or RBA. This 
forms one of the key pillars through which informal civil society as a concept can be 
both observed and analysed when approaching the empirical data. The rights-based 
approach to development has been adopted by many CSOs and the UN as a relatively 
new approach within development studies. It combines many different concepts of 
international development, such as capacity building, human rights, participation and 
sustainability. The goal of a rights-based approach is to empower groups that do not 
exercise full rights and to strengthen the capacity of duty-bearers or the institution or 
government obligated to fulfil these rights.  
 
Right-based approaches (RBA) seek to hold governments and other duty-bearers to 
be accountable to citizens and encourage rights-holders to claim their rights. 
Demanding accountability does not simply imply confrontation with the state.142 In 
addition to this, rights-based approaches emphasise the importance of state and civil 
society dialogue and finding mechanisms for rights-holder and duty-bearer (i.e. the 
state) interaction.143 This could be applicable when applied to the more established 
informal settings, such as public diwaniyyat and local majalis. In this respect, 
observing informal spaces through the lens of RBA can prove to show how the state 
(in some capacity) must interact with such spaces as they could circumvent their 
sphere of control, or in the case of diwaniyyat for example, they are protected by the 
constitution itself.  
 
With this in mind, RBA can also be useful with regards to reframing the discussion on 
civic participation – making way for informal spaces to either bypass or have a more 
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direct relationship with the state regarding demands or grievances. RBA provides a 
new frame within which to signal a move towards a more genuinely inclusive and 
democratic process of popular involvement in decision-making over the resources and 
institutions that affect people's lives.144 
 
In addition to this, Gready highlights the value-added of RBA in its explicit reference 
to relations between civil society and the state. Gready notes how RBA re-centres the 
state and asks the question about its appropriate role in development. In this respect, 
RBAs add value by calling the state into account; building capacities of rights holders 
and duty bearers and encourages a new kind of ownership of human rights among 
CSOs.145 Of course, this is regarding institutionalised or formal CSOs, but the inclusion 
of informal associations will become more notable with the multi-dimensional 
framework by Malena and Heinrich (2007) which shall be discussed further on.  
 
With regards to civic participation and empowering rights holders, RBA ties in with the 
focus on inter-communal/sectarian relations; as the demand for universally recognised 
rights sheds light on more contentious topics – and in this regard sectarian policies. 
With this in mind, applying RBA will determine whether informal spaces are an 
expedient venue in airing grievances pertaining to sectarianism through open and 
frank discussions where human rights nomenclature often features, namely how the 
state may impede on religious pluralism and the cultural rights of religious 
communities. This could potentially provide a new model for capacity-building within 
those countries both on an inter-communal and state-societal level. Incorporating a 
rights-based approach will serve as a framework to assess whether informal 
associations in Kuwait are more proactive in the rapprochement between communities 
than in Bahrain. The infringement on rights within the kingdom at the level of the state, 
compounded by the instituting of exclusionary policies, has had an adverse effect 
when it comes to inter-communal relations. Compared to Kuwait where relations 
between religious denominations are perceived to be more cordial as state policies 
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are not seen to disenfranchise particular groups and, therefore, do not actively seek 
to polarise religious communities to the same degree as in the Bahraini context. In 
sum, RBA, as promoted by development studies scholars such as Cornwall and 
Nyamu-Musembi and Gready rests on the following principles: 
 
1. In the form of capacity building – through this feature, the research will seek to 
assess how effective informal spaces are in tackling contemporary issues and what 
skills/abilities/assets do they potentially possess over traditional CSOs that will serve 
them well in addressing the pressing problem of sectarian polarisation, where formal 
civil society may be unable to confront such contentious topics.  
2. RBA also emphasises notion of state-civil society dialogue as oppose to merely 
direct confrontation, by focusing on informal spaces that can bypass the state’s 
reach/influence. This could potentially pave the way for more direct dialogue between 
state and civil society in addressing social grievances. This can already be evidenced 
in the case of MP/Public diwaniyyat/majalis where citizens can air their 
demands/complaints or even raise a particular subject that may not see the light of 
day within co-opted CSOs or state institutions such as parliament. 
 
3. RBA places the precedence on human rights when observing civil society, with this 
in mind, the research shall observe to what extent informal spaces are applying the 
language of human rights in raising the issue of sectarianism and how it impedes on 
several basic human rights, be it cultural rights or calls for religious pluralism to be 
tolerated and endorsed by the state. Informal civil society can therefore be observed 
through this lens – if it is effective in demanding human rights, does this extend to try 
curtailing sectarian policies by the state and any inter-communal tension that may 
arise from those policies. 
 
One issue arising from the current discourse on civil society is that in contrast to the 
substantial literature on the concept itself, the study of civil society as an empirical 
reality, i.e. something observed, measured and shaped, is markedly underdeveloped. 
Over the last decade, it has become increasingly acknowledged that scientific and 
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practitioner communities know little about the strength and shape of civil society 
around the world let alone factors that are fostering or inhibiting its development.146 
 
It is evident that when observing the existing debates on civil society, the concept has 
proven difficult to both define and operationalise. Broadly understood as a space in 
society where “collective action” takes place, Malena and Heinrich (2007) produced a 
framework and methodology for measuring and comparing the state of different civil 
societies around the world. Grounded in development studies, this re-
conceptualisation of civil society(s), not only allows observers to recapture civil society 
within a more globalised context but enables researchers to bridge the perceived 
disconnect between theory on civil society and its practical application as a discernible 
reality.   
 
Within the context of Kuwait and Bahrain, this research will seek to address this issue 
by incorporating the overlooked variable of sectarian relations which, depending on 
the context, could either be promoting or inhibiting the development of various civil 
society initiatives. The rights-based and multi-dimensional approaches will serve as 
practical models for not only observing informal spaces within the broader context of 
civil society but will also offer a platform for understanding some of the variables that 
determine the strength of a particular space or group vis-à-vis state impingement on 
civic life. For this to be possible, civil society ought to be treated as a public arena and 
to move away from the traditional Euro-centric conceptualisations that emphasise a 
focus on formal organisations. 
 
Based on previous research within global development studies, conceptualising civil 
society as a public arena allows us to apply a more holistic view and explore critical 
factors that a narrower definition, which focuses solely on formal organisations would 
not detect. By focusing on arenas as opposed to organisations, this stresses the 
importance of civil society’s role in providing public spaces where diverse societal 
values and interests interact i.e. where people can come together to discuss, associate 
and seek to influence broader society.  
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Another issue that ties into the objectives of this research is that civil society definitions 
that focus solely on associations fail to account for more informal and ephemeral forms 
of collective action. This is where the multi-dimensional approach will mark its 
presence, as it accommodates to more informal, fluid forms of collective action as 
oppose to Western-centric models of conceptualising civil society. It is also important 
to note that given the existing legal, extra-legal and bureaucratic impediments facing 
formal CSOs in Kuwait and Bahrain, the institutional vacuum that may become visible 
can be then aided or supplemented by informal spaces that have flourished in more 
recent years and practically (if not legally) have come to dominate the civil society 
landscape. A prime example would be the suspension of parliament (particularly 
throughout the 1980s and during the Gulf war), which at times, has been replaced by 
informal discussions that took place within Kuwaiti diwaniyyat and to a lesser extent in 
Bahraini majalis.147    
 
The notion of “uncivil” civil society is also important to this research particularly with 
regards to sectarianism, which will feature as part of the multi-dimensional framework. 
Lawrence Whitehead, uses multiple criteria to define uncivil civil society, by 1.) The 
lack of commitment to act within the constraints of legal or pre-established rules and 
2.) The lack of a spirit of civility i.e. possessing certain negative traits of interpersonal 
behaviour…this relates more to the ideals of organisations.148   
 
This idea will be of particular importance when addressing sectarian relations as it 
refutes the normative content/assumptions that civil society is inherently democratic 
or even oriented towards the elusive concept of public good. Through the lens of global 
development, in real ‘civil societies' throughout the globe, the scope of interests 
advanced collectively in the public sphere is broad. This includes democratic, 
progressive, as well as undemocratic, fundamentalist and uncivil ones, such as violent 
demonstrations, hate speeches or deal-striking behind closed doors. Again, this 
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factors in sectarian relations, as initiatives or discussions around rapprochement and 
polarisation are both shaped by democratic and non-democratic elements of this broad 
public space, a key question that aims to be addressed as part of this research when 
looking at the impact and influence of informal spaces both in Kuwait and Bahrain.  
It is also important to note that the emphasis on citizens within the multi-dimensional 
framework is crucial in theorising informal civil society as the venue itself is primarily 
influenced by who frequents the space and the ideas they harbour in discussions. 
Again this is in contrast to formal organisations – a feature more commonly affiliated 
with associational life.  
 
To conceptualise the notion of civil society in a more holistic manner and in order to 
facilitate the inclusion of informal spaces so that it can be applied as a model to answer 
some of the key research questions. This research will, therefore, incorporate a rights-
based and multi-dimensional approach grounded in development studies to the study 
of informal spaces and sectarianism in Bahrain and Kuwait. More specifically, it will 
adopt the four-dimensional framework proposed by Malena and Heinrich, in their 
theorising on civil society. They devise four key dimensions when examining the worth 
or rather the social utility of any CSO or informal space. Those variables are; structure, 
environment, values and impact. The four dimensions framework will serve as a useful 
template not only when analysing the empirical data but can accommodate or rather 
ties in with other theoretical approaches that will be relevant in answering key research 
questions.  
 
Diagram A – Multi-Dimensional Framework  
85 
 
 
Key to diagram:  
*Intrinsic link to central research theme of inter-communal relations. 
** Ties to RBA – Human Rights discourse. 
*** Ties to ISA – Extent to which state narrative on sectarian relations reflective in 
spaces. 
**** Ties to ISA – Extent to which state dominates informal spaces – potential 
limitations of informal civil society. 
***** Ties to RBA – Informal spaces as platform for capacity-building. 
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The first dimension, structure, examines the overall size and make-up of the civil 
society arena, its actors, activities and resources. The second dimension, 
environment, focuses on the external environment in which civil society exists and 
functions, and the extent to which various aspects of that environment are enabling or 
disabling. The third dimension, values, assesses the values that are practised or 
promulgated within the civil society arena, and the extent to which these values serve 
the “common good”. The fourth dimension, impact, evaluates the impact of activities 
pursued by civil society actors, particularly concerning governance and development 
goals.149   
 
When addressing the first dimension; structure, this feature is composed of a total of 
six sub-dimensions but only four of those sub-dimensions explicitly relate to the 
research at hand, namely when addressing the triangular relationship between 
informal spaces, inter-communal relations and homing in on the broader civil society 
debate. The first of those is diversity within civil society; by reconceptualising civil 
society as an arena where conflicting interests and power relations are played out, the 
equitable representation of various social groups within civil society, especially 
traditionally marginalised groups, is considered an important feature.150 The emphasis 
on traditionally marginalised groups and its place within civil society is undoubtedly 
linked to this research. The focus on sectarian relations within informal spaces will 
enable to provide a better understanding of whether disenfranchised groups seek to 
look beyond the traditional confines of civil society and to see whether informal spaces 
(particularly emerging youth groups) resonate more with disenfranchised 
communities.  
The next sub-dimension is level of organisation; this measures the stability and 
potential for expansion as well as its capacity for collective action. Indicators to 
measure this feature include the existence and effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies 
and support organisations, alongside the efforts made to self-regulate, by members or 
visitors of that particular space. In respect to this research, this feature will be applied 
to see whether informal spaces (especially youth societies) are operating 
                                                          
149 Malena, Carmen, and Volkhart Finn Heinrich. "Can We Measure Civil Society? A Proposed Methodology for 
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independently or under the wing of a broader CSO. Moreover, the self-regulatory 
aspect will be a key feature when assessing informal spaces and the extent to which 
they can circumvent state authorities when carrying out their activities.  
 
Interrelations is yet another sub-dimension that is vital to understanding the structure 
and ultimately the strength of informal spaces. Interrelations measures the extent to 
which diverse actors share information and co-operate with one another, by assessing 
the extent of communication and cross-sectoral cooperation and alliance-building 
among CSOs.151 This serves as a critical feature when applied to the research at hand, 
regarding analysing data and answering key questions surrounding the level of co-
operation that exists amongst informal civil society actors and the extent to which they 
can bridge gaps where the state has sought to polarise communities, as is the case 
particularly in the Bahraini context.  
 
Resources are another component to measuring informal civil society under the wider 
umbrella of the structure of CSOs. This feature shall look to shed light on the resources 
available to the arena, space or group in question. It evaluates the extent to which 
CSOs have adequate financial, human and technological resources to achieve their 
aims.152 This is important to assess when observing the overall efficacy of informal 
spaces. One question that may demonstrate their limitations is the inadequate lack of 
funds/donorships they receive from external non-state sources. However, some 
spaces, particularly those positioned in the home or community centre (e.g. 
diwaniyyat, majalis) may come to highlight that funding is not necessarily an essential 
feature to carry out its principal function of providing a platform for discussions and 
networking that could potentially materialise in some form of civic activism.   
The second key dimension devised by Malena and Heinrich, is the environment in 
which informal civil society operates, is perhaps the most crucial factor incorporated 
into this research, particularly the interconnect with other theoretical approaches that 
shall serve as a template for understanding the way in which informal spaces function 
in Bahrain and Kuwait and their standing within wider state-societal relations. This 
dimension will become pertinent when establishing the link to another theoretical 
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approach widely known as ideological state apparatus, or ISA, which shall be touched 
upon in greater detail in section 4.3.  
 
The dimension itself illustrates how enabling or disabling the external environment is 
for civil society and more broadly citizen empowerment. The emphasis on environment 
naturally distinguishes itself from conventional understandings of civil society. Not only 
does it observes legal factors that have often impeded on formal CSOs but also 
comprises of an assessment of political, constitutional, social, economic and cultural 
factors. Addressing these external factors are more conducive to understanding the 
manner in which informal civil society operates and how it can either succeed or fail in 
bringing religious communities closer. 
 
Again, as with structure, the notion of environment is sub-divided into distinct sub-
dimensions of relevance to this research. The first of these sub-dimension is political 
context. Factoring in the political context in both Kuwait and Bahrain is crucial in 
recognising the parameters by which civil society operates, which ties in closely with 
another sub-dimension, basic freedom and rights. More pertinent to the discussion on 
formal CSOs, this assesses the rights and liberties that directly relate to the functioning 
of civil society. Indicators that ought to be observed when addressing this feature 
would be to look at basic civil liberties (e.g. state of freedom of expression, assembly 
and association) and how are these circumscribed within the formal realm, and where 
informal groupings/spaces can potentially fill the void. This sub-dimension is ultimately 
used to measure the extent to which the law in both countries safeguards these 
freedoms and how well protected they are in practice.153  
This feature could potentially provide explanations as to the emergence or increasing 
popularity and demand for informal associations within the context of Kuwait and 
Bahrain. 
 
Another important sub-dimension falling under the external environment aspect is the 
socio-economic context and its impact on civil society. When drawing on the issue of 
sectarian relations, this feature deals with a range of conditions that are often known 
to stifle civil society. Within the context of this research, this needs to be taken into 
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consideration, as severe ethnic or religious conflict have often stemmed from socio-
economic disparity between various groups, which also has a detrimental impact on 
formally recognised civil society groups. One key question this research sets out to 
answer is whether informal spaces could be the exception to the rule or like formal 
CSOs is it influenced by broader social issues. 
 
Closely linked to this sub-dimension is the socio-cultural context in which civil society 
functions. This feature seeks to measure levels of trust, tolerance and public-
spiritedness amongst members of society, as indicators of the extent to which socio-
cultural norms and attitudes are conducive to civil society.154 The role of socio-cultural 
norms and attitudes within informal spaces will be pivotal when looking more closely 
at the ISA’s operating within both countries and the extent to which the state’s narrative 
on sectarian relations is reflective within these spaces. Furthermore, how could the 
state’s portrayal of various communities be influencing the way informal groups 
operate – are they looking to replicate or break away from the state script and how 
does that bear on relations between sectarian communities? A prime example of this 
could be the state perception of the Shia community in Kuwait, which is largely 
favourable, often regarded as loyalists, whereas the Bahraini state views its Shia 
population as potential fifth columnists of Iran. 
 
Linking to such questions is the relationship between state and civil society that shall 
be incorporated into the research by making the link between the multi-dimensional 
approach to informal civil society and the theory of ideological state apparatuses. This 
feature is intrinsic to this research as it focuses on the nature and quality of state-
societal relations. It shall also observe the level of autonomy that informal spaces 
acquire vis-à-vis the state. Broadly speaking, this is seen to be more pertinent to 
informal civil society as in both the Kuwaiti and Bahraini contexts informal spaces are 
perceived to be more autonomous than formal CSOs in the region. One question that 
arises however, is the extent to which they are immune from state interference and 
depending on the results from the empirical data, how does that in turn impact inter-
communal relations. If the state is also proven to dominate certain aspects of informal 
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civil society, in what way does that impede on inter-communal rapprochement, if at all, 
and which spaces in particular are effected?  
 
Another indicator of this sub-dimension is to observe any state-civil society dialogue 
this is vital when addressing ISA’s impact on sectarian relations and the extent to 
which dialogue has been initiated by the state and informal spaces, particularly when 
it comes to addressing sensitive or contentious issues like sectarianism. Additionally, 
the level of cooperation and support between the state and informal civil society also 
needs to be factored in when analysing the data, whether such a thing exists and in 
what capacity.  
 
The third key dimension when incorporating Malena and Heinrich’s multi-dimensional 
approach to informal civil society is values. As alluded to previously, the purpose of 
this feature is to consider values that are practiced or promulgated within the civil 
society arena and the extent to which these values serve the “common good”. As the 
research looks to focus on sectarianism and inter-communal relations, what will be 
regarded as the common good, in the context of this research will be whether these 
spaces can and actively try to facilitate cross-sectarian discussions and initiatives. In 
contrast to attempts that seek to further antagonising or be seen to polarise 
communities during such turbulent times in a post-2011 uprisings era. Two sub-
dimensions are of relevance to this discussion, namely issues surrounding tolerance 
and non-violence. With regards to tolerance, the multi-dimensional approach seeks to 
assess the balance between tolerant and intolerant forces within civil society and the 
extent to which civil society is engaged in promoting tolerance within society at 
large.155  
This is once again significant when looking at sectarian relations and addressing the 
effectiveness of informal spaces, by asking the question as to how inclusive or 
exclusive they are of others and how often they look to reach out beyond their 
respective communities. With that in mind, comes the issue of non-violence. Malena 
and Heinrich note that when civil society plays an important role in denouncing 
violence and resolving conflicts, it is also at times an arena where groups use violent 
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means to express their interests.156 Important to note that this research will apply this 
feature to see whether informal civil society can be used to diffuse tensions by asking 
whether they promote non-violence at the individual, household and societal levels 
and how these spaces can be used as a potential platform to address such issues 
surrounding inter-communal violence. 
 
The fourth and final dimension put forward by Malena and Heinrich concerns the 
impact of civil society actors on citizens and society more broadly. Two of the sub-
dimensions are of particular relevance to this research. One of those being the idea of 
holding the state to accountability, could informal civil society be used as a watchdog, 
holding state entities to accountability for their actions. A more notable sub-dimension 
is the notion of empowering citizens. This ties in with one of the key rationales for 
emphasising the significance of informal spaces, in particular, as it seeks to offer an 
avenue by which citizens have more options to participate in civic life than the 
traditional CSOs that are often co-opted by the state to its advantage, making them 
redundant. This harps back to the rights-based approach as one of the indicators for 
measuring citizen empowerment is to observe civil society’s impact on building 
capacity for collective action. By that, supporting individuals and groups in their efforts 
to organise, mobilising resources and working together to solve common problems.157 
Whilst building social capital by promoting trust, tolerance and public-spiritedness, 
which informal spaces seem to have the potential or capacity to achieve in certain 
situations. 
 
Another feature that touches on inter-communal relations once again is the idea of 
informal spaces having to meet societal needs; particularly in/for/with regards to 
marginalised sections of society. This sub-dimension aims to address how effective 
informal civil society is by meeting the needs of marginalised groups as compared with 
the state, who if anything, have instigated or exacerbated the problem in the first hand 
and how this may have detrimental implications for community relations. Therefore, 
one question this research will set out to ask is whether informal civil society can act 
as a platform to rectify inter-communal issues. As oppose to policies of alienating or 
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securitising populations that are ultimately infringing on the broader campaign for 
greater democratic liberties both within Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 
Of course, there were other sub-dimensions which Malena and Heinrich apply to their 
multi-dimensional framework. However, for the sake of this research they have 
purposefully been omitted as they are solely pertaining to formal civil society and 
cannot be observed or analysed in relation to informal spaces and its impact on 
sectarian relations. It was therefore important to specifically pick out the key features 
of each dimension that can be utilised to analyse the empirical data and to assess the 
social utility of the informal arena. Be it efficacy of such spaces in overcoming the state 
narrative, the demanding/advocating of human rights pertaining to sectarian policies 
and the positive/negative impact that then has on the nature of sectarian relations 
between communities in Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 
As noted in the diagram above, RBA and multi-dimensional approach come together 
within the environmental and impact dimensions, where the focus on advocating basic 
freedom and rights takes precedence in gauging the impact informal associations 
possess over the state. Moreover, the link between RBA and the multi-dimensional 
approach can be evidenced within the empowering citizens sub-dimension, which 
seeks to observe whether informal spaces serve as an ideal platform for capacity-
building – namely whether it obtains the necessary features/abilities/resources to 
bridge communities together.  
 
3.2 Ideological State Apparatus (ISA)  
Moving on from RBA and the multi-dimensional framework, the environmental factors 
within this model are inextricably linked to the following theoretical approach. In order 
to present a structural analysis of sectarianism based on the data provided, it is 
essential to look towards the notion of ideological state apparatus or (ISA) and how it 
distinguishes itself from the repressive or coercive state apparatus. Grounded in the 
works of Marxist theorists such as Althusser as part of his broader commentary on 
ideology, this apparatus will serve to facilitate a better understanding of how the state 
utilises sectarian policies through various institutional outlets or “soft power” 
mechanisms in order to assert its hegemony. By employing a dominant/normative 
93 
 
worldview on citizens through various avenues, the authoritarian state subsequently 
inhibits the otherwise potential influence traditional civil society actors could achieve 
and arguably alters the trajectory of inter-communal relations altogether in a 
detrimental manner. External factors (namely the state) and the resources it has at its 
disposal are crucial to evaluating the limitations of any CSO in achieving a notion of 
“common good” – as already established beforehand this would be seen as efforts to 
harmonise relations between religious communities in both Kuwait and Bahrain.   
 
Althusser’s position on ISA and how it differs from CSA is grounded in Marxist theory 
on the state. Commencing with the premise that the state (and its existence in its 
apparatus) has no meaning except as a function of state power. The whole of the 
political class struggle revolves around the state. The apparatus, which serves to prop 
up the state presents itself in the form of distinct and specialised institutions. This 
would directly tie into government ministries in Kuwait and Bahrain that deal with 
licencing CSOs, but to what extent do they have a hold or can monitor informal groups 
remains to be observed. The following institutions are considered to be ideological 
state apparatuses: -  
 
The religious ISA (the system of different mosques) – given this research is on 
religious communities in Kuwait and Bahrain, the role of state-sponsored religious 
institutions will undoubtedly play a role in determining the nature of sectarian relations 
– but to what extent they influence informal spaces, is something that has yet to be 
addressed.  
 
Alongside this is the educational ISA (the system of different public and private 
schools), the legal ISA, the political ISA, the cultural ISA (Literature, arts, sports etc) 
and finally the communications ISA (Press, radio and TV) which will also be another 
important feature when addressing the role media outlets are having in disseminating 
polarising messages and whether that is reflective within informal spaces themselves 
or do they work to counter these narratives. What distinguishes the ISA from the CSA, 
is in the distinction that CSA functions primarily through violence (or what is often 
referred to as hard power), whereas the ISA by and large operates by ideology – a 
soft power mechanism. 
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It is important to note that although CSA functions predominantly on violence and 
repression, there is still however no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus. A 
prime example being the army or police who likewise function by ideology both to 
ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the ‘values’ they propound 
externally. Likewise, there is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus. Even 
schools and mosques use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection etc. 
in order to be ‘disciplined’.  
 
Same is also true of cultural ISA with censorship for example to understand ISA and 
its influence on CSOs, it should be noted how it differs from the notion of the coercive 
state apparatus, or CSA. Althusser describes the CSA via three central elements: (1) 
the government and its administration; (2) the police and its specialised auxiliary corps, 
courts, and prisons; and (3) the army, which intervenes directly as a supplementary 
repressive force in the last instance.158 When addressing the differences between ISA 
and CSA it needs to be understood that concepts of ‘rule’ and hegemony’ are different 
in the way they operate in society. “Rule” is defined by direct forms of governance or 
effective coercion, in contrast to “hegemony,” which consists of active social and 
cultural forces that dominate and subjugate individuals ideologically and symbolically 
rather than physically.159 
 
Althusser accentuates differences between the ISA and CSA by stating that CSA 
functions as a unified entity (an organised whole, as evidenced above in its core 
elements) as opposed to the ISA which is diverse and plural. However, what unites 
the disparate ISA’s is the fact that the ruling ideology ultimately controls them. Again 
this is applicable in both Kuwait and Bahrain, in that both countries are ruled by 
absolute monarchs who have a hand in all governmental ministries – including the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, which is where formal CSOs have to register and are 
monitored via legal, extra-legal and bureaucratic measures as mentioned in the 
background chapter. According to Althusser, a repressive state exercises its 
                                                          
158 Althusser, L. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation). Trans. B. Brewster. 
In Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. 
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hegemony over the ISA, which functions primarily by reinforcing ideologies. Families, 
religious institutions, schools, and media may function as part of the ISA.160  
 
Where the explicit links to the central research themes come in is not only in the 
external environment in which civil society operates in Kuwait and Bahrain but in the 
idea that ISA includes the private domain. Here is where both formal and informal civil 
society actors (depending on the space and context) could potentially have played a 
part in either perpetuating or trying to undermine the dominant state narrative. Rather 
than direct repression like the CSA and inflicting order through repression, ISA 
reinforces the rule of the dominant class, which in the Bahraini context is sectarian in 
itself, as the government seek to maintain their control over an increasingly restive 
population. Identifying ISA as a mechanism that maintains hegemonic world-views and 
limits changes in the existing power structure161, this could be none more evident than 
in the case of Bahrain, as recent commentary on authoritarian survival in Bahrain 
analyses the ISA that is in operation in order to undermine pro-democracy movements, 
as illustrated in this recent quote. 
 
‘In addition to the CSA…the government of Bahrain has utilized the media, schools, 
mosques, and private and public-sector jobs to create an ISA that encourages and 
coerces public affirmation of the status quo. Tactics include the characterization of 
Bahrain as Arab, Sunnī, and loyal to the monarchy and the protestors as dangerous, 
deceitful, sectarian, and loyal to Iran. Hardliners in the government particularly 
promote anti-Shī‘ī agendas that stigmatize, disenfranchise, and repress the majority 
of its citizens.’162  
 
Husayn adds to this observation by citing the example of patriotism being utilised as 
a form of ISA. As Husayn remarks: ‘In support of the repression instituted by branches 
of the government, the ISA in Bahrain utilized patriotism as a reason to repress its 
population. Those who were loyal to the state were encouraged to identify all who 
                                                          
160 Althusser, L. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation). Trans. B. Brewster. 
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participated in the protests through social media to facilitate their arrest. The 
government posted photos of protestors on Facebook and requested citizens to 
anonymously tag their faces State media claimed the following: medics were diabolical 
forgers of medical records, protest was treason, and protestors deserved no leniency 
and the death penalty. The editors of an opposition newspaper as well as international 
journalists were forgers of news. Iran was a logistical and financial source of instability. 
Bahraini Shī‘īs were disloyal.’163 
 
The importance of media outlets in disseminating the ISA is critical in establishing links 
with informal civil society, as the value-worth of informal spaces are expressed through 
the discussions that take place and the people who frequent that location as oppose 
to the organisation/association itself. In this regard, it is vital that we address the notion 
of rhetoric based on the discussions that take place within informal spaces – again, 
like state-civil society relations, a question that needs to be posed is whether the 
rhetoric emanating from these spaces, panders to or contradicts the state’s narrative 
and in the context of Kuwait and Bahrain and depending on the arena in particular, the 
results could in fact vary between spaces. 
 
3.3 ISA, RBA and Multi-Dimensional Framework: A Combined Approach  
As illustrated in the diagram, the eclectic incorporated into this research is reflective 
of the various central themes that need to be addressed in order to answer the 
research questions effectively. Those being the relationship between informal civil 
societies, inter-communal relations and homing in on the wider civil society debate.  
Merging certain aspects of these three approaches will provide a robust framework 
when it comes to analysing the empirical data with each approach embodying or 
contributing to the other in some shape or form. The nature of the research requires a 
combination of inter-linked approaches as not only does it offer the most 
comprehensive understanding to approaching civil society vis-à-vis sectarian 
relations, but it provides a tool kit in order to explore and understand the key questions. 
Whether those questions pertain to sectarian sentiment or how autonomous informal 
spaces are from the state’s domain, each theoretical approach will complement the 
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other in providing a clear-cut response and an explanation that is ultimately theory-
driven from several angles.   
 
As the model shows the framework applies elements of two approaches to civil society 
– RBA and multi-dimensional framework which are grounded in developmental studies 
to civil society but have proven the linkages and application to this research in several 
ways. RBA is found throughout the multi-dimensional framework and is applied in 
several contexts, via capacity-building, through the importance of state-civil society 
dialogue/engagement and human rights discourse which extends to issues 
surrounding sectarian policies. The environmental factors in which informal civil 
society operates is then intrinsically linked to another theoretical approach – the 
ideological state apparatus. With this in mind, this will focus in particular on the 
religious and communications ISA, as these institutions have arguably been the 
greatest contributing factors in propagating sectarian sentiment. The question that now 
arises, is whether informal civil society can find innovative ways to counter such 
narratives and to see what initiatives (if any) they have in order to tackle top-down 
sectarian sentiment that only serves to polarise communities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM B: Theoretical Approach  
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3.4 Conclusion  
With the chosen theoretical approaches in mind that will serve as a practical 
framework to answering the key research questions/objectives, this thesis shall now 
turn to the empirical data chapters which focus on research collated from the chosen 
case studies of Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 
4. Formal and Informal Civic Spaces in Bahrain and Kuwait 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, this research seeks to investigate the extent 
to which informal political spaces influence inter-communal relations in the Kuwaiti and 
Bahraini political landscape. This background chapter will therefore provide further 
insight into the nature and role of these informal spaces, and where they fit within the 
broader context of civil society organisations in the two countries. The following 
introduction of this background chapter will present a breakdown of the existing CSOs 
that exist within both case studies, as well as the legal framework and conditions by 
which they are conformed to operate under. This chapter shall then introduce the 
notion of an informal civil society, what exactly constitutes informal civil society and 
shed light on the various types of informal spaces that exist in both countries, whilst 
presenting a comparison of the features and the state’s response to both formal and 
informal civic society.  
 
To put into context why an informal civic sector has emerged and is gaining traction in 
the first place, it is first important to discuss formal civil society organisations and the 
existing impediments facing them when dealing with state authorities. This is because 
formal civil society has, in some respect, proven to by and large ineffective in 
challenging the state and in turn state-sponsored narratives on sectarianism. Whereas 
the unregulated, informal space has the capacity, depending on how the space is 
utilised, but nevertheless still has the capacity to provide or facilitate alternative 
narratives regarding sectarianism, be they conducive or detrimental towards sectarian 
relations.  
 
For the sake of this research, formal spaces (or CSOs) are those associations that 
have been institutionalised. In that respect, they are obligated to register with the 
relevant social ministries, and often receive funding from state donors which in turn 
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enables them to co-opt and monitor their activities, this point will be explored in further 
depth when exploring the interaction between state and formal civil society. On the 
other hand, the various types of, majalis and youth societies which are the primary 
focus of this research investigation, shall be designated as informal spaces; as the 
distinctive hallmarks of traditional CSOs do not necessarily apply to these groups, 
which will become evident in the sections concerning informal civil society.  
 
In Kuwait, formal civil society is known to be relatively small and composed of public 
interest associations. The Law of Association prohibits these groups to engage in what 
the state recognises as political activity, and almost all of the associations that are 
registered as public benefit societies receive some form of government funding. The 
state also reimburses such groups for the costs of attending conferences, seconds 
civil servants to assist CSOs and provides grants. However, state support does not 
extend to CSOs own costs and many primarily depend on their own fundraising. These 
associations may typically focus on gender issues, economic liberalisation or the 
promotion of Islamic values. More importantly concerning this research, is to 
acknowledge the hundreds of unofficial CSOs, which do not receive any government 
subsidies and have no legal status.164  
 
According to the Arab NGO Directory, which is said to have one of the largest and 
most concise listing of Arab-based NGOs and charities, there are around 38 formal 
associations that are active and currently in operation within Kuwait. To understand 
what areas formal civil society is mostly invested in Kuwait and within the broader field 
of advocacy groups, there are 7 groups that can be broken down into 3 sub-sectors. 
3 CSOs pertaining to civil and legal rights, 3 human rights organisations which are 
Human Rights Kuwait, the Social Work Society of Kuwait and Kuwait Bidoon Human 
Rights Organisation, and lastly, 1 group operating within the field of media, the Kuwait 
Journalists Society.165  
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Within the development sector, there are some 15 organisations that are concerned 
with culture/leisure, research and sustainability. There are 5 cultural societies, two of 
which are dedicated to women. In research, there are 7 organisations pertaining to 
town planning and engineering, science and conservation; and there are 3 groups in 
sustainability which principally focus on economic development.166  
 
Within the education sector, there are around 5 organisations such as the Kuwait 
Teacher’s society. Likewise, there are 5 groups in the medical sector, ranging from 
nutrition and disability to smoking prevention campaigns. Finally, there are 3 faith-
based charities such as Direct Aid, 2 organisations concerned with animal welfare and 
preservation and one Kuwaiti humanitarian society in the form of the Kuwaiti Red 
Crescent.167 
 
When observing the legal environment under which these organisations operate, it 
becomes evident that based on some of the latest Freedom House reports, freedom 
of assembly and association is technically guaranteed by law but constrained in 
practice. Kuwaitis must notify authorities of a public meeting or protest, though it has 
been acknowledged that some peaceful demonstrations have been allowed without a 
permit. In 2012, the government declared public assemblies of more than 20 people 
to be illegal. The government routinely restricts registration and licencing of CSOs, 
forcing dozens of groups to operate without legal standing or state assistance. This 
also means that representatives of licensed CSOs must obtain government permission 
to attend foreign conferences.  
 
In August 2004, for example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour officially 
recognised the existence of the Kuwait Human Rights Society (KHRS) which had been 
founded 10 years earlier but operated without official status.168 This demonstrates both 
the presence and a desire for proto-organisations to still operate irrespective of 
whether they are acknowledged or registered with the state, this disregard for state 
approval therefore becomes a prevalent feature of the informal spaces. Interestingly, 
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the 2009 U.S. State Department report into civil society activities in Kuwait, specifically 
notes that “NGOs may not engage in overtly political activity and are prohibited from 
encouraging sectarianism. They must also demonstrate that their existence is in the 
public interest.”169 This could corroborate the thesis findings as the state having to 
exclusively spell out a prohibition on sectarian discourse and activities for registered 
CSOs, could in itself be indicative of a bottom-up pressure that has given rise to 
sectarian sentiment, and may therefore be a testament to the unencumbered informal 
sector acting as an incubator for polarising voices.  
 
The state’s perceived apprehension towards sectarian discourse could be evidenced 
in its response to regional events, where Kuwaiti authorities also claim that it has 
increased monitoring of the country’s charities over concerns about financial support 
for extremist militants in Syria and Iraq originating from Kuwait.170 The defiance of tens 
of thousands of demonstrators in 2012 and 2013 led to violent clashes with authorities, 
after peaceful demonstrations were held throughout 2012, mostly in response to 
charges of government corruption and the parliamentary crisis.171 
 
Moving on to the political sphere, political parties are prohibited, although political 
groupings, such as political associations and parliamentary blocs, have been allowed 
to emerge and participate in electoral and legislative politics.172 It has been reported, 
however, that the government has impeded their activities through harassment and 
arrests in the past.173 Likewise, with regards to the legal aspect, Kuwait also lacks an 
independent judiciary. The Emir appoints all judges, and the executive branch 
approves judicial promotions. Authorities may also detain suspects for up to four days 
without charge.174  
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The formal civil society landscape in Bahrain exposes similar characteristics to that of 
Kuwait, with most associations operating in the same sectors, with a total of around 
64 groups. In the development sector, there are some 33 organisations currently 
functioning, which again encompass a broad spectrum of public interest groups from 
cultural societies all the way through to sustainability, sports and faith-based charities. 
In the advocacy sector, which ranges from civil and human rights to labour 
organisations, legal affairs and security, there are some 15 groups. Smaller sectors 
include the likes of health, finance, environment, animal welfare and relief or aid 
organisations of which there are around 10 CSOs. Finally, there are people-orientated 
groups which are specifically concerned with child and youth welfare as well as women 
and family issues, of which there are six groups specifically catered to this sector.175 
Albeit operating in their respective sectors, it should be noted that formal CSOs in both 
the context of Kuwait and Bahrain can have mutual concerns and interests in various 
sectors, one example to illustrate this would be a woman’s organisation that may be 
dealing with broader developmental initiatives. 
 
Considering the 2011 Arab uprisings that took place in Bahrain, associational life has 
by and large been met with a relatively harsher clampdown compared to its Kuwaiti 
counterpart. The 1989 Societies Law prohibits any nongovernmental organisation 
(NGO) from operating without a permit, and authorities have broad discretion to deny 
or revoke permits. Citizens must obtain a permit to hold demonstrations, and a variety 
of onerous restrictions make it difficult to organise a legal gathering in practice. Police 
regularly use force to break up political protests, most of which occur in Shiite villages, 
and participants can face long jail terms, particularly if the demonstrations involve 
clashes with security personnel. Prominent Bahraini human rights defenders continue 
to face harassment, intimidation, and prosecution on dubious grounds.176  
 
Political societies had also once operated under this law which governed other CSOs, 
until the Law of Political Societies was drafted in August 2005. Political societies have 
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de facto operated as political parties without being afforded any legal protection. As 
Niethammer examined, that similarly to the Law of Associations,  
 
“it was restrictive, especially regarding external funding. Moreover, it forces 
political societies to recognise the constitution and forbids promoting ethnically 
and/or sectarian based programmes – a provision that could be used against 
all Islamic political societies since those cater almost exclusively to their own 
sects.”177  
 
Bahrainis do have the right to establish independent labour unions, but workers must 
give two weeks’ notice before a strike, and strikes are banned in a variety of economic 
sectors. Trade unions cannot operate in the public sector, and collective-bargaining 
rights are limited even in the private sector. Harassment and firing of unionist workers 
does occur in practice.178  
 
In 2013, in the wake of ongoing protests and rising levels of violence, King Hamad 
decreed additions to Bahrain’s antiterrorism law that imposed heavy penalties on 
those convicted of demonstrating unlawfully, measures that included large fines and 
revoking citizenship.179  
 
It becomes apparent therefore, that as in the Kuwaiti context, there are various legal 
impediments on existing CSOs, albeit on a considerably severer scale. According to 
the 2002 Bahraini Constitution, freedom of association is said to be ensured in several 
instances. Article 27 states, “The freedom to form associations and unions…for lawful 
objectives and by peaceful means is guaranteed under the rules and conditions laid 
down by law and as long as the fundamentals of the religion and public order are not 
                                                          
177 Niethammer, Katja, Voices in Parliament, Debates in Majalis, and Banners on Streets: Avenues of Political 
Participation in Bahrain, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
Mediterranean Programme Series, 2006, p.5.   
178 “Bahrain”, Freedom House 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/bahrain. 
(accessed: August 20, 2017) 
179 Ibid, 2016 Report. 
105 
 
infringed. No one can be forced to join any association or union or to continue as a 
member.”180  
 
Article 31 however later on states, “the public rights and freedoms stated in this 
constitution may be regulated or limited in accordance with the law, and such 
regulation or limitation may not prejudice the essence of the right or freedom.”181 
According to an explanatory memorandum of the constitution which explains the 
rationale for the limitations of the right to freedom of association and other public 
freedoms, it states; “these articles were amended in a way to guarantee the freedom 
of association…and in order to keep the Islamic principles and unity of the people.”182 
As is the case in the Kuwaiti context, there are specific legal provisions related to the 
formation, functioning and dissolution of associations. Although the constitution 
guarantees the right to freedom of association, the Bahraini legal and policy framework 
regarding freedom of association is restrictive and offers authorities a wide scope of 
control regarding the formation of an association. 
 
Furthermore, with regards to the law of political societies from 2005, the law’s 
provisions grant further draconian powers to ministerial authorities;  
 
“The law allows the minister of justice to refer to court any society that violates 
the provisions of Bahrain's constitution, or this law or any other Bahraini law. 
The minister of justice may ask the court to freeze the activities of the violating 
society for 3 months during which the society corrects the violation or removes 
its causes. The minister may also ask the court to dissolve the violating society, 
liquidate its assets and determine who receives them if that society commits 
grave violations of Bahrain's constitution or of this law or any other Bahraini 
law.”183 
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Again, the Law of Association states the legal recognition of a CSO is only realised 
after the application for registration is approved and published in the official gazette 
by the administrative authority (Article 1). Associations considered to compromise 
‘public order’ and ‘morals’ or are established for an illegitimate aim such as 
undermining the wellbeing of the state or government shall be considered void (Article 
3). Establishment of an association requires at least ten founding members (Article 4). 
In addition, (Article 11) requires that members should be 18 years or older.184 The 
administrative authorities managing regulations on associational life, be it the Ministry 
of Social Development, Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Labour for example, have 
the right to deny registration to an association if it considers there is no need for its 
services, or if another existing association fulfils the same objectives, or if its 
establishment is against state security interests, or if its formation is to replace another 
association that had been previously dissolved (Article 11, Paragraph 1).185 
 
Again, in the Bahraini context (as in the case of Kuwait), several legal circumscriptions 
become apparent for registered CSOs, namely the right to be free of control, 
interference and supervision. For example, the Societies Law contains several 
provisions that ultimately restricts them from freely conducting their activities. 
Associations therefore must detail in their statutes their objectives and types of 
activities; the covered geographical area(s); the names and personal details of the 
founding members; its financial resources and its means of expenditure, the rights and 
responsibilities of members, the procedures for the amendments of the statutes as 
well as for merging or separation or setting up branches and the rules for voluntary 
dissolution (Article 5).186  
 
Further to this, associations are not allowed to be involved in political activity (Article 
18) and this prohibition must also be written within their statutes. The state’s further 
inspections include examination of associations’ internal records, documents and 
correspondence to ensure their compliance with the provisions of the law (Article 15). 
The intrusion of administrative authorities covers other aspects of internal organisation 
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and management of CSOs as well. They may add new conditions for the membership 
of the board (Article 43), call for a meeting of the general assembly (Article 30) or the 
board of the CSO (Article 45). The authorities can also attend general assembly 
meetings (Article 33) and CSOs must send the authorities copies of every decision 
taken by the board (Article 46).187 
 
Like Kuwait, there is also the issue of seeking and receiving external funds. The Law 
of Association allows authorities to have tight control over funding of CSOs and makes 
the violation of the provisions related to funding punishable by up to 6 months 
imprisonment and/or fine (Article 89). The law also clearly states how CSOs must 
obtain prior approval from the relevant ministry before receiving any foreign funding 
(Article 20).188 
 
The Bahraini authorities justify this monitoring of CSO activity by noting that it comes 
under their obligation to prevent money laundering, or in more recent years extremist 
financing as in the case of Kuwait, especially as Bahrain has to report to the World 
Bank in this regard.189 According to the authorities, every ministry is responsible to 
supervise the flow of money transactions for the subjects that fall under its 
competency, including details of foreign sponsorship and the method of 
expenditure.190 
 
It can be noted therefore that the legal framework in both countries has enabled the 
relevant ministries to monitor and constrain civil society through a plethora of 
mechanisms which in turn inhibit civil society to function in an effective manner 
particularly in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Issues concerning institutional 
transparency and a lack of adequate representation are the inevitable results which 
will become evident. The following section shall therefore observe the modus operandi 
and interaction between state and CSO by acknowledging the role of state corporatism 
in the Gulf and explore some of the extra-legal measures as well as the bureaucratic 
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and administrative elements that are currently in operation which have ultimately 
impeded the operation of formal civil society within both countries.  
 
The remainder of the chapter shall then explore the various types of informal spaces 
that exist in Kuwait and Bahrain. It is important that these spaces be looked at in 
relation to what sets them apart from traditional CSOs - and where they could be 
perceived as a viable alternative to formal CSOs vis-à-vis their influence on issues 
pertaining to sectarianism and inter-communal relations. This will be brought forth in 
the following chapters as the research will touch on the initiatives by informal 
spaces/groupings as well as their responses to what are commonly perceived as 
sectarian policymaking by the state in the case of Bahrain, or the sectarian lens to 
which regional events and conflicts are portrayed which is the principal focus in the 
case of Kuwait. 
 
4.1 State-Societal Relations and Formal Civic Organisations 
One useful analytical frame to understanding state-societal relations and the existing 
impediments facing the civic sector is the long-established notion of state corporatism, 
which is particularly applicable to the GCC states. In most studies, corporatism has 
been confined to describe the relationship of the state, labour and employers, but as 
Phillipe Schmitter who provides a comprehensive definition illustrates, that 
corporatism can be broken down into two, state and societal corporatism. The latter is 
a more democratic conception, and has emerged from the relatively open contention 
of societal interests. However, in the case of this research, corporatism which is state-
imposed remains one of the more expedient frameworks to explore the operational 
dynamics between state and civil society. For Schmitter, “corporatism can be defined 
as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into 
a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licenced (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports.”191 
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Expanding on this notion, Collier and Collier present several themes that have sought 
to disaggregate corporatism; as a comparative study of two Gulf states, this is 
particularly beneficial to this research as it provides a scope to differentiate between 
more or less authoritarian corporatism. The variables of differentiation as cited by 
Collier and Collier are one, state structuring; so how much does the state aid specific 
institutions in their representational monopoly through licencing, compulsory 
membership etc. Another variable is subsidies, so how does the state pay for a group 
or help to finance itself, and lastly, constraints, so how the state controls the selection 
of leaders, the scope of collective action, group policies etc. With those variables of 
differentiation, they contend that the first two categories, i.e. state structuring and 
subsidies, can be classed as incentives which are then balanced against the 
constraints imposed by governments, albeit to varying degrees according to the type 
of political regime in question.192 However the scope to which the civic sector can 
navigate its way through the existing state apparatuses by which they are confined 
can vary accordingly.  
 
Furthermore, Steffen Hertog who has observed state corporatism in the Saudi context 
has argued that “corporatism is not a one-dimensional concept which can be described 
easily across a “more or less” continuum, but rather a cluster of characteristics. There 
are different subtypes, arrived at not only through specific variables being articulated 
differently, but also through the absence of specific characteristics: few political set-
ups perfectly match Schmitter’s definition, but many can still be usefully categorised 
as corporatist.”193 
 
What is particularly pertinent concerning this research are the observations Hertog 
had taken from the Saudi case study and its very own specific type of corporatism, 
whereby there is a surprisingly low degree of formal organisation of Saudi political 
interests within the social sphere, with only the business sector being a recognised 
negotiating partner for the Saudi monarchy. As Hertog notes, “this points to how 
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different trajectories of political development shape and limit corporatist options for 
authoritarian regimes: The Al Saud have very few formal structures to co-opt and find 
it hard to impose new formal structures onto a society mostly organised along informal 
lines.”194 
This observation not only showcases the potentially inflated projection of the state’s 
ability to practically dominate associational life altogether but could also elucidate on 
why informal civil society in Kuwait and Bahrain is gaining more traction and is being 
viewed increasingly as a more politically expedient outlet in channelling opposition 
interests; a more organic space operating outside the state’s recognised remit of 
accepted public discourse. 
 
The impact of state corporatism is none more evident than in the extra legal and 
administrative measures the authorities have in place to circumscribe any dissenting 
views and activities, this also extends to the issue of escalating sectarian tensions. 
One Freedom House report noted how in August 2010, the Kuwaiti Shi’ite historian 
Yasir Habib made some provocative comments concerning revered personalities 
within Sunni Islam, this prompted some Kuwaiti Sunnis to call for public 
demonstrations. As tensions escalated, the interior ministry responded by banning all 
public rallies in September of that year. The Kuwaiti authorities also responded by 
revoking Habib (who now resides in London) of his Kuwaiti citizenship.195 A possible 
sign that the state is attempting to exploit the pretext of escalating sectarian tensions 
both within the country itself and the wider region to further its own authoritarian reach. 
This could also be applicable in the case of the state’s closer monitoring of charity 
activities on the suspicion they could potentially be funding extremist activities both in 
Kuwait and neighbouring countries. 
 
Expanding on the practical implications facing existing CSOs, an International 
Federation for Human Rights report specifically dealing with freedom of association 
within the Arabian Gulf made several observations. According to the 1962 
Constitution, the Kuwaiti law guarantees the right to freedom of association. Article 34 
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states ‘Freedom to form associations and unions on a national basis and by peaceful 
means shall be guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and manner specified 
by law. No one may be compelled to join any association or union.’196 
So, there is no obligation to be a part of any association, but as alluded to, public 
gatherings require government approval, unlike the informal social gatherings like , 
which provide a forum for political discussion. The law, however, impedes existing 
CSOs, as it gives the government complete authority to regulate, ban or license any 
society and prohibits associations from engaging in political activities of any kind. As 
alluded to earlier, it was only up until 2004, that the government had granted formal 
recognition to human rights NGOs and had restricted their ability to organise publicly 
beforehand.197 This also extends to any registered youth societies that either operate 
independently or as a branch or affiliate of one of the political societies. To understand 
many of the practical impediments facing Kuwaiti CSOs at present, many originate 
from earlier legal provisions. The state, through the Ministry of Social Affairs, practices 
close supervision over the associations’ activity. The ministry can therefore dissolve 
the association’s board of directors if they find out that it conducts what the state 
believes to be inappropriate activity or if their funds are ‘mishandled’.  
 
As mentioned, up until 2004, Kuwait denied legal recognition of all CSOs pertaining to 
human rights issues. It imposed restrictions on them that inhibit their ability to organise 
public meetings, even prior to some of these associations being legally recognised by 
the state. For example, in August 1993, the cabinet ordered the dissolution of all 
unlicensed human rights and humanitarian organisations.198 
 
During the 1980s, following considerable political instability inside the country, the 
Kuwaiti government decided to halt the registration of all associations. This was only 
resumed decades later, when the Council of Ministers issued decision 836 in July 
2004. It should be noted that designated human rights groups tend to go through a 
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more scrupulous process in obtaining their licence. This was the case with two human 
rights organisations which are registered as ‘socio-cultural organisations’ – KHRS and 
the Kuwait Association for Basic Evaluators of Human Rights (KABE). Their legal 
recognition and registration was only obtained after significant lobbying and pressure 
by those groups.199 
 
In addition, those key impediments that restrict licensed CSOs are still in place, as 
highlighted in the Fidh report. One of those is the right of associations to be free of 
control, interference and supervision. The Law of Association currently provides 
authorities with a substantial level of interference in the associations’ statutory 
activities; CSO statutes therefore must specify the objectives and details of the 
organisations’ mode of functioning, such as its source of funding, the finances’ control 
procedures and the rules for amendments of its statutes. The authorities also have 
direct control over activities and finances of registered associations. That entails 
representatives of the relevant ministry, in this case the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
attending general assembly meetings and being able to investigate the association’s 
internal records and books.200    
 
The Law of Association also infringes on the right to seek and receive funds, as the 
current law states that CSOs need to obtain permission from the state before carrying 
out any public fundraising activities (Article 22). CSOs may receive some state 
support, such as low-rent office space to use as a headquarters or support with 
maintenance and logistical costs e.g. hosting events or kick-starting campaigns, all of 
course with prior permission from the state (Articles 24, 25 and 26.) This means that 
CSOs are prohibited from receiving, directly or through any connections, money or 
benefits in the form of contributions of any kind from a person, association or body 
located outside the state of Kuwait, without the prior approval of authorities (Article 
30).201 The status of government support is not entirely clear either, Decision 836 in 
July 2004 made it that newly registered CSOs would have to make a formal 
commitment not to request financial support from the government, only those 
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registered prior to 2004 continue to benefit from government support. So that of course 
excludes the right to funding either from the state or outside Kuwait for the two human 
rights bodies that were legally recognised in 2004.  
 
Another legal impediment for state recognised CSOs is the right of affiliation to 
regional and international organisations. Article 30 of the Law of Association stipulates 
that CSOs are prohibited from participating or affiliating with any association outside 
Kuwait without prior permission from the relevant ministry. Furthermore, in extra-legal 
terms, CSOs have the constant threat of suspension, closure or dissolution to contend 
with which is not protected by existing laws. Authorities can therefore take a decision 
to dissolve a CSO in the following cases if; the association’s membership falls below 
10 members; the activities depart from the original objectives of the association; the 
association commits a serious violation of its statues (again bear in mind these 
statutes are closely monitored by state authorities); or it cannot meet its financial 
obligations (Article 27). In practice, since 2004 the ministry has confirmed that no 
human rights associations have been dissolved. However, human rights organisations 
must consistently make concessions in order not to displease authorities and run the 
risk of dissolution. Therefore, they must be prudent and act with precaution particularly 
when it comes to working on any politically contentious issues in order that they do not 
violate the constitution.202 
 
Moving onto the case of Bahrain, a similar pattern is apparent in terms of the extra-
legal measures being implemented as a result of the legal framework. According to 
the 1989 Societies Law, the government can refuse registration of any organisation. 
The official rationale behind this draconian measure is that society may not require 
their services or if there are other associations that fulfil the same need or activity. The 
role of these organisations particularly within the political arena is still severely 
restricted.203 
 
                                                          
202 Ibid, p.42. 
203 Fakhro, Munira. "Civil Society and Democracy in the Gulf Region." 11th Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar: 
Security and Development in the Gulf Region, 2005, 3-5. 
114 
 
According to a 2015 Freedom House report, the 1989 Societies Law prohibits any 
CSO from operating without a permit. In September 2014, the Ministry of Justice 
ordered all groups to obtain government permission before meeting with any diplomats 
and officials from outside Bahrain, limiting the contact of opposition and human rights 
networks with potentially supportive foreign governments and international 
organisations. The order also required a government official to be present at any 
interaction, which undoubtedly has an impact on the nature of the discussion if 
government representatives are present and involved in the conversation. A prime 
example of this would be when the Bahraini government questioned Al-Wefaq’s (Shia 
political society) Ali Salman and Khalil Marzooq in July 2014 after they met with US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labour Tom 
Malinowski; the Bahraini government requested that Malinowski leave the country 
shortly after.204  
 
In addition to this, some of the extra-legal measures to curb formal dissent can be 
seen in the restriction of movement of prominent activists, as the government has 
continued to obstruct foreign travel by key opposition figures and activists in recent 
years. Authorities also restrict movement inside the country, particularly for residents 
of largely Shiite villages outside Manama, whereby a tight security cordon has blocked 
easy access to the capital.205 
 
Again, the government’s heavy handling of the civic sector was even discernible prior 
to the 2011 uprisings, in 2010 for example, the Bahraini government dissolved the 
board of directors of the Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS), and assigned a 
government-appointed director to run the organisation. The Bahraini authorities also 
blocked visits from foreign CSOs in 2012. Examples include delegates from the 
Physicians for Human Rights who were denied entry in 2012, as were delegations 
from the International Trade Union Confederation and the International Labour 
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Organisation. In April 2013, the government cancelled a visit by torture expert Juan 
Mendez, the UN special rapporteur on torture.206  
 
Likewise, such extra-legal measures by the Bahraini state have produced further 
social and economic disparities based on sect, and this is none more evident than in 
the business sector. As although registered businesses are largely free to operate, 
obtaining approval can be difficult due to high capital requirements and political 
influence on the economy. Among the wealthy elites that dominate the business 
sector, property rights are generally respected and expropriation is rare. However, 
Shiite citizens encounter difficulties and in some cases, bans on purchasing housing 
and land, with the al-Khalifa family gifting vast swaths of land to regime cronies.207 
 
Bahrainis technically have the right to establish independent labour unions, but 
workers must give 2 weeks’ notice prior to organising a strike, and strikes are 
prohibited in a variety of economic sectors. Foreign workers lack the right to seek help 
from Bahraini unions. Among the several thousand-people known to have been fired 
in 2011 for allegedly supporting the pro-democracy protests were key officials in the 
General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions. The government has generally 
accepted so called ‘political societies’ to operate, however, while the government 
claimed that political societies remained free to operate in 2011, it has imprisoned key 
opposition leaders, including Hassan Mushaima and Abd al-Jalil Singace (Haq), Matar 
Ibrahim Matar and Jawad Fairuz (al-Wefaq). Mushaima, Sharif and Singace were 
sentenced to life in prison for their activism, after a lengthy appeals process, Bahrain’s 
courts upheld their sentences in September 2012.208 
 
Academic freedom is not formally restricted but scholars who do criticise the 
government are subject to dismissal. In 2011, a number of university faculty members 
and administrators were fired for supporting the call for democracy along with 
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hundreds of students from the same faculty were expelled. Those who remained were 
compelled to sign loyalty pledges.209 
 
The government continued its repression of Shi’ite political organisations in 2014. As 
in January, a Bahraini court officially banned the prominent Islamic Scholars Council 
following a lawsuit by the Justice Ministry which found it was an illegal society. 
Furthermore, police and armed forces continue to regularly use violence to break up 
political protests, most of which occur in Shi’ite villages.210  
 
What is particularly interesting is that funding becomes an even more precarious issue 
for non-registered or dissolved human rights CSOs as they are not permitted to open 
bank accounts. Examples the report offers are Bahrain Human Rights Center (BHRC) 
and Bahrain Youth Human Rights Society (BYHRS) whose bank accounts are in the 
name of individual members. This may be an obstacle that prevents them from 
conducting internal fund raising or obtaining funds from foreign donors, if the 
government insists it will only fund registered organisations.211 
 
Once more, the right to be affiliated to regional or international associations is 
restricted by law. The current legal framework requires CSOs to obtain prior approval 
form the relevant ministry for membership in other international 
organisations/networks. If the request goes without response for 45 days of 
application, this is assumed to indicate a negative decision (Article 20). The 
regulations state how CSOs must include in their own statutes a clause expressly 
saying they are ‘forbidden from joining or adhering to an association that has its 
headquarters outside Bahrain without prior authorisation of the ministry (Article 7). In 
practice however, the two non-registered human rights associations are also members 
of international organisations. However, none of them have been subject to 
harassment on grounds of membership to international groups. The same can be said 
for registered associations.212  
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When it comes to the issue of suspension, closure or dissolution in Bahrain, the 1989 
Societies Law gives authorities wide powers to take required actions affecting the 
functioning and stability of an association. These key decisions can address merging, 
suspending activities, closing premises and dissolving associations. Authorities are 
permitted to dissolve an association or close it for a temporary period not exceeding 
45 days if the association; is no longer able to achieve its aims (Article 50); has used 
its assets for purposes other than the stated purposes of the organisation (Article 50, 
Paragraph 1-2); has not been able to convene the general assembly for two 
consecutive years (Article 50, Paragraph 1-3).  
 
This happened to be the case in September 2004, as the government dissolved the 
BHRC on the pretext that they committed serious violations to the law and public order 
(Article 50, Paragraph 4). Coincidentally, it appears this decision to dissolve the group 
was taken only four days after the BHRC launched its report on poverty and corruption 
in Bahrain. The group challenged the authorities’ decision in court and by 2005 had 
lost the case to reapprove their licence.213 
 
Another issue particularly concerning CSOs in Bahrain is the right of members to 
protection from prosecution and discrimination and the right of human rights activists 
not to be penalised for belonging to a non-registered association. The Societies Law 
provides for prosecution of individuals who participate in the activities of a dissolved 
or unregistered organisation. Any person starting activities of a non-registered 
organisation or continues to be active in an organisation after its dissolution shall be 
sentenced to prison term not exceeding 6 months (Article 89).214  
 
In practice however, members of the BHRC continue with their human rights activities. 
The authorities are said to be aware of these activities but are not taking any measures 
against them. However, the freedom to organise public events is limited as these 
activities require notifying authorities and such procedures. In order to circumvent the 
state, they are having to hold public meetings under the umbrella of other 
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associations.215 There is, however, the ability for some political manoeuvring of more 
formal civil society organisations which demonstrates some promising signs for civil 
society within the old rentier, corporatist Gulf countries, particularly in the Kuwaiti 
context. Albeit many of these voluntary associations still have to subscribe to the 
relevant authorities, new found movements are taking shape that are finding new 
methods to circumvent state interference. In addition to this, regime acceptance for 
co-operation between associations together with the proliferation of social media 
networks has proved to be a catalyst for an active political opposition coming to the 
fore, as evidenced in the case of Bahrain from 2011 onwards.  
 
It must be noted therefore, that although there are significant constraints on formal 
civil society organisations (particularly from a legal standpoint amongst other factors), 
that is not to suggest that they are essentially futile or have no other means to being 
effective in the political sphere. The rise in new technologies over the last decade e.g. 
greater internet access and the proliferation of social media networks are already 
being utilised by established associations as a mode to expressing grievances towards 
the state and moreover as a facilitator for political mobilisation. Therefore, the point of 
highlighting these limitations is not merely to demonstrate that they bear little 
importance. On the contrary, the utility of formal associations remains central to any 
initiatives towards social reform, democratisation and in the context of this research 
the impact they have on inter-communal relations. However, it must be acknowledged 
that in social and cultural environments that differ to those of Europe and North 
America, it is the purposes of activity rather than the forms of organisation itself that 
should be the critical test of civic life. This outlook could look favourably or otherwise 
at both formal and informal spaces depending on the context in which these spaces 
are located.216  
 
In summary, this and the preceding section have highlighted the main restrictions and 
issues surrounding state-recognised CSOs in Kuwait and Bahrain. Having dealt 
exclusively with formal civil society, the previous sections have touched on figures in 
terms of how many CSOs there are in operation, and what sectors they are actively 
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involved in. It also detailed the state’s legal provisions concerning the freedom of 
association and how these laws infringe on those group’s ability to operate effectively 
and independent of the state, by presenting tangible examples of how state 
corporatism has impacted the nature of state-civic relations and how it has been 
constrained in practice.  
 
As international NGO reports such as Freedom House and Fidh illustrated the legal 
impediments existing CSOs currently face – from the lack of rights to be free of control 
and supervision, to the lack of rights concerning funding, to the issues surrounding 
affiliation to regional and international organisations and the right to protection from 
suspension, closure or dissolution by the state.  
 
It is therefore suffice to say, that formal civil society within both cases, are for the most 
part, perceived as constrained in law and in practice which in turn makes it heavily 
dependent on the state. Not only does it serve to buttress authoritarian rule in the two 
cases, it simultaneously acts as an impediment to any genuine grassroots democratic 
movement and much of the existing scholarship from the late 1990s onwards would 
corroborate this position.    
 
The next section will look into the emergence of an informal civil society in Kuwait and 
Bahrain, what are its characteristics or features that make it similar or distinct from 
recognised formal associations and the various types of spaces that currently exist 
within both states. This is with the view to assess whether these political spaces and 
informal civil society more broadly can act as a viable alternative to established or 
registered organisations, which have already showcased their ineptitude in the political 
sphere, by attempting to effectively channel opposition demands and forge 
coalitions/alliances, and to identify the impact they could have on the trajectory of 
sectarian relations.   
 
4.2 Informal Civil Society and Spaces: Diwaniyyat, Majalis and Youth 
Societies/Movements  
One of the key hallmarks of informal civil society that is discernible in both case studies 
is how informal spaces have greater room for manoeuvre, particularly as it is 
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commonly acknowledged that established CSOs are suppressed or co-opted by the 
state. The fact they operate as an unlicensed entity means they cannot be 
corporatised in the same way state-recognised CSOs are. In some cases, certain 
spaces (namely the Kuwaiti diwaniyya) are protected by the law itself, as the home, 
where the diwaniyya is most often located, is protected explicitly under articles 38 and 
44 of the 1962 constitution and is the only secular space that enjoys such a high 
degree of formal protection. Ironically, it is this exclusive feature that enhances its 
appeal to political organisers whenever public meetings are restricted or banned. Even 
at the height of civil liberties being suppressed in Kuwait, (e.g. 1989-1990 pro-
democracy movement), the privacy of the Kuwaiti home was rarely violated. This 
constitutes a stark contrast to the formal associations that are routinely inspected by 
the state.217 
 
Interestingly, it is mentioned in one report how academic freedom, bar it does not touch 
on politically contentious issues, is generally tolerated. But more specific to this 
research, is how one report specifically cites how Kuwait allows relatively open and 
free private discussion, often in traditional gatherings or  that typically only include 
men.218 In another report however, Freedom House noted that in recent years, there 
have been indications that these traditional sanctuaries of free speech have come 
under increasing pressure. In November 2009, police arrested the prominent journalist 
Adbulqader al-Jassem for criticising the PM at a private diwaniyya, but he was later 
released on bail.219 This could illustrate a sign that state interference is now becoming 
apparent in the informal realm, where these private spaces were once insulated from 
the state by law. As noted, the government imposes constraints on freedoms of 
assembly and association. In April 2008, the government issued a decree outlawing 
public assemblies and demonstrations, which includes some public, however the 
measure was quickly rescinded under popular pressure.220   
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With regards to this research, based on a workshop that observed Kuwaiti civil society, 
as cited in a 2012 paper presented by Chatham House, participants noted how civil 
society groups,  
 
“could play an important role in addressing the causes of sectarian tensions, promoting 
dialogue and calling for specific policies to address the spatial, economic, social and 
labour-market segregation that sometimes divides different religious and ethnic 
groups in the GCC. Professional associations can be important in bringing people 
together based on shared professional interests rather than religious or ethnic 
identities. They would, however, face resistance from political, religious and official 
leaders who personally benefit from sect-based divisions…Some participants however 
questioned whether civil society could effect change when senior decision-makers 
lacked the political will to see such changes through. Others argued that resolving 
social issues could be a catalyst for political change, and that building bottom-up 
support for dialogue and compromise could help to empower reformers within the 
regimes.”221  
 
This will be important when observing informal spaces and whether they can be 
treated as a viable alternative in redressing existing sectarian disparities that have 
played out from the top-down, namely in the form of policymaking and bottom-up in 
terms of the perception of inter-communal relations. 
 
To understand the background in which these informal spaces operate (i.e. majalis 
and youth groups) it is important to note that there is a wide spectrum of variables that 
distinguish one space from another. Examples of this could include who frequents 
such spaces, whether a membership of sorts is required. In many cases, people 
attending these spaces will possibly know one another within a personal capacity – 
friends, family members, work colleagues. Another distinguishing variable is whether 
a space operates within a public or private domain, in other words, whether anyone 
could turn up as an open invitation to a neighbourhood/community or whether it is 
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confined to a select group of people. Of course, these spaces share several common 
features between them but unlike formal political institutions such as a parliament 
which are proven to have designated functions, these informal spaces are very much 
determined by the nature of discussions that take place within them, as defined in the 
introduction.  
It is therefore the content i.e. the topics discussed and the people who frequent such 
spaces which ultimately offers some insight as to whether they possess any social or 
political clout. This will be evidenced later when addressing the specific types of 
informal political spaces there are at present, but just to elucidate on the point is the 
example of a youth-orientated diwaniyya. On their own, they could acquire little 
political expediency if they are merely used for recreational or leisurely purposes. 
However, if they are affiliated to a youth society or more significantly a larger political 
society, then the discussions and the subsequent actions that arise from those spaces 
are more likely to resonate in terms of civic activism.222   
 
It is also important to recognise the informal nature in which these spaces operate. 
Often, they can be a makeshift arrangement from a meeting in a coffee-house all the 
way through to spaces that are utilised for the sole purpose of hosting social functions, 
for example, most  are an extension of the home. Furthermore, because of the informal 
or casual nature of these spaces, it is often commonplace for topics of discussion to 
vary from one subject to another, for example this would differ from the role of a council 
meeting that has specific issues it intends to address via minutes. Particularly within 
the context of diwaniyyat and majalis one finds that various discussions can take place 
simultaneously depending on the size of each space and the physical proximity 
between guests, i.e. if one group of people are in relatively close proximity to each 
other they could form their own circle for discussion.223   
 
Another significant point to make prior to delving into the specifics of these spaces in 
Bahrain and Kuwait, is to recognise that they are not confined to one particular area 
or location and are seemingly prevalent throughout both countries. Their presence 
within Kuwaiti and Bahraini society can be traced across various classes, tribes, 
                                                          
222 Kuwait, Host, "Youth Diwaniyya 1 (Private and Inter-communal)", May 17th, 2014.  
223 Ibid (based on observations within the diwaniyya).  
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denominations and generations. It is because of this long-engrained familiarity and the 
cultural affinity people have to these informal spaces, that one often finds 
representatives of formal institutions utilising such spaces to their advantage, from 
sitting MP’s and candidates in parliamentary elections, as well as working 
professionals. Likewise, there are formal civil society organisations, or at least 
members thereof, who at times operate within these informal spaces depending on 
the occasion, context or nature of a discussion taking place. In this respect, you find 
there is a cross-fertilisation, or overlap, between the formal and more informal spaces 
in Kuwaiti and Bahraini civil society which shall be illustrated further on in the vend 
diagrams below that highlight the fluctuation between the various types of spaces.   
 
It is therefore the emphasis on activities as opposed to the organisation itself which 
not only ought to be recognised, but to be taken seriously as a viable alternative if not 
complementing existing civil society organisations that in some cases could be either 
banned or severely restricted. They can complement or work alongside more formal, 
institutionalised spaces as well as act as a replacement, depending on the context and 
circumstance in which they are having to function. A pertinent example of this can be 
illustrated in Kuwait, where parliament has been suspended on numerous occasions 
and so these spaces, particularly during Kuwait’s electoral history, have come in to fill 
the void.  
 
Without intending to demote the value of civility altogether, and to further add to the 
rationale for observing informal political spaces, scholars such as Bayat have 
suggested that the reductionism prevalent within existing discourse on civil society has 
ultimately excluded and even scorned modes of struggles, which in the context of the 
Middle East are far more extensive and effective than conventional institutions outside 
the state. Bayat aimed to examine the dynamics of free-form or casual activism, which 
tends to characterise the politics of what he referred to as ‘informal people’. 
 
Bayat posited the claim that ordinary, everyday practices conducted by ordinary folk 
can in fact engender significant social changes.224 According to Bayat, it is inevitable 
                                                          
224 Bayat, Asef. "Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the 'informal' People." Third World Quarterly 18, no. 1 (2007): 
55-56. 
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that such simple and everyday practices are bound to shift within the realm of politics. 
The participants engage in collective action e.g. via informal gatherings such as , 
public and online forums, youth societies etc. and in some cases they only realise their 
actions to be politically motivated when challenged by state authorities who impede 
on their advances.225 Rather than acting through the formal channels of protest or 
publicity, these informal spaces take it upon themselves to fulfil their needs as an 
organisation, albeit individually without the assistance or more notably without 
intervention from formally recognised organisations and discretely. This process is 
also known as ‘quiet encroachment.’226 This in turn means not having access to state 
sponsorship or backing, however these informal spaces can co-operate or forge links 
with other informal networks based on shared interests, just as recognised 
associations co-operate between themselves.  
 
As alluded to previously, the rising prominence of informal political spaces and their 
pertinence within the political realm can be attributed to several factors. These reasons 
illustrate the expediency of these spaces to operate outside the confines of the Kuwaiti 
and Bahraini authorities. One primary explanation for this is due to their makeshift 
nature and their ability to improvise with those conditions imposed by the state on 
formal associations. Unlike formal CSOs, these informal spaces are not fixed 
institutions with designated functions. Rather, because of their casual 
arrangement/format, these spaces can often hold meetings or host a social event in 
various and transient locations, for example, many informal youth societies have no 
designated site and so members often frequent public spaces such as coffeehouses 
to hold discussions.227 Likewise, many are situated within people’s homes. This also 
means that any potential discussions or meetings can be arranged at the discretion of 
those members and are not compelled to operate within set times where they could 
be monitored.  
 
Why the makeshift nature of these informal spaces is so significant is because not 
only does it enable them to act autonomously but it insulates them from state 
                                                          
225 Ibid, p.58. 
226 Ibid, p.59. 
227 Bahrain Youth Society 1, Ex-President and Vice-President, BYSHR, Tuesday 3rd June 2014.  
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interference and any inspections made by the relevant social authorities. Were these 
informal networks to have a designated location or a headquarters, as many registered 
CSOs are required to have, their activities could then be easily monitored, making it 
far more difficult to lay the foundations for any initiatives toward grassroots activism.228      
Another reason as to why informal spaces could be viewed as a viable alternative in 
the political sphere is because of their non-compliance with state authorities, a prime 
example being not registering with the relevant authorities. The informality itself is an 
important characteristic to recognise here as this often entails having a complete 
disregard for legislation which requires associations to apply to become a registered 
civil society organisation. For many informal youth groups that work on matters 
pertaining to human rights229, they acknowledge that were they to apply, it is highly 
likely that their application would be rejected, whilst many existing organisations which 
are registered have been suspended because their activities are deemed to be 
political. Additionally, rather than being perceived to be ineffective due to their inability 
to access government funding, the fact that several youth societies now operate 
online, indicates that they may not require state resources to operate effectively.230  
 
For non-registered and independent organisations231, being active online enables 
them to disseminate messages to a wider audience via social media outlets. In 
addition, this allows them to arrange meetings as well as orchestrate demonstrations 
and rallies, which in the context of Kuwait and Bahrain where freedom of assembly is 
severely restricted, this would be practically impossible for a registered organisation 
to attempt to replicate. It is suffice to say, that these spaces are better positioned in 
carrying out their functions, as many non-registered groups feel they can document 
issues with more transparency and less influence from outside parties. The same 
cannot be said for registered CSOs or as some research participants disparagingly 
referred to as Government-Organised NGOs or GONGO’s who may be more hesitant 
in disclosing certain information that could consequently see them being stripped of 
any future funding from the state.232 
                                                          
228 Ibid. 
229 Bahrain Youth Society 5, President of Bahrain Youth Centre (Al-Wefaq Affiliate), Saturday 7th June 2014.  
230 Bahrain Youth Society 6, Committee of Unemployed Graduates, Sunday 8th June 2014.   
231 Ibid. 
232 Bahrain Youth Society 1, Ex-President and Vice-President, BYSHR, Tuesday 3rd June 2014. 
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Another factor which has been touched upon is lack of funding from the state and how 
that may be of concern for registered CSOs, that is not to say however that insufficient 
funds is necessarily a major hindrance for informal groups to function effectively. As 
previously mentioned, because many groups are now online as well as their makeshift 
nature, people can meet in various locations without inspection from state authorities. 
In addition, and unlike many formal CSOs, the fact that many do not have access to 
funds means not only are they not dependent on the government but, more 
importantly, they are not acting at the behest of the state. This means they are not 
inhibited by having a single-issue focus which are conditions that governments and 
foreign donors often impose on formal CSO’s. This ultimately enables them to discuss 
or act upon prevalent issues taking place, and in the case of human rights groups, 
they are not predisposed to government policies or obliged to detract attention from 
possible human rights violations.233  
 
Another point to mention is that because of their informal/casual nature as it were, in 
terms of set-up and membership at least, anyone can participate depending on the 
social connections amongst those people whom attend that particular space, there are 
no formal requirements to becoming a member. Furthermore, because they are not 
authorised or regulated by the state, it also means that they are not held accountable 
for their actions within those spaces, an example to illustrate this case would be were 
a group to hold a meeting and they were speaking about contentious issues which 
cannot be aired in public.   
 
To briefly summarise, these factors highlight not only the limitations of existing 
associations that are registered with the state, but how informal political spaces may 
be utilised as a viable alternative to formal civil society organisations and could even 
complement them depending on the context and the type of space in question. The 
next section is going to introduce the various expressions of informal civil society that 
currently exist in Kuwait and Bahrain, namely the diwaniyya in Kuwait and the majlis 
in Bahrain. This will consist of an introduction to the history of these spaces as well as 
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a typology of the various and majalis whilst highlighting their prominence within Kuwaiti 
and Bahraini society. 
 
4.3 Diwaniyyat and Majalis: Structures, Functions and Types 
It is commonly thought that the diwaniyya (roughly translated as a salon) has existed 
across GCC countries since time immemorial. Traditionally thought of as a reception 
area where men would welcome guests into their home, often typically comprising of 
business colleagues and male relatives, the diwaniyya would become well noted for 
the gatherings they held. Although variations of the diwaniyya exist across GCC 
States, it was within Kuwait where they would gain most popularity, as the act of 
visiting and hosting a diwaniyya is now an indispensable feature of a Kuwaiti man’s 
social life.234 However, the proliferation of mixed-gender and female in recent years, 
has transformed this space from an exclusively all men’s club, yet it is still 
commonplace to find that most are frequented by men and those mixed-gender are 
often male-dominated.235    
 
Seldom expressed in past civil society literature, these informal spaces have been 
heralded as the quintessential institution of Kuwaiti civil society, yet variations thereof 
exist across GCC States, namely in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. When 
mentioning the purpose and the function of diwanniyat, it needs to be noted that the 
political space they occupy is an exclusive one within Kuwait. Their location in the 
home insulates them from state intervention, with their relative security being integral 
to grass-roots efforts that aided in bringing both periods of constitutional suspension 
to a close in Kuwait. As a result of the state protection granted to diwanniyat under 
Article 38 and 44 of the 1962 constitution, since the beginning of Kuwaiti constitutional 
life, diwanniyat have been regarded as favoured locations for political campaigning.236 
In addition, diwanniyat have been crucial to political participation in Kuwait as despite 
                                                          
234 Based on several observations from outside observers and participants in diwaniyya gatherings.  
235 Tetreault, Mary-Ann. Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000. 
236 Tetreault, Mary-Ann. "Managing Contentious Politics: Women's Right's and Social Peace in Kuwait." Lecture, 
Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco, CA, January 1, 2008. 
128 
 
the diversity and transparency of other public political platforms, such spaces have 
proven unexpectedly vulnerable to closure over the last decade.237 
 
The diwaniyya has its roots in the Arabian majlis, one space that is also prominent 
across the Gulf States and namely Bahrain, where people would typically gather or 
congregate to discuss pertinent issues of the day.238 The more social/private 
diwaniyya would often vary in topics and matters of discussion which can range from 
day to day business all the way through to trivial small talk between family and friends. 
While the majlis, which will be discussed in further detail, may be described as more 
akin to a town hall in terms of function and formality, as it could be perceived as more 
of a communal space, the diwaniyya evolved as a more regular and casual gathering 
spot for families, friends, tribes and work colleagues. Due to the more private and 
enclosed setting of the diwaniyya, outside guests who do not often attend are welcome 
but would need to be invited by either a guest attending a diwaniyya or by the host 
themselves.239    
 
As a social event, a diwaniyya takes place in the evening in a spare room or an annex 
which is often separate or removed from the rest of the house.240 A typical diwaniyya 
setting would consist of soft benches and cushions along the wall whilst guests often 
converse between themselves over warm beverages and snacks. The casual, informal 
nature of the diwaniyya can also be seen with guests (particularly relatives and friends) 
coming and leaving throughout the evening. It is the responsibility of the host i.e. the 
owner of the diwaniyya meaning usually the home owner to be as hospitable as 
possible to their guests and if it is a social/private diwaniyya there often needs to be 
some form of entertainment.241 
 
When examining the history and transformation diwaniyyat have undergone, one 
factor that does remain is their pivotal role in developing Kuwait itself. Over the last 
250 years, they have been utilised to facilitate quick communication amongst 
                                                          
237 Tetreault, Mary-Ann. Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000, p.60. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Kuwait Diwaniyya 3, Social Diwaniyya, Jabal Ahmad Area, Sunday 25th May 2014.  
240 Based on several observations inside various diwaniyya gatherings. 
241 Kuwait Diwaniyya 1, Family Diwaniyya of Journalist and Academic, Sulaibiyya, Friday 16th May 2014. 
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public/political figures as well as consensus building between local communities.242 
There are various types that have evolved from the original archetype and these can 
be distinguished in terms of the groups they serve and their level of formality. As the 
quintessential mode of Kuwaiti civil society, diwaniyyat are at the heart of Kuwait’s 
social, business and political life. How these spaces showcase their expediency is by 
the topics being discussed within diwaniyya gatherings, on the political level, a whole 
host of policies are frequently discussed whilst election campaigns are often run from 
these spaces by acting as platforms for prospective MPs. In addition, they are often 
utilised for professional networking where associates are introduced to one another 
and alliances are formed.243 
 
As alluded to above, the more politically prominent diwaniyyat are employed for 
specific purposes, most notably in election campaigns. These spaces form the basis 
of Kuwait’s consensual political system. Visiting  is not only commonplace in Kuwaiti 
social life but during election time these spaces demonstrate their influence as they 
are used by National Assembly candidates to reach out to their prospective 
constituents, likewise they can be used to insure or maintain their support base from 
past voters. The diwaniyya itself brings together various families, tribes and associates 
from the same district and can be viewed as a practical tool for National Assembly 
candidates to amplify their voices by getting any points or policies across to large 
segments of a single district. A list of diwaniyyat in various areas is prepared from the 
day electoral campaigning commences and with this information; candidates can then 
arrange appointments to visit those prominent diwaniyyat prior to the day that elections 
are held to try and maximize their potential reach.244 
 
Diwaniyyat can also be employed to conduct business, as prominent figures from 
government ministries, public companies, CEO’s of multinational corporations all 
receive guests on a weekly or monthly basis in the confines of their family/private . As 
part of traditional custom, the host, by being hospitable to his guests is obliged to listen 
                                                          
242 Kuwait Outside Observer 4, Former Independent MP and Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University, 
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243 Kuwait Outside Observer 2, Columnist and Contributor for Al-Rai, Al-Qabas and Al-Watan Newspapers, Beneid 
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and engage with proposals from those guests who have come to visit, particularly if it 
pertains to business. The diwaniyya is therefore an important space for guests 
(typically businessmen) to deliver an informal pitch or offer a proposal to a receptive 
host.245 
Therefore, just to elucidate further on some of the points raised and to gain a better 
grasp of each space and its function, it makes sense to offer a typology of the various 
diwaniyyat that are prominent within Kuwait today: 
Social/Private diwaniyya – The archetype of what a diwaniyya was once traditionally 
perceived as, this space is typically family-orientated and regularly attended by close 
relatives and friends; it is arguably the most common of all and is present in most 
Kuwaiti households. This is also the place where wedding ceremonies and funeral 
rites are often held for the male side of the family.246 Casual/Youth-Orientated – 
typically comprising of a group of friends of a similar age, often young people frequent 
these spaces as a leisurely pastime. These spaces could be affiliated to a youth 
movement/society. They can also be mixed sect or sect-based depending on the 
people who attend.247      
 
Working Professionals/Colleagues – These spaces are important for networking, 
forming alliances/connections and making important business transactions. This is of 
course dependent on the nature of work involved; it could just be a matter of work 
colleagues getting together. Likewise depending on the nature of their occupations 
this could be influential in Kuwaiti politics, for example a diwaniyya comprised of 
journalists.248    
    
Political/Public – A relatively recent development of the 20th Century when Kuwaitis 
starting to seek political rights and more representation in a system that had become 
more skewed towards the absolutist rule of the Emir in contrast to the more 
participatory consensual system that existed earlier. These are often prominent 
communal spaces where National Assembly candidates would come to present 
                                                          
245 Kuwait MP Diwaniyya 5, Former Independent MP, Participant A2, Tuesday 27th May 2014.  
246 Based on observations from attending several social diwaniyyat.  
247 Kuwait, Host, Youth Diwaniyya 1, Private and Inter-communal, Saturday 17th May 2014. 
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themselves during election time. However, this phenomenon of public figures visiting 
diwaniyyat is not confined to this particular space.249   
 
MP – these are arguably the most significant in political terms; not only do candidates 
and existing MP’s visit other diwaniyyat in electoral campaigns but they also host their 
own, in which guests, often from their own district, can attend to get their views and 
opinions on certain policies and it also provides an opportunity for their constituents to 
air some of their concerns or grievances to their local MP.250 Finally there are Sect-
Based - due to the familial and tribal composition of early diwaniyyat, many until today 
are affiliated based on religious denomination. There are of course cross-
denominational or inter-communal, but one prominent feature particularly during 
Kuwaiti elections is the various sect-based spaces that could be of use to an MP who 
comes from a certain religious background.251 
 
It is important to emphasise that the various types of  that exist today are not mutually 
exclusive of one another and often their functions; which vary dependant on nature of 
discussion as oppose to the physical space itself, may be similar to one another 
depending on the occasion. For example, a social or private diwaniyya can have 
political implications; rather it is just dependant on the location and the people who 
attend that diwaniyya at the time of discussion as to whether it acquires any political 
ramifications.  
 
Below is a Venn diagram to elucidate on the fluid relationship between the various 
types of diwaniyyat. 
 
Diagram A: Types of Diwaniyyat 
                                                          
249 Kuwait Outside Observer 4, Former Independent MP and Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University, 
Monday 26th May 2014. 
250 Kuwait MP Diwaniyya 5, Former Independent MP, Tuesday 27th May 2014. 
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132 
 
 
 
As expressed in the above diagram, these spaces fluctuate depending on the context 
of the discussions and the people who frequent the space. i.e. you could have an MP 
diwaniyya where both Shia and Sunni constituents are present, making it a mixed-sect 
MP diwaniyya and vice versa. It also important to note that the public or professional 
can appear to be more formal in appearance with orchestrated discussions where 
there could be minutes or set topics to get through. Nevertheless, these are no less 
informal then the casual, day to day in terms of having no membership requirements 
or a registration process. In this context, it is important to note the distinction between 
formal and informal spaces even where informal spaces appear to have more 
ostensibly formal undertones.252 
 
Coming onto the Bahraini majlis, it is apparent that there are notable similarities with 
the Kuwaiti diwaniyya in the functions they perform. One key distinction between them 
however, is that the original diwaniyya was first utilised as more of a private space for 
family and close relatives to get together, whereas the original formation of the majlis 
acquired a more public/communal feature to it, almost akin to a local town hall in the 
Western context.253 Another crucial point to bear in mind when contrasting the two 
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spaces is that although Bahrain’s majalis are renowned and can be distinguished from 
other political spaces for having greater freedoms to discuss economic, political and 
social issues, this does not necessarily entail that they are insulated from state 
intervention in contrast to the diwaniyya which is protected by the Kuwaiti Constitution. 
  
However, this does not imply that they have no influence in the political sphere. Like , 
majalis have traditionally expressed their utility during election time, as candidates for 
upcoming municipal and parliamentary elections often preoccupy themselves by 
preparing to visit the various prominent majalis, with the hope to win over constituents. 
During past elections in Bahrain, there has often been a tense rivalry between various 
political societies, particularly the Islamic affiliated ones, which often spills into these 
majalis.254 
 
Like the Kuwaiti diwaniyya, there are thousands of majalis in Bahrain and an 
increasing number open during the Ramadhan period, a similar feature to . The 
proliferation of majalis opening during Ramadhan is often due to more people staying 
up late following their fast. Majalis have become increasingly influential in part because 
the various political societies are dependent on them, they can no longer depend on 
their in-house and charitable activities to reach out to voters, as they seek to control 
and attract some of these majalis to ensure their dominance in the polls.255  
 
In addition, these majalis are proven to be effective in the political realm primarily 
because they are cost-effective and are useful as a facilitator for quick interaction 
between parliamentary candidates and constituent. The majlis is therefore important 
for any candidate because if they were to go and start a campaign it would be a costly 
process, compared to attending a majlis where constituents of various political and 
religious persuasions in one district are gathered. The majlis also plays a key role in 
gauging the chances of prospective candidates. Often considered to be highly reliable, 
to the extent that some political societies will use majalis to help determine which 
candidate to back during elections.256     
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Like the Kuwaiti diwaniyya, there are several variants of the Bahraini majlis that require 
a typology to understand the key qualities and functions that differentiate them from 
one another: 
 
Communal/Public Majlis – These spaces are also recognised to be the traditional and 
most popular majlis to date. Acting as a communal space for local communities to 
congregate, this space almost acts as a civic hall for pertinent issues to be discussed 
which may affect that local district/community. Candidates during election time will 
frequent these spaces to garner support and to obtain a vote of confidence from 
locals.257 There are also Private/Family Majlis, again, this space is typically located in 
the home, and most often people who frequent this space are family members and 
friends.258 
 
MP Majlis – Like MP diwaniyyat, these spaces are often located in the home and carry 
out similar functions. Guests from around the local district come to hear the views and 
get the opinions of the MP on government policies. Constituents can also express their 
concerns and air their grievances in order that these issues are raised in parliament.259 
Lastly, Sect-Based Majlis – With the perceived intense rivalry between Islamic political 
societies, it is commonplace in Bahrain to see majalis being used as political hubs for 
both Shia and Sunni communities. Having said that, there are also mixed-sect majalis 
but these tend to be more popular with secular/liberal orientated groups. However, 
these mixed-sect majalis are not solely confined to secularists or liberals, as Islamist 
societies have on previous occasions arranged mixed-sect majalis.260 
 
Diagram B: Types of Majalis 
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As demonstrated in this diagram, MP Majalis could either comprise of both 
communities or be addressing only one denomination. This has a significant impact 
on the way informal spaces are impacting on inter-communal relations with regards to 
whether they are bringing communities together or facilitating a space for its 
polarisation. This will be discussed further on in the empirical chapters when it 
becomes apparent that sect-based majalis or can be used to offer prospective MP’s 
who may themselves harbour radical/sectarian views a platform to enter the political 
fray, if elected this may then filter through at the governmental level – e.g. ongoing 
disputes between Shia and Salafi MP’s in Parliament. However, the mixed-sect 
majalis, which may not necessarily discuss such contentious issues as sectarianism 
as frequent as sect-based majalis, could still be perceived to be more constructive in 
terms of rapprochement and could ultimately be better at getting people together to 
discuss the need for reforms, political openings and forming cross-denominational 
coalitions.  
 
To summarise, both the diwaniyya and majlis appear to illustrate their utility in the 
political sphere namely via municipal and parliamentary elections, albeit one key 
distinction lies in the legal protection that is afforded to the Kuwaiti diwaniyya by the 
1962 Constitution in comparison to its Bahraini counterpart that does not possess such 
safeguarding of free speech. In terms of structure and layout, the several variants that 
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have evolved out of the traditional diwaniyya and majlis demonstrate that they can 
operate both as a public or private space, depending on the occasion. One common 
denominator of both spaces is that they have played their part as incubators for 
political movements and civil society projects overall. What appears to be a functional 
distinction between the two spaces is that they are focused more toward social 
functions/gatherings, whereas majalis seem to have a more structured format, often 
initiated by a talk or lecture from the host or guest speaker, in the form of a political 
candidate announcing their nomination followed by a discussion amongst guests.261 
 
4.4 Expressions of Informal Civil Society: Youth Movements and Societies  
This following section introduces another key informal space in Kuwaiti and Bahraini 
society, the youth societies/movements. In Kuwait, and most notably Bahrain, these 
societies have gained significant traction as another expression of informal civil 
society. The section shall explore the hallmarks of emerging youth movements, in what 
context they have come to fruition and assessing the reasons for why they have gained 
traction at the expense of registered youth groups. This will be followed by a 
conclusion which provides a snapshot of the commonalities between formal and 
informal civil society spaces and presents a rationale as to why informal 
groupings/spaces have become increasingly salient in the wake of the 2011 Arab 
uprisings.  
 
Although Kuwait and Bahrain share the longest history of civil society movements from 
across the GCC states, youth movements, societies and coalitions are a much more 
recent phenomenon to enter the political arena.262 There are two known groups in 
Kuwait, Youth Association of Kuwait and Civil Democratic Movement, and in Bahrain, 
as alluded to in the preceding sections on formal civil society, there are a plethora of 
formal youth organisations that operate in several fields, namely within the 
development sector, often acting as subsidiaries of recognised political societies. What 
is discussed here however, is the relatively recent proliferation of non-registered youth 
societies, which can also be characterised as informal spaces.  
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Again, what distinguishes the formal from the informal youth groups are several 
variables, namely, non-compliance with state authorities in the form of registration, 
effectively operating illegally in some cases. They also have extremely loose internal 
structures, meaning minimal bureaucratic elements such as a monitored membership 
process that would typically impede formal CSOs. In addition, they have the ability to 
forge ties and alliances with whom that group chooses instead of being at the 
discretion of the state. They can be located across the country as in most cases they 
do not acquire a fixed location or have registered offices, a marked distinction not only 
from formal associations but from the traditional informal spaces that are also in a 
permanent location and more importantly in terms of social mobilisation they acquire 
a platform both physically and online. These, amongst other factors, shall be explored 
in further detail.  
 
When it comes to understanding the catalysts behind the emergence of informal youth 
groups in recent years, it is important to note that the new generations in Kuwait and 
Bahrain are demanding a more modern country, more rational laws, less corruption 
and a merit-based economic system that helps the middle-class and the 
marginalised.263 Furthermore, one of the pressing issues for both Kuwaiti and Bahraini 
youth that has contributed to the proliferation of informal youth groups/societies is due 
to demographic factors and increasing socio-economic disparities that highlight the 
need for structural reforms within Gulf States. Approximately one third of citizenry in 
Bahrain and one quarter of Kuwaitis are between the ages of 15-29, with 
unemployment figures among 15-24 years ranging between 17-24% in both Kuwait 
and Bahrain.264 
 
Sustained joblessness on that scale could cause further political discontent amongst 
younger populations. Although Gulf rulers will no doubt dole out national largesse to 
muffle disgruntlement, a continuous predicament of the rentier state, many youths 
continue to search for dignified work and independent income, and so because of this 
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disposable time, the youth are better positioned to focus their attention toward grass-
roots activism.265    
 
In 2012, Kuwait witnessed the founding of its first independent youth society in the 
Gulf, the Civil Democratic Movement.  Though small, the movement has worked 
diligently to push opposition members of Parliament to agitate for an elected 
government.266 This goes to prove that such youth movements operating outside the 
states remit could carry important political implications regarding the extent of political 
change in the Gulf. Like their counterparts in other Arab states, young Gulf activists 
tend to pursue political agendas that are more far-reaching than those of traditional 
opposition elements and older generations.267  
 
In Kuwait for example, emerging youth organisations and longstanding opposition 
elements have quarrelled over the anticipated pace and extent of reform. With youth 
movements demanding more rapid change and have pushed harder for a full 
parliamentary system. This can be illustrated during the one-vote project and the 1st 
December elections of 2012. This was a decree passed by Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh 
Sabah Al-Ahmed who had reduced the number of votes that could be cast from four 
to one. This decree sparked widespread protests, comprising mostly of factions from 
Kuwait’s youth. The Kuwaiti Youth Movement, in large part responsible for the ‘2012 
dignity protests’, was aided by social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook.268 
The movement has previously stressed the importance of removing the distinction 
between societal groups by focusing on the civil state, which aims to accommodate 
all. This goes to show how Kuwait’s youth via unconventional means in contrast to 
traditional opposition, may try to reshape the role of political opposition in Kuwait.269  
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However, youth groups that emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ were 
principally backed by opposition members of parliament, with the latter often speaking 
for them at rallies and protests. This means that while Kuwaiti youth are becoming 
more involved in the national arena, their participation is rarely autonomous and this, 
again, often perpetuates the status quo.270 For example, Islamist members of the 
Majlis al-Umma (national assembly) are heavily involved in the Kuwait national 
students’ union, inculcating youth with patriarchal ideologies.271 
 
Having noted these recent strides by becoming more vocal in the political sphere, 
youth movements in Kuwait are still few and far between and very much a recent 
phenomenon, for that sake, this research will focus solely on the role of Bahraini youth 
groups which are far more established and have been in operation not only following 
the Arab Spring revolutions but their activities were also documented long prior to 
2011.  
 
Within the Bahraini context, meanwhile, youth were a key driving force behind the 
2011 uprisings that swept the country. Although Bahrain’s youth movements like 
broader political societies consist of various political persuasions, an intriguing 
phenomenon which directly relates back to this research is the recent grassroots 
initiatives to reach across the sectarian divide. In 2012, a group of young Bahrainis 
held a rare public political debate, the ‘Bahrain Debate’, at the Alumni Club in Manama. 
The debate discussed the country’s impending political crisis in an open forum that 
was streamed live online and comprised of key figures from across the political and 
denominational divide; the organisers said the 50 tickets for the event sold out in less 
than 10 minutes. The debate was praised by Bahrainis from across the political 
spectrum as a rare example of civil-society dialogue. Another youth civil-society 
initiative, the Bahrain Foundation for Reconciliation and Social Discourse, has 
organised ‘dialogue dinners’ aimed at increasing understanding between various 
social groups, and has also held talks on reconciliation with various individuals.272  
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In light of these cross-sectarian initiatives, Bahrain’s youth activists have proven to be 
flexible, shifting in response to current events and specific political goals rather than 
hewing to general ideological lines as in the case of traditional opposition groups. A 
pertinent example of this on the eve of the Arab uprisings were the various 
neighbourhood street demonstrators and cyber activists, many of whom planned the 
February 14, 2011, "Day of Rage" that first sparked the island's protest movement.273 
The online group responsible for orchestrating the event were The Youth of the 
February 14th Revolution who interestingly describe themselves as "unaffiliated with 
any political movement or organisation" and rejected any "religious, sectarian or 
ideological bases" for their demands.274  Making this research concerning non-
registered youth societies and their interaction with inter-communal dynamics all the 
more timely.  
 
In the absence of substantive change on the ground, the strength and influence of 
youth campaigns in both countries will likely continue their upward trajectory. In 
Bahrain, the more revolutionary youth groups will likely grow stronger if the sluggish 
National Dialogue process continues to entangle al-Wefaq and other large, well-
established Shiite opposition parties indefinitely -- assuming young protestors can 
abstain from violence. In contrast, an agreement on genuine political restructuring 
between the government and mainstream opposition would probably weaken the more 
extreme youth groups.275 
 
Perhaps, what has in part contributed to this receptiveness towards political activism 
within youth societies is the difference in generational attitudes, and this is none more 
visible than on social media outlets. The ongoing social media debates following the 
2011 protests have highlighted how activists from the younger generation have a less 
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hierarchical way of thinking then their elders.276 They assume the right to criticise and 
disagree with opposition leaders, community elders and religious circles, some of 
whom now face routine humorous backchat on twitter. This illustrates a significant 
cultural change from a more deferential past.  
 
To elucidate on the points raised as to the background and nature of youth movements 
in Kuwait and Bahrain, below is a typology of the various organisations that exist today: 
Shia Islamist – These are often registered youth societies that within the Bahraini 
context are regarded as part of a wider opposition network, a prime example would be 
Bahrain Youth Centre which is affiliated with al-Wefaq. Sunni Islamist – Again 
registered youth groups with relevant social authorities, these often receive funding 
and donor support from government to host events and other activities.  Mixed-
denominational – These are groups that are often operating as a registered youth 
group; however, they are more prone to hosting cross-sectarian initiatives and 
facilitating dialogue between loyalists and opposition. Human Rights Groups – These 
youth societies are more informal, as they are often not registered with relevant 
authorities, operating clandestinely, and in some contexts, have been revoked of their 
license because of the abuses or violations they document. These groups tend to be 
the most popular youth networks and often have no headquarters or designated 
location, a prime example being Bahraini Youth Society for Human Rights.277 
 
Diagram C: Types of Youth Movements 
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277 This typology based on observations across the various youth societies.  
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As illustrated in the diagram, those non-registered youth groups could comprise of 
members solely from one denomination or could be mixed-sect. As previously 
mentioned, those youth societies could have broader links to larger political societies 
which operate as an umbrella organisation. This in turn could potentially make them 
less informal as they could be operating at the behest of that political society – (which 
depending on whether that political society is a registered organisation or not), could 
impact whether that youth society can be designated as an informal space in its own 
right. 
 
To summarise, although youth societies are relatively inexperienced and are still 
developing within the political sphere, both in Kuwait and Bahrain, they are starting to 
take the lead from traditional opposition networks through a host of activities and 
methods. Their online presence means they are better positioned to organise 
demonstrations and to disseminate their message to a wider audience. In addition, 
youth movements are generally seen to be more prone to grass-roots initiatives that 
cross ideological lines, this can be seen in the case of the Civil Democratic Movement 
in Kuwait, which emphasises a civil state for all Kuwaitis as oppose to favouring one 
Shia Islamist Mixed-
denominational
Sunni Islamist
Human Rights Groups 
Political Societies (Could be registered or 
non-registered)  
143 
 
particular social group. Or in the case of the cyber activists that helped to orchestrate 
cross-denominational pro-democracy protests in Bahrain and popularised the 
February 14th movement. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
To summarise, this chapter has explored the existing legal and extra-legal 
impediments facing formal CSOs in Kuwait and Bahrain via the longstanding 
corporatist model that has sought to co-opt civil society in the Gulf, and with it, 
suppress any transparent grassroots activism and cross-denominational alliances that 
could be a perceived threat to the state. The chapter has also shed light on the 
emergence of an informal civil society, its notable distinction from formal groupings, 
as well as dissecting the unique and distinguishing characteristics between the more 
traditional and contemporary upcoming spaces. In addition to this, providing concrete 
examples of how these groups are gaining momentum as an alternative civic space 
that can circumvent state auspices.  
 
Just to reiterate the similarities and differences in those spaces, the diwaniyya and the 
majlis share several features, namely they both involve discussions pertaining to local 
politics. It could be mentioned that the Kuwaiti diwaniyya has historically been viewed 
as a more viable political space given that it is protected within Kuwaiti legislation itself, 
which the same cannot be said of in the case of the Bahraini majlis. However, that is 
not to necessarily reduce its influence in orchestrating civic activism in the form of 
organising demonstrations and protests. The same can be said of non-registered 
youth groups, which despite lack of government funding, will network, often online, to 
bring people together and discuss pressing issues within a casual setting e.g. an 
activists home or in a coffeehouse, which could not be possible in the case of 
registered organisations, and so have proven to become increasingly expedient in the 
wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings. What has not been addressed however, is their effect 
and interaction vis-à-vis sectarian relations and how that plays out at the communal 
level and to investigate whether informal spaces merely act as a reflection of wider 
state-societal relations or can they influence the trajectory of inter-communal relations 
on the whole, which is what this research has set out to achieve as a core objective. 
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5. Informal Spaces and the Framing of Sectarian Discourse  
Departing from regime mechanisms and the top-down narratives that have been 
disseminated in influencing the trajectory of sectarianism, this chapter seeks to offer 
a snapshot of the various ways in which informal civil society plays out and operates 
in its approach to sectarian relations in both Kuwait and Bahrain. The emerging 
themes that arose from the empirical data collated by the author are the location of 
such spaces, the activities research participants partake in and what those spaces 
represent to people who actively participate within them. Observing these themes can 
provide an understanding into the various ways in which informal spaces can 
potentially play both a positive and detrimental role in influencing the trajectory of inter-
communal relations at the grass-roots level and the extent to which they have served 
to mitigate or exacerbate banal or “everyday” sectarianism (i.e. is there a repetition or 
dispelling of regime narratives on a communal level).  
 
Furthermore, this chapter will seek to examine the topics or themes in question when 
it comes to observing inter-communal discourse and whether it can be harnessed in a 
way that brings about further rapprochement or reconciliation between denominations, 
particularly in times of heightened political instability, as is the ongoing case in Bahrain 
today or in Kuwait throughout the 1980s for example. It will become evident throughout 
the empirical chapters and as alluded to in previous chapters, that state-led or state-
sponsored discourse, namely the sectarianized portrayal of both domestic and 
regional events, ought to be challenged and common misconceptions pertaining to 
current affairs be alleviated, to harmonise communal relations.  
 
It can be suggested therefore that one potential outlet, be it the research in question 
i.e. the informal space, whether it can facilitate community building initiatives to bring 
about alternative narratives that do not seek to further polarise communities or whether 
they too likewise serve to exacerbate tensions and incur a greater trust deficit between 
religious communities, which again only panders or lends credence to state policies of 
securitizing certain segments of the population and to then perceive them as fifth 
columnists that behold external loyalties. It may be argued therefore, that the way in 
which the space or grouping is utilised and is channeled to further what end, this will 
in effect determine whether informal civil society can be regarded not only as a more 
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effective replacement of formal CSOs, but whether they can shape or determine 
perceptions of one another and in turn act as a potential platform for meaningful cross-
communal mobilisation that could even resonate on a political level (e.g. cross-
communal coalition group), which it could be argued has long impeded social reform 
movements both in the Kuwaiti and Bahraini context, as will be evidenced from 
participant responses in the following chapters.   
 
The findings come to display an overall unclear picture as to each space, its context 
and the roles it carries out within its given capacity. What becomes evident is that 
informal spaces in some cases have been influential in the selection of their locality, 
particularly in the Bahraini context with the emergence of cultural workshops where 
the neutrality in location is integral to its influence (i.e. being situated in a public area 
as oppose to in a predominantly Sunni or Shi’i neighborhood). This has enabled and 
facilitated cross-communal dialogue and solidarity on a host of topics that the regime 
would in normative circumstances seek to dictate, albeit it must be noted that despite 
its well-received reception and popularity amongst locals across Bahrain, this is a 
space that is still looking to grow and gather momentum.  
 
The observations also indicate that youth-led initiatives and activities have made in 
part gains and limitations as to their own scope of influence, particularly given the 
potential risks some members/individuals may face were they to ever come into 
conflict with the law, and by extension the state. That said, it may therefore warrant 
further investigation into observing majalis more closely and whether utilizing the more 
traditional informal spaces maybe more conducive to being an influential cross-
communal platform, particularly given that they are far more established then some of 
the emerging spaces.  
 
However, taking those findings into account, it can be suggested that despite its past 
and present political utility, (e.g. during election time or political lobbying in the case of 
diwaniyyat or majalis), when it comes to recognising its capacity to overcome banal 
(everyday) sectarianism, it must be acknowledged that as of present, given the current 
geo-political climate, informal spaces cannot be regarded as a practical means to 
overcoming sectarian tensions. Nevertheless, based on the understanding of several 
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research respondents, there is scope for cautious optimism that they could give rise 
to more tangible or sustainable cross-communal coalitions and initiatives should the 
external conditions (i.e. the broader political climate) become more favourable to an 
alternative civic space to flourish and prosper.  
 
5.1 Location, Activities and Autonomy  
One common theme that was deduced from the empirical data was that the locality, 
positioning and activities of informal spaces are a key factor in determining their ability 
to pursue grass-roots activism and whether they can address the top-down utility of 
sectarian politics that is employed by those regimes in question, albeit to varying 
degrees and in different ways which shall be explored at further length in the following 
chapter on regime-societal relations. In order to understand the significance of location 
or locality in this context, it must be understood how location determines who 
comprises or makes up the attendees of any given space, secondly, how that then 
impacts on the types of discussions/dialogue that takes place, and thirdly, how 
discussions can then determine the activities and functions the space can cater 
towards.  
 
To understand their emergence, it must be noted what the rationale was for 
participants and in what context they were first formed. According to one research 
participant who chairs a group and is in contact with several other informal workshops, 
the reasoning behind their formation was in light of events following 2011, however 
the idea itself did not commence from that time.  
 
“These groups were formed with the intent to offer an alternative to established 
groups, but to also have an impact on members of registered groups and to 
engage with what was already present in civic society. It should be stated, that 
the idea of Bahrain Debate for example existed prior to 2011, the idea being to 
give youth a greater platform to discuss politics, however they eventually did 
the event in 2012, it was not a new concept but rather the result of existing 
environment and circumstances. There was now a pressing need more than 
ever to facilitate dialogue between communities and political societies but more 
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importantly is that it was not a coincidence these groups emerged because they 
wanted to be seen as independent.”278  
 
This emphasis on autonomy was integral to the rationale for forming, firstly to be 
regarded as legitimate by all, which meant being perceived as politically neutral, and 
not affiliated to any group, as people coming from a registered organisation came with 
their own predisposed ideas but simultaneously to attract those people from a broad 
political spectrum to participate in their activities.  
 
One case of location being integral to the purpose of the space is with the example of 
informal workshop groups, namely in the form of pop up art exhibitions or literary clubs. 
Particularly in Bahrain, where the positioning of the space is integral to bringing various 
communities together and to have a candid discussion as to the politics within the 
country, amongst a host of other topics, in some respects acting like the more 
traditional spaces of the majlis or diwaniyya.  
 
“Mawana (one local workshop operating across the Bahraini coastline) does a 
very good job of bringing people together from many different communities, 
something that cannot be exactly said about many other initiatives. What 
Mawana does well is that it is in an area that many Bahrainis would not go to 
or have never been to in their entire lives, so they attract all these people from 
urban, rural and sectarian identities to come in and just listen and participate 
and interact with one another.”279  
 
Mawana, which despite not exclusively catering for the youth, has a strong youth 
component where they organize various activities and workshops, all of which are 
centered around the idea of encouraging the use of public and urbanised space. This 
is then brought into context of people’s daily realities by attempting to understand the 
politics that has an impact on them. In this particular case, hosting an event near a 
privately-owned beach as a symbolic challenge to the political and economic elites 
                                                          
278 Outside Observer 2, Chairman of Tasa’ol, Independent Bahraini initiative that aims to raise questions on 
conflict and identity, 7th March 2017, Skype Discussion. 
279 Outside Observer 2, Chairman of Tasa’ol, Independent Bahraini initiative that aims to raise questions on 
conflict and identity, 2nd February 2015, Skype Discussion.  
148 
 
who have taken control of the coastline, with murals that say “the beach is a public 
right”. This is noteworthy because the group aims to bring people together on issues 
that resonate with young people across the sectarian divide. The significance of the 
location of such activities is once more highlighted in the fact that they host their 
activities in areas where the clear majority of Bahrainis would not tend to go or have 
never visited. This “neutral grounding” as it were, is instrumental in bringing people 
from urban or rural areas and more pertinently from different sectarian identities to 
come visit, participate and interact on timely issues.  
 
However, where the emerging informal space is limited is in terms of established 
recognition, and with that popularity, which the more traditional spaces like the 
Bahraini majlis can more likely achieve. As one research respondent explains:  
 
“Albeit the workshops or forums can be very cross-class, very cross-sectarian, 
cross-communal, as far as traditional groups go, they have a wider audience 
not just because of resources but because of the name and when it comes to 
these initiatives, the name is as important as the content. Sometimes when you 
are doing these initiatives and you are trying to encourage people to attend they 
often get shunned or they would be questioned, people are skeptical, they do 
not trust this new initiative, they have never heard of it before, they want to know 
the names of the organisers, they want to know who participates in these 
activities, and so there is always a kind of cynicism from certain elements of the 
public.”280 
 
One issue the research respondent more recently noted are also some of the logistical 
obstacles facing the emerging workshops, in that their activities are sporadic or 
seasonal, as members cannot commit on a regular basis, unlike the registered/formal 
groups where they have sustained (albeit largely futile) activities by paid members who 
receive government funding.  
 
“The big difference is that informal workshops do not have the ability to manage 
sustained activities, they are often project based with an expiration date. They 
                                                          
280 Ibid. 
149 
 
do not have financial support in most cases or the skills to sustain the work, 
and furthermore because the active members have multiple affiliations to other 
organisations/societies this can also in turn undermine their work due to other 
commitments.”281 
 
Likewise, when it comes to specific numbers, this too raises questions regarding their 
potential scope to have a sustained influence on inter-communal relations. When 
probed as to the number of such initiatives, the research respondent admitted that,  
 
“it is difficult to really pinpoint or quantify the number of informal workshops, 
because they are project based, they often emerge and dissolve frequently, 
and furthermore their disbandment can be attributed to other factors such as 
mismanagement and limited resources to sustain events.”282  
 
However, the participant did concede that by working on a seasonal or project by 
project basis, some workshops such as Mawana could maintain hosting art exhibitions 
and even start working on publications.  
“Their second cultural season is starting in Juffair for Summer 2017…again it is 
a workshop that is not explicitly political but touches on the pressing issues of 
the day from society to economy and political identity.”283  
 
Another pertinent example more recently is the continuation of the Bahrain Debate, 
which has been successful not only in attracting state ministry funding whilst retaining 
its associational independence, but also operating on a broader scale as it hosts key 
political figures and societies in panel discussions and integrating youth networks into 
the fold. “For their upcoming event this year, they will be organizing an event with 
Bahrain Democratic Youth Society.”284 
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Despite the Bahrain Debate being a recent example, it becomes evident therefore that 
one of the potential limitations for emerging informal groups to make a name for 
themselves is due to there being a trust deficit, often due to lack of awareness or 
publicity of the group itself or the organisers. However, given the recent mixed 
successes of startup groups/workshops throughout Bahrain, there have been spaces 
that solely use the buzzword of inclusivity to gain popularity and there are those that 
follow through on their claims of bridging communities, particularly groups that share 
a common interest in terms of activities.   
 
Although having said this, the research respondent highlighted how;  
“there is one art group called Ul’affa and they are very big on cross-communal 
conversation, expanding on community relations and peace and conflict and 
emphasizing a Bahraini identity through art. They have been very 
successful…their group’s success can be attributed to their diversity, one thing 
that brings them together is that they are all artists...they act independently but 
were also able to be granted outside funding from the U.S embassy in Bahrain 
for example but this did not undermine their work.”285  
 
Furthermore, their utility can be illustrated in the fact that as an exhibition they are in 
a transient location, moving from one area to another to showcase their work as artists, 
even receiving invitations from neighboring states. As one research respondent 
recounts/asserts/states: “They have done a couple of art exhibitions and photo 
exhibitions in the UAE and were directly asked to come to the UAE to present their 
work.”286 
 
It is important therefore to highlight some of the activities of these shared interest start-
up groups as with the previous case it demonstrates how they can retain their 
independence, be successful in addressing inter-communal issues and bringing artists 
from various backgrounds together, and more interestingly were also simultaneously 
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able to receive funding from external sources which does not necessarily jeopardize 
or undermine their activities.  
 
The research participant also explains how their unique ability to showcasing their 
work and talents, enables them to mitigate a potential trust deficit that other emerging 
groups may experience given that they are not a long-established group or do not 
affiliate with a particular society, such as Mawana.  
“I am inclined to say that being independent can often be very effective, 
especially because once they manage to gain the trust of the public, that they 
do not have a hidden agenda, they have credibility, they started to become very 
successful and within a short amount of time they managed to gain a following 
from across Bahrain…their work is often of a political character, but why it was 
so successful is that being an art group it is not explicit in your face, so when 
people come to visit their workshops or one of the exhibitions they do not 
necessarily treat it as a political space, so they manage to attract people from 
many different affiliations…what made them really effective was their capacity 
to gain trust and credibility across Bahraini society in such a short space of time, 
within a year.”287 
 
Again, another key factor to note was how the positioning/locality of the space as well 
as the activity itself were integral to the group’s success in bringing communities 
together and discussing contentious political topics in the country. Acquiring a 
transient, fluid location as opposed to having a set space or gallery (in this context) for 
their activities was influential in gaining popularity across Bahrain.  
“They chose the location and the spaces very effectively in that they did not 
have a permanent space, so they would go to different galleries, public spaces, 
parks and try to create something there, in that sense many of their initiatives 
would attract a different crowd each time…once they went to an abandoned 
house in Juffair, an area where a lot of youth go, they held an exhibition there, 
they’ve also held more formal or informal events in higher class, lower class 
places as well, and within people’s homes, they operate in various locations.”288   
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Furthermore, rather than discounting the potential benefits of more traditional informal 
spaces, the research respondent also highlighted how they too can be effective in the 
way they operate vis-à-vis inter-communal discourse compared to many registered 
groups where events or the dynamic of discussions may take a different course of 
action.  
“I do think some registered and informal groups also have the potential and 
capacity to promote social cohesion, but I think because their activities differ, 
the results, and the impact and the character of the space differs also. With 
majalis, there is a greater potential for social cohesion there because people 
directly speak to each other, they get to know the person, their name, their face, 
where they live, their families, in that respect it is more interpersonal, but with 
registered groups for example, it will be more formal in that they bring in a 
lecturer/speaker, people might sit there, and listen to the lecture, and perhaps 
talk with a few of their colleagues...it is not necessarily interactive, whereas with 
the majalis and some of these emerging informal groups, you find they are 
geared or more tailored toward discussion and open debate, alongside the 
socialising aspect of people getting to know one another.”289 
 
This observation made by the research participant both complements and stands in 
contrast to the assessment of some non-registered youth societies, particularly where 
they differ in strategies to appear politically neutral. In addition to this, some youth 
societies may depart from the workshops’ methods in that they want to have more 
autonomy over their own affairs as oppose to liaising with registered groups or 
societies as a means to overcoming both state-dominated discourse and the CSA 
(coercive state apparatus) in place.  
 
According to one youth society that documents human rights violations, it was 
important for its members not only to operate independently, but not to “have any 
relations with political societies or parties.”290 Indeed, the group felt that, despite it 
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being evident that some of its members showed solidarity with opposition groups’ 
demands, it was important for them as human rights activists to document any abuse 
that is taking place in the country, be it by the state or opposition actors. The rationale 
being that it would hopefully put them in good standing across Bahrain’s population, 
as a means to safeguard their own credibility.  
 
However, the implications of them operating as an informal/independent group always 
entailed they were running legal risks operating without registration by the Ministry of 
Social Development. As one participant conceded that it could potentially jeopardise 
their line of work when documenting human rights violations when recalling one 
incident.  
“We lost the case against the government (to get registered), so we decided to 
continue regardless. We believe it is a price worthy of paying, however it has 
come back to hurt us, as in 2007, when some of our members were arrested, 
for four to five months I was working alone, after they were released they 
continued to do their work. There were also other people who worked 
temporarily with us in that time, but they feared to work with us directly in fear 
of the same, so they were working for us anonymously.”291 
 
This could therefore suggest that despite the commendable perseverance of some of 
these individual activists participating in non-registered youth groups, they are still 
being impeded by a coercive state that could arrest them at any point and disband 
their informal youth societies. In addition, this could offer further credence to the majlis 
as potentially more of an ideal platform for grassroots activism and mobilisation as its 
location, (although it is static unlike the emerging workshops), it does operate in most 
cases within the private remit of the home or community centre. Youth groups on the 
other hand, despite not being as transparent and as susceptible to government 
monitoring as a formal CSO, still find a recurring problem in that their effectively illegal 
activity always runs a risk for the participant’s safety. Having said that, one telling 
strength of the independent youth group, is that their selected members have more 
organisational autonomy, which may not be the case for more formal organisations 
that look to co-opt their members. “I think our idea is to mobilise, because I see political 
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parties use the youth, they exploit them, and they do not give them real representation, 
and this is the one thing in our society, in our society we don’t have a real hierarchy.”292 
 
What is also interesting to observe was the protocol around membership within 
BYSHR, which is selective for specific reasons, mitigating the potential trust deficit by 
employing only those they know well and see fit for such a role.  
“The powerful human rights organisations with government tried to spy on us, 
before we had two members who were in the government, so for membership 
therefore we are very careful or selective…because we don’t want our 
organisation to be infiltrated.”293 
 
However, what is most pertinent to the issue of sectarianism, is the measured way in 
which they managed the discussion around the topic. BYSHR felt it was imperative to 
shift Bahrain’s political and socio-economic challenges into a civil rights discourse, and 
they attempt to evidence this in the diverse group of people they work with, in the hope 
of trying to universalize demands and common concerns in the name of human rights 
as opposed to framing issues in sectarian terms.  
“We have no problem, anyone who works with us we do not care for their 
religion, we have to work for the human rights which are universal…we have 
people across the board, we do not have that problem in our society.”294  
 
In addition to this, when the informal youth group were probed as to the role of majalis 
in recent times, they viewed them as a conducive platform that has the cross-
communal capacity to wield influence in mobilising people and to actively counter 
government narratives on sectarianism.  
“At the beginning of the 2011 revolution, the majalis were discussing how we 
can react to the government’s actions…this was happening inside the majalis 
because this is one of few spaces that government cannot interfere in, you do 
not need to have permission or membership. It’s more effective, like the Kuwaiti 
diwaniyyat, I have visited there is a space to talk openly, and likewise some of 
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the majalis the political elites attend, influential people of all walks can go, 
however these kind of more influential majalis may occur every now and then, 
they may not necessarily be an everyday occurrence compared to the more 
regular ones which are more casual in discussion.”295 
 
Albeit a positive response when discussing the utility of politically influential majlis, one 
limitation the research participants did note is their infrequent timing which may 
possibly be detrimental in the long run, particularly when it comes to concerted efforts 
in consolidating cross-communal opposition ties for example. Likewise, the head of 
Bahrain’s Human Rights Observatory and General Federation of Bahrain, (an 
independent trade union) echoed these positive remarks regarding youth activities, in 
terms of orchestrating mobilisation but however argued that ultimately, they proved to 
be largely ineffective or futile in meeting their demands, which was to curb sectarian 
discrimination in the hope of attaining improved employment prospects.  
 
“If you see any demonstrations, the core of it are youth, the blocking of the road 
is done by youth, the one’s on social media are youth.”296 When probed about 
young people’s tactics using road blocks, the respondent noted that “it depends, 
some people understand, some people do not understand this measure…but 
all in all it is irrelevant because they (the state) bring in migrant workers to take 
over his position anyway.”297  
 
It is evident therefore that many of the mobilisation strategies are orchestrated by 
youth groups, however judging from the participants’ remarks they have been proven 
only to be detrimental if not socially divisive in some quarters of Bahrain, and 
furthermore they have proven to be ineffective as the authorities can simply overlook 
these demands/activities through the use of the CSA in place.  
 
This again could offer some indication that independent youth groups may need to 
revise some of their strategies, potentially looking towards, or emulating the 
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exhibitions/workshop efforts, at bringing about more effective modes of 
rapprochement as opposed to by means of civil disruption. That being said, cross-
communal partnership in human rights work for youth is abundantly clear and if 
anything, needs to be further harnessed.   
 
Returning to the majalis, the research participant notes that the traditional outlet of the 
majlis has become an emerging space re-inventing itself depending on the socio-
political conditions within the country. Likewise, given the relative freedom afforded to 
visitors who frequent such spaces, it seemed appropriate for platforms outside the 
official civil society remit to step in and make their mark in terms of mediating between 
people of various political persuasions, where in ordinary circumstances they may not 
have the opportunity to necessarily air their concerns, whilst also acquiring a new-
found structure almost akin to the formal civil society organisations. “For a long time, 
the majlis in Bahrain were primarily a social space, but now for the past few years, 
there is a movement or a trend for majlis to operate more on a political basis, and even 
operate in some ways as formal civil society spaces, there is one majlis (Majlis al-
Mesh’aal) in particular that runs political discussions and lectures and meetings every 
week with a variety of political affiliations, so sometimes they will invite opposition 
people, sometimes they invite MP’s, former ministers…”298 
 
When probed further as to what the reasons are for the increasing politicization of the 
informal space collectively, the same research participant noted “that because along 
with that movement of primarily youth-led groups feeling like there is something 
missing in Bahrain, a lot of people felt like there is a lack of appropriate spaces or 
venues to discuss and debate so many of these people who most likely have been 
running their majlis for a very long time, possibly years, but more recently decided to 
formalize their majlis a little more, for example they may advertise their majlis with 
custom designed posters and highlight how this guest is coming and will speak about 
this particular topic for example.”299  
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When questioned about this gravitating towards a more formal, even institutionalized 
outlook of the informal space, the research participant still however highlighted its 
effectiveness and unique characteristics that would make headway in terms of 
empowering inter-communal relations, unlike official political spaces, and this is by 
and large due to the environment the majlis can potentially foster, emphasizing that 
there is relatively easier accessibility for people across the political spectrum to attend 
majalis as oppose to a CSO’s headquarters for example.  
 
“Being a majlis, people think of the space and treat it differently, so although a 
majlis for example invites an opposition speaker or someone from parliament 
or a former minister etc…people still think of it as a majlis i.e. a neutral space 
of sorts despite who maybe in attendance. The fact that people organize events 
at a majlis has actually helped get people from across the political divide to 
attend, because it is not viewed as x or y people’s space, it is a majlis, open for 
anyone who wishes to attend…in that sense the environment of a majlis itself 
helps, for example it would be difficult for a loyalist person to attend a meeting 
at al-Wefaq headquarters, a person by themselves may feel somewhat 
uncomfortable walking in, simple due to the way they view themselves and the 
way they view others vice-versa, but with a majlis, they will more often than not 
feel comfortable to attend irrespective of who is or who is not present.”300 
 
The research participant went on to claim rather emphatically how the re-invention of 
the majlis and the way it is perceived (often as a neutral space), and how it can make 
way for open discussion, has been a success in bringing communities together in 
Bahrain despite the evident societal divisions born out of the ramifications of the 2011 
uprising, there is a gradual rapprochement taking place once again, and the majlis as 
one outlet serves to facilitate this, and in doing so, is also undermining top-down and 
regime elite narratives of how sectarianism came to being in the country.  
 
When asked as to whether the majlis caters in bringing people together,  
“I think they already have actually. Like there was one recent meeting at a majlis 
in Riffa’, which as you may know Riffa’ is a majority Sunni area and is renowned 
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for being explicitly loyalist and there have even been many examples of some 
anti-opposition or anti-Shi’i militant activities here, but recently, after elections 
were over I recall a majlis hosted by Dr Ali Fakhro, who was the former minister 
of education, had a very good reputation amongst many people in Bahrain but 
he was often perceived as an opposition figure because he criticized the 
government on occasions, but the fact he had a good reputation had allowed 
people from Riffa’ to be willing to go listen to him despite the topic…I also think 
it being a majlis having a good reputation, even if they brought someone like 
Khalil Marzooq from al-Wefaq, people may have actually listened.”301  
 
When comparing the various informal outlets, the outside observer highlighted that 
there are marked differences between the ways in which emerging youth-based 
groups/workshops operate compared to the traditional space of the majlis, however 
both can be utilised to a positive effect in the political sphere in their own way 
depending on who they can attract and the different social networks utilizing these 
spaces.  
“Neither of them are detrimental, but they operate in a different setting. It must 
be stated that in addition to sectarian, political and economic divisions in 
Bahrain, there is a big generational gap, so youth groups are not able to attract 
people from across generations, and likewise majalis are not usually able to 
attract many young people, because people who often frequent majalis and 
youth groups operate in different social networks. So how do you get to know 
about these venues – from your friends, your peers, your social media 
accounts, and because your social networks are already tailored to adhere to 
what you are interested in.”302 
 
Lastly on location, the observer highlighted how the urban centres could be more 
prone to attracting a cross-sectarian audience as opposed to more isolated villages 
surrounding the cities. “Majalis in Manama, Muharraq, simply just based on their 
capacity to attract a wide cross-section of society, people are more likely to visit a 
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majlis in these places than one in Sitra or Riffa’”.303 Albeit as noted previously, even 
the majlis in isolated areas of villages that tend to be denomination-only or sect-based 
can still offer a platform for alternative voices to come to the fore, and this can only 
bode well for harnessing stronger communal ties in the long term.  
 
Comparing this once again with the locality, or rather the locations of independent 
workshops or informal initiatives, it becomes clear that locality is the central 
hallmark/determinant as to whether a group can foster stronger social ties both inside 
and outside the country and with that cross-communal rapprochement. The Bahrain 
Debate initiative, for example, sets out to facilitate debate amongst Bahraini civil 
society itself, and arranges panel discussions not only in Bahrain but outside the 
country in London for example, to publicise and shed light on the case for relevant 
state and non-state actors that play a key role in Bahraini politics on a transnational 
level.  
 
“Having a session in London is used at this point to get messages across to 
outside partners or actors whether it is the British Government or political 
parties or even think tanks such as representatives from Chatham House, they 
will also attend for example but I think the goal right now is to pick it up in 
Bahrain, build a better grounding there and then have the more controversial 
sessions in London.”304 
 
This point alludes to the suggestion that technically independent (i.e. non-registered) 
groups that do however operate on a more formally structured basis such as this 
initiative that takes the form of an open debate highlights a potential limitation in that 
some contentious political topics, sectarianism being one of them, is having to be 
discussed outside Bahrain, which also demonstrates that these emerging groups that 
do try to bring people from across sectarian and political divides may have to come up 
with alternatives in order to have what can be considered productive state-societal and 
inter-communal dialogue. Unlike the traditional informal spaces of the majlis that is 
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insulated from state interference. However plausible this assessment may be, it is a 
point that would still require further substantiation.  
 
Linking back to the previous observer’s comments about there being an evident gap 
when it comes to addressing unchecked sectarian discourse that was exacerbating 
tensions, the Bahrain debate was therefore also born out of events stemming from 
2011 and the need for moderates across the political spectrum to try bridge the 
sectarian gap, this was to be another grass-roots initiative that sought to do precisely 
that. When asked as to whether members of the debate and participants come solely 
from a specific area of Bahrain, the respondent claimed that  
 
“they tried to diversify as much as possible, we have members both Sunni and 
Shi’i and generally we have a Sunni Islamist, Sunni secular etc…across the 
political spectrum, people who have the connections to get us the people we 
need on the debate as well…because you have to create something that 
appears to be neutral, that is a neutral political space where people of different 
views are welcomed, we do still have some problems with members of political 
societies like al-Esalah or al-Minbar (Conservative Sunni Islamist groups), 
trying to get them to our events so there is still this gap…they cannot bear the 
fact that they would have to sit with someone like Khalil Marzooq (al-Wefaq) for 
instance.”305 
 
Therefore, much as there is a demand for such initiatives and this is reflective in the 
group’s diversity, having members and panel participants from different sects, all over 
Bahrain, you find there are still some deterrence from certain political societies despite 
its apparent impartiality, which may not necessarily be the case were such events or 
discussions located in a majlis which is not a political space per se.  
The participant did, however, highlight that being a non-registered group still had 
tangible benefits in comparison to existing registered CSO’s in Bahrain like other 
emerging workshops.  
“Being informal gives you more space to do stuff without having to check with 
the government every now and then because that is how NGO’s function, you 
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have to report back to the Ministry of Social Development every now and then 
to tell them we did x, y, z activities. So, it does offer you more space to think 
and have your own discussions that is not necessarily state-approved 
discourse. But working within state structures in a sense, I think the state turns 
a blind eye to what we do.”306 
 
As noted before, however, there is still some resistance to such discussions on either 
side of the political spectrum in Bahrain that have sought to polarise communities 
further for their own gain. This has in part undermined inter-communal relations and 
is once again pandering to a state mechanism of securitizing and scaremongering its 
own communities to act as a safeguard or at least be perceived as legitimate rulers 
with segments of the Bahraini population.  
“I think the Salafists from al-Esalah, they think this initiative is a very bad idea 
basically, every time we talk to them about it, they have been alarmed, I am not 
quite sure why to be honest, and on the other side of the spectrum, the 
gathering of National Unit, they have been alarmed to the point that a day before 
the event in London, they cancelled saying they will not attend the conference, 
they always had an issue or questions as to who was behind the Bahrain 
Debate…we get a lot of people thinking the initiative is very close to the Crown 
Prince or something even though it simply isn’t. I don’t even think the Crown 
Prince would want us to speak about such issues…they don’t want to speak to 
each other anyway.”307  
 
In some respect, and despite the efforts made by emerging groups, this demonstrates 
that there are still visible divisions particularly with either side of the political spectrum 
and that bridging the gap so to speak will be harder with such groups that seek to 
exacerbate tensions between communities, the government of course can then pick 
apart and utilise the political fringe elements in order to safeguard its rule, so there is 
still work to be done for such emerging groups if they are to be considered successful 
in the long run.  
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However, the Co-Founder of the Bahrain Debate does go on to note that longstanding 
socio-economic inequalities in Bahrain have failed to be redressed which effects all 
communities albeit to a varying degree and it is this point that ought to be highlighted 
in discussions. If this is brought up and raised not only will it highlight a common cause 
for Bahrainis but will in turn bring Bahrainis together in solidarity to tackle these issues, 
which is what the government does not seem to want to focus on.  
“The colonial legacy we are inheriting, even sort of the neo-imperialist phase 
we are dealing with in terms of British and U.S foreign policy today, that impacts 
of course but it is also locally at the state level, economically they have just 
stuck to rentier politics or socially stratifying society, creating inequalities. For 
example, if you are from a Shia background you cannot go to the military or 
police force, which automatically puts high school students who do not enter 
university at a disadvantage…what we are trying to do therefore, especially with 
our last session was to talk about sectarianism in Bahrain, but discuss it within 
the prism of political economy, we wanted to make it as factual as possible to 
assert that it is the state itself that is the main perpetrator of sectarianism.”308 
 
This is particularly significant in the way of making inter-communal discourse more 
conducive in addressing issues as opposed to offering ideologically-charged 
narratives that could inadvertently exacerbate tensions or play on counter-productive 
generalisations to formulate an argument. Rather the discussion ought to be focusing 
on material conditions, and the evident disparity in wealth and how it has been afforded 
to various Bahraini communities, asking what the effects and ramifications of policies 
are such as naturalization, gerrymandering etc. For the Bahrain Debate and other such 
emerging groups, emphasizing these tangible issues as it were will go much further in 
bringing about inter-communal rapprochement.  
 
However, having such discussions is not always an easy feat, particularly when a 
diverse panel reflecting the broad political spectrum of Bahraini society is required and 
again people are averse to such conversations given who may be in attendance on 
the panel for example. A problem that is not so prevalent in the traditional majlis which 
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could be another benefit compared to the relatively inexperienced emerging groups, 
that are often having to compromise on who should or should not attend.  
“It’s called the Bahrain Debate for a reason, you have to have all of those parts, 
and we sort of fall into the trap of not doing that constantly to sort of 
accommodate for other people, we cannot for example bring someone like Ali 
Mushaima to one of our events because aspects of the other side just will not 
come, Hatam al-Hassan won’t come etc etc...it is frustrating because we want 
to have a free debate, people are there and we do not have any structural 
constraints on people like formal CSOs, we want to deal with the reality, the 
political reality of what is going on and a reality of state bureaucracy.”309 
 
So it is evident that there are positives and evident limitations to the formally structured 
independent groups, however it can be asserted that other emerging workshops that 
are not explicitly politicized in the form of Mawana or Ul’Affa for example and moreover 
the increasing utilization of the traditional majlis showcases that in terms of their 
location and activities, these informal spaces may be more conducive in bringing about 
more productive discussions both at a state-societal and inter-communal level. Even 
the co-founder of the Bahrain debate acknowledged this; 
“the majalis function very well on a communal level, spaces like majlis al-
Dow’ee, they become a community hub of sorts, so you generally get elders 
and they discuss politics, it’s a very traditional space and it does serve a 
function but I think you must accommodate for both, in terms of old and new 
spaces…you must have a strong community outreach on all fronts for starters 
if you want to overcome the local divide.”310 
 
In the Kuwaiti context, observations also indicate location to be an important theme 
albeit for different purposes to the Bahraini case. Rather, several observers have 
asserted how the state had engineered inter-communal discord over the years by 
manipulating or dividing the various residential areas that make up Kuwait. This 
division of Kuwaiti districts has historically speaking played an important role in 
impeding on the emergence of a strong cross-communal, cross-sectarian opposition 
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in challenging the state’s political incompetence, namely in the form of curbing 
pervasive corruption. 
 
“Historically in Kuwait, the people used to live within one small city, I am talking 
about prior to independence, you found communities, and the neighborhood 
were very much interactive with one another. After independence, and the 
expansion of rural areas and politics came in at that point in order to divide 
Kuwaitis, for example now as a small country with around a million population, 
you can see that by and large Shia live alone, in their own neighborhood and 
residential areas, the Sunnis live in different parts of the country, and even 
among them you will find the upper class live in different neighborhoods and so 
this kind of division among different segments was intentionally made by the 
government, so everyone now has their own interests, and it has up until late 
been difficult to find cross-cultural, national political figures who can genuinely 
speak about national demands and national aspirations…however the new 
technology, non-profit organisations activities, demonstrations, the universities, 
these modes of grass-roots activism can help in bringing people together.”311 
 
Changes in the dynamics of inter-communal discourse can be in part attributed to the 
re-shaping of the diwaniyya; like the majlis, it has reinvented itself in various ways, 
which has given rise to the emergence of youth diwaniyya. As stated; 
“There is a diwaniyya on Wednesdays in al-Qadissiya, and you can observe 
how the people who frequent the space are typical Kuwaiti youth from different 
backgrounds, different cultures, and you see different views being exchanged 
but based on a mutual respect that the diwaniyya fosters, so they see their 
arguments are not based on point-scoring or being confrontational but actual 
dialogue on policies that are impeding Kuwaiti politics, so this is one example 
of how we are going in the positive direction…so we now have  that are 
designated for youth, from certain political and social backgrounds, and they 
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can be considered activists in their own right, and they try to participate in 
changing the Kuwaiti political landscape.”312 
 
There is the argument therefore, that the evolution of traditional informal spaces such 
as the Kuwaiti diwaniyya that is cross-communal is making way in undermining the 
early government initiative of engineering the landscape of where communities reside, 
you find now, with the aid of social networking, people from different areas and 
backgrounds in Kuwait are coming to meet and discuss the political conditions that 
face them. However, as the outside observer concedes, that although there is more 
cross-communal interaction across informal platforms that does not necessarily 
suggest or signal cordial or polarizing sectarian relations. What is apparent however, 
is that in the Bahraini context it is local politics that has impeded on civic discourse, 
and in the Kuwaiti context it seems that it is how transnational events/movements then 
reverberate or play out within Kuwait political life that ultimately effects the relationship 
between religious denominations.  
“I admit if you are talking about tolerance, if you talk about cohesion, the older 
generations were better. The 60s and 70s were better, in the 80s it was at its 
worst (given the Iran-Iraq War) but now it is far better than the 80s, but still if 
you compare it with the decades’ prior inter-communal relations were 
better…all our problems in this regard have been external.”313 
 
Likewise, despite the emergence of social media and the proliferation of young 
people’s diwaniyya, Kuwaiti society collectively remains unable to overcome the 
existing barriers to forming an all-encompassing coalition against the state. Kuwaiti 
youth have been particularly hampered by a leadership deficit which has undermined 
their mobilization, unlike in the Bahraini context where cross-communal mobilisation 
across the generations has been relatively more successful than its Kuwaiti 
counterpart.  
“I cannot say they are successful in achieving their own goals because of 
existing barriers and element of power still not in their hands, the youth usually 
have ambitions and a lot of energy and enthusiasm, but they are still unclear of 
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their own goals and to what end, some beautiful ideas but not pragmatic, or 
they need leadership, the lack of leadership is pivotal at this stage, and this can 
be extended to the failings of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen 
etc, the young people who initiated the revolutions, suddenly broke down 
barriers, but there was always someone to hijack the movement and use it to 
their own advantage.”314 
 
This could also be alluding to the failures of Kuwait’s own Arab Spring movement in 
the form of the 2013 Orange movement where it effectively ran short of ideas and was 
soon dominated by established Islamist societies which in turn undermined the 
movement as it failed to appeal across the political spectrum.  
 
However, the observer was optimistic that they collectively could play a conducive role 
in harmonizing sectarian relations as they have done during tumultuous periods within 
Kuwaiti history before.  
“Due to the historical heritage of diwaniyyat, as a key factor in social, political 
life, they are very influential, but it depends on how it is utilised, you need a 
clear vision of how to invest in your diwaniyya and you may succeed in bringing 
your own ideas to fruition. During some very sensitive moments in Kuwait, 
whether it be in the 80s, 90s or more recently, we have faced a lot of dangerous 
times in Kuwait which caused sharp divisions between the people, but it was 
the role of diwaniyya that brought people together…the diwaniyya by default 
almost became like a neutral social space, where attendees must retain the 
peace if you will.”315 
 
Again, like the Bahraini majlis, emphasizing this notion of neutrality that has enabled 
to repair or restore relations between communities during times of political crisis in 
Kuwait, but of course the priorities and motivations can change subject to the 
discussion (particularly if it focuses or digresses onto discussing external/transnational 
events) and this can also have implications on the discussions taking place within the 
diwaniyyat. They can therefore potentially play a positive role for inter-communal 
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discourse when the issues are tangible and focused on policy change and reform that 
impact all Kuwaiti communities.  
 
“It all depends on whether they are discussing major events inside the country, 
for example in the year 2006, the general topic of conversation was political 
reform, changing the electoral voting system, reducing the constituencies, 
making them smaller to get better representation, and so every diwaniyya I 
visited, they praised the initiative, they supported it, and whomever of the 
candidates believed in it received a lot of support. Fast forward to 2011, the 
same , their main issue is to solely discuss sectarianism, Sunnis attacking Shia 
and vice-versa…the same people, the same groups…I do not solely blame the 
government although it holds major responsibility, but I also blame the 
opposition leadership, who prior to 2011 were discussing the important issues 
that Kuwaiti people could rally around, corrupt parliament, corrupt MPs, 
bribery…however following 2011 some of the opposition leaders started to 
utilise sectarian discourse, so you had opposition MPs who started to attack 
Shia and conflate them with Iran, diverting from the real issues and in turn 
manipulated the entire meaning of political reform…and this had negative 
implications within the , as the majority of my constituency at the time were 
Shia, and by 2012, some of these  who had supported me for 15 years, had 
distanced themselves from me because of what the opposition had become 
associated with, they would not blame my position, arguing that I am taking up 
a good stance in combatting corruption but that I went to the wrong people for 
solidarity.”316 
 
This is a case example of how external events have played on the framing of sectarian 
discourse, undermining relations between communities and impeded on tackling 
cross-communal issues in this case corruption, and this would manifest within the 
diwaniyya as a reflection of current public opinion/sentiment. So, it is dependent on 
how the diwaniyya is utilised but the question remains as to whether it can be a positive 
influence when Kuwaiti society looks to be polarised by regional events. It has proved 
itself to be a success for local issues and domestic politics over the years but arguably 
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one of its limitations is that it may serve to exacerbate sectarian rhetoric when regional 
affairs come to the forefront.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
To summarise and after observing the various functions of informal civil society and 
the way in which it plays out within the public realm, there are several observations 
that can be made across the board, both in the Bahraini and Kuwaiti context. Informal 
spaces have undoubtedly been influential where there they are positioned within an 
impermanent, transient location such as the informal workshops that are not 
necessarily politicized per se but have been influential in bringing people from various 
backgrounds together, furthermore activities at these upcoming spaces like 
workshops, exhibitions for example, have been successful in fostering inter-communal 
discussion without having to take an explicitly political tone, in some cases through the 
medium of being a shared interest group.   
 
Furthermore, the neutrality in location for the workshops (e.g. using a public space) 
helps to facilitate the cross-communal dimension; an essential component of the 
discussions and activities, especially if it is not to repeat the flaws in registered formal 
CSOs that can only cater to or attract one segment of society. It must be reiterated 
however that these emerging groups do have their limitations in retaining their 
independence, one of which is sustainability to manage and maintain these activities 
as well as a lack of resources and logistical support to orchestrate such events on a 
regular basis.  
 
In order to gauge the expediency of these particular spaces, the observations from 
research participants need to put up against the multi-dimensional framework within 
the rights-based approach which are predicated on the four key variants of structure, 
environment, values and impact (as mentioned on p.130). In terms of structure, it 
would appear their transient, impermanent location has been favourable in fostering 
good interrelations, whilst simultaneously not having to be as resource-dependent as 
many registered CSOs who may require funding to carry out their activities. Where 
their limitations may lie is in the environment and impact variants, pop up groups with 
no support may hinder its broader appeal and in turn its ability to foster the state-civil 
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society dialogue as emphasised by the RBA that is required to achieve some form of 
state accountability or citizen empowerment.  
 
This then links to the more traditional spaces of the majlis and the diwaniyyat which 
owes some of its success in harmonizing relations by its perception from many as 
being a neutral non-partisan space irrespective even of its increasing interaction with 
political discourse, which could not be said of the emerging groups that sought a more 
formal outlook, like the open panel discussion for example which at times has 
struggled to attract and engage with public figures across the political spectrum. The 
Majlis and the diwaniyya has a flexibility in operating in both an informal and semi-
formal role,  
“formal events such as guest lectures and Q&A often take place, however what 
makes it unique, is that unlike a registered CSO, it can bypass the state 
because it does not require official permission to host such events, it is 
ultimately at the host’s discretion, and so majalis have been and can again be 
a key platform for citizenship-building in the future.”317 
 
However, the limitations of the traditional spaces, particularly in the Kuwait context, is 
that they are susceptible to external/transnational events (which shall be discussed 
further in the following chapter and how regime elites have utilised this to their 
advantage). This can somewhat undermine or bring into scrutiny the impact diwaniyyat 
can have when discussions within the space are not focused on cross-communal 
issues that the public can rally around, rather when public discourse is polarizing, the 
diwaniyyat serves to polarise communities. Serving as a broader reflection of public 
sentiment as oppose to counteracting it, whereas the Bahraini majlis seeks to actively 
counter the ISA and this can be evidenced in the more successful social mobilisation 
campaigns over time.  
 
That is on the grassroots level, however, as mentioned in the introductory section, 
informal civil society has yet to be able to circumvent sectarian politics, as skeptics of 
the informal space can still pose questions as to what extent they can tangibly change 
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the situation on the ground, a national cross-communal campaign or coalition that 
actively seeks to defy the state, that, in some respect, is yet to be seen. Advocates for 
the informal space can however argue that it can potentially facilitate the conversation 
required to bring those initial steps into action. This point will be observed in more 
depth in the following chapter, which seeks to observe the dynamics of state-societal 
relations and the impact informal civil society can potentially make. 
 
Once again, it also appears there to be both pros and cons for the more traditional 
settings likewise, however unlike the pop-up exhibitions which seemingly rank higher 
in terms of structure and values, the fluidity and broader scope of traditional spaces 
leaves greater room for values which may not necessarily be tolerant or working 
towards that “common good” as espoused by the RBA in a sense that it could polarise 
communities. However, in terms of impact, its popularity and prominent individuals 
from both government and opposition figures indicates that long term, it could have a 
greater lasting impact in terms of facilitating state-civil society dialogue.  
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6. Regimes, Informal Spaces and Sectarian Narratives  
The preceding chapter sought to focus on the operationalisation of the informal space 
with an emphasis on the locality and the specific activities partaken in the space. This 
chapter in turn will seek to examine the existing sectarian narratives that have been 
perpetuated at the state level and in wider society, and to examine how those regimes 
have sought to reinforce their own ISA’s through several themes that emerged from 
the empirical data, those namely being external/regional events and the role that 
education and media have played in public discourse.  
 
With that in mind, the chapter will explore how the traditional informal spaces of the 
Bahraini majlis and the Kuwaiti diwaniyya have responded to such ISA’s employed by 
those states, and whether they have served as a platform to try circumventing 
sectarianism in both countries or merely act as a broader reflection of society and in 
turn perpetuate the problem of sectarian discord. The chapter thus seeks to 
understand the narratives propagated, the mechanisms and tools utilised by both 
regime and informal spaces, to observe where they align or not and whether there is 
a ‘sectarian discourse differential’ which can be used as a model template to 
harmonise sectarian relations which could in turn form the basis of an effective broad 
coalition network of opposition movements that seek to overcome state-sponsored 
rhetoric and policies.  
 
The following sections will be centred on themes that tie into the theoretical framework 
developed in chapter four to gain an understanding of the evolving dynamic of 
sectarian relations within both countries and the variables that influence the 
relationship. Applying the notion of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), the first section 
will seek to understand whether informal spaces within the Bahraini context are 
pandering to or looking to resist the regime’s narrative on inter-communal relations. In 
chapter seven, these observations will be brought into further examination by situating 
informal spaces within the broader rubric of civil society, and by observing whether 
they repeat the same methods as formal CSOs, which have often been co-opted by 
the state or are employing alternative strategies to circumvent state sponsored 
discourse.  
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The second section will explore domestic, transnational and regional events that have 
had a consequential impact on sectarian relations within both countries and the 
broader MENA region. This became a recurring theme particularly in observations 
from Kuwaiti participants and how events external to the country play out within Kuwaiti 
politics and at the grassroots level, which concerns informal spaces. Finally, the last 
section shall be dedicated to another key instrument at the state’s disposal, which is 
of course media outlets; how they are dictating the narrative and to what extent they 
are, if anything, undermining informal civil society’s potential utility to foster inter-
communal harmony, and how the proliferation of social media in recent years has 
made polarised opinions more salient and radical sentiment more accessible to a 
wider audience.  
 
Based on several observations, it may be suggested that as in the preceding chapter, 
the various traditional and emerging spaces possess the capacity to play what can be 
normatively regarded as a “positive” role (e.g. foster greater social cohesion, tolerance 
and understanding, forming cross-communal civic coalitions and effective modes of 
social and political mobilisation) or a typically “detrimental” role (e.g. facilitating divisive 
or polarising rhetoric, playing into regime narratives making 
securitisation/marginalisation an accepted reality and more alarmingly incubating 
radicalised/extremist sentiment towards the other) – what determines the role an 
informal space has, is in large part a testament and due to the fluid, fluctuating nature 
of the informal space itself. The discourse varies from one place to another, and this 
consequently has an impact on the community-building capacity the space in question 
may possess.  
 
In the Bahraini context, the empirics have offered a mixed picture, where successful 
inter-communal discourse is largely dependent on the individuals who frequent the 
space and the views those individuals harbour. What becomes evident from the 
empirical data, is that the self-identification or type of majlis can be considered a 
variable in quantifying its potential influence. This becomes telling as some majalis 
(albeit they are still few and far between which can be considered as another limitation) 
are more willing to engage and less apprehensive to discuss sensitive political matters, 
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such as sectarianism, and this again is primarily dependent on the types of discourse 
the majalis caters for and who attends that space. 
 
Although few in number, given the traditional perception of the majlis as a pro-
government/loyalist outpost (as evidenced in one observation), those majalis actively 
seeking inter-communal rapprochement are emerging and gaining traction, partially in 
response to the domestic crises ensuing since the Arab uprisings began in 2011, as 
they have been instrumental in the past as an effective mode for cross-communal 
social mobilisation. Although more recent observations may suggest that tangibly 
speaking, the majalis can only facilitate a conversation as oppose to bringing about 
anything constructive in the political sense.  
 
In the Kuwaiti context on the other hand, the empirical data suggests a potentially even 
more divisive trajectory forming vis-à-vis inter-communal relations. Although research 
respondents highlighted the diwaniyya’s features in trying to prove that it does have 
the capacity to establish more concerted efforts at harmonising communal relations, 
as was the case during more politically volatile times in Kuwait, namely throughout the 
1980s when the Iran-Iraq War took place and likewise in the early 1990s when 
parliament was being frequently suspended. However, one charge that can be levelled 
at the diwaniyya is that its loose structural basis (some perceive to be a positive in 
being able to facilitate any type of discussion) coupled with the proliferation of social 
media has, at least in recent years, impeded diwaniyyat from taking a more socially 
constructive role in overcoming/counteracting state-sponsored narratives. In fact, it 
could even be suggested that the diwaniyyat, reflecting broader social sentiment, is 
acting as an echo chamber for such divisive narratives, amplifying and affording a 
platform to sectarian polemics.  
 
6.1 Reinforcing or countering the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) – Bahrain 
As evidenced in the theory chapter, the ideological state apparatus promoted by the 
ruling regime is a key mechanism to its survival, particularly in the Bahraini context. 
Ideologically charged narratives that effectively demonise the indigenous Shi’i 
population, implying they are potential fifth columnists and ought to be securitised, is 
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perpetuated by the Bahraini monarchy.318 This divisive narrative undoubtedly has an 
influence on the trajectory of inter-communal relations at the grass-roots level. 
Through the various mediums at its disposal, (education, media etc.) the rulers can 
purposely create a climate of social discord, this in turn affords the state a means by 
which it can justify utilising repressive, or in this context, ostensibly sectarian policies 
towards specific communities. This is often done via securitising one denomination 
and portraying itself as somehow safeguarding the other. With that in mind, this section 
of the chapter will be dedicated to unpacking the role in which informal spaces can 
serve as a potential platform to countering top-down narratives by presenting an 
alternative image of the social fabric of their respective countries (be it Kuwait or 
Bahrain) or whether the discourse prevalent in these networks are by and large a 
manifestation of what the state sets out to do, which is to amplify sectarian discord 
and divisive rhetoric.  
 
As alluded to in the introductory section, one can be cautiously optimistic in that 
informal spaces, namely in the form of emerging cultural workshops or in the cross-
communal politicised majalis, could signal a growing demand for greater inter-
communal understanding, to counter-act the state narrative that religious communities 
are unable to politically reconcile with one another based on ideological grounds. 
Although, this visible demand for rapprochement and reconciliation may occur at a 
much more gradual pace, given that both these specific types of emerging and 
traditional spaces are still few and far between. Moreover, if such spaces were to 
gather considerable momentum over time, the more pressing question for sceptics of 
informal civil society will be as to how long these spaces can operate outside the 
state’s orbit if they are increasingly influential and become a vehicle to posing a threat 
to regime survival, and whether they would fall into the same trappings as formal civil 
society.  
 
With one prominent social majlis in the predominantly Shi’i district of Saar, Bahrain, 
the respondents saw both itself and other majalis as unable, at least at present, to 
foster further rapprochement between denominations, with research participants who 
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frequent the majlis stating that they are designed more for social occasions and the 
nature of the majlis actively attempts to remove itself from political discourse. The idea 
being that keeping conversations apolitical are a means to maintaining mutual 
interests and respect between communities. Even though from time to time you may 
get a pressing issue that does get discussed which would often otherwise be perceived 
to be contentious to raise, such as a march that took place or security forces and 
protestor clashes that resulted in fatalities.319  
 
In that respect, for such spaces to remain apolitical would effectively serve to amplify 
the ISA at the grass-roots level by failing to counter or at least interact with state-
sponsored rhetoric and narratives, enabling it to manifest without being challenged. 
Furthermore, respondents would concur that there was a major reluctance to discuss 
Sunni-Shia relations (even in a predominantly Shi’i space), as having no value going 
forward for the country, touting the idea that it was ultimately something out of their 
control and they had resigned to the notion that “the state will play out or rather set the 
tone for inter-communal relations depending on its domestic policies.”320 
 
One respondent went even further to suggest that the comments of some of his Sunni 
counterparts when visiting predominantly Sunni majalis, can be indirectly rather 
disparaging or can even pass derogatory remarks, claiming that if they are from a Shia 
background their opinion would be discarded because they are automatically 
perceived to have vested interests and agendas that are detrimental to Bahrain (again 
pandering to the Bahraini government’s ISA, something that shall be noted more 
closely in the section on transnational/regional events).321 Why this is important is 
because it indicates for at least some of the more social informal spaces that do not 
profess to have any political association or motives, that they are still promoting this 
idea of othering, which again is part and parcel of the social securitisation process and 
that some people’s grievances should be of little or no concern due to their 
background. This in turn perpetuates the belief that gripes over state policies should 
go unheard depending on the identity of the person complaining (i.e. they are only 
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critical because of identity politics and not because of actual policies), which again, is 
convenient for the regime as a means of deflecting legitimate criticism.  
Research participants who attended this majlis also viewed the politically-orientated 
spaces as having little effect in dealing with the increasing sectarian divisions that were 
particularly discernible in light of the 2011 Arab uprisings. One research participant 
noted that when parliamentary candidates visit various majalis, they will often only talk 
about the services they can provide and their specific policies for that local area or 
district. They would not, however, mention anything specifically related to improving 
the state of inter-communal relations in that area, meaning that the status quo of the 
majalis would still be playing into the hands of state-sponsored discourse.  
 
However, the same respondent tried to highlight that the majlis as a meeting point and 
civic space can still be used to facilitate a more positive role at the grassroots, citing 
the communal-building capacity to serve as a potential platform, however it would 
require more initiatives and more concerted, individual efforts in order to make the 
informal space more productive in countering the state’s narrative.  As an example, 
one respondent mentioned how they had to persuade their Sunni friend to come to 
visit a market in Budaiya (a mixed but predominantly Sunni village around Manama) 
and he had to allay and dispel her fears that there were no stones, violent protests or 
Molotov cocktails being thrown in the streets so she eventually decided to come.322 
Why this is significant is that such narratives are to an extent a testament to how the 
ISA via state-controlled media have been able to effectively scaremonger parts of the 
Sunni population of visiting one particular area in fear of violence or reprisal attacks, 
again tacitly re-enforcing the notion that some areas are unstable or “no-go zones” 
and therefore the state ought to be that mediating force that restores social order.  
 
The same research participant, highlighted how majalis have this potential of a 
communal-building capacity by mentioning that one of his friends, a former municipal 
council chairman, established a social network of friends and work colleagues and 
frequently visited various majalis in different parts of Bahrain, using it as a convenient 
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social space to foster further Sunni-Shi’i rapprochement which he felt was being 
eroded or undermined by the state.323 
Research respondents from a politicised cross-sectarian majlis, hosted by a former 
MP, meanwhile presented a different account of the role majalis can play vis-à-vis 
sectarian relations, where the issue of sectarianism often dominates the discussions 
that take place.324 This social space comprised attendees belonging to various political 
societies and persuasions in Bahrain and even included one participant who headed 
an organisation that was dedicated to enhancing religious and inter-faith tolerance 
called “Ta’ayush” (Co-existence).325 In that respect, it is already notable just from some 
of the backgrounds of participants that they have sought to overcome the state’s ISA 
by creating an environment to have frank and candid discussions as well as setting up 
initiatives that look to tackle existing barriers between faith communities.  
 
Some of the research participants agreed that majalis acquire the means to play a 
constructive role in facilitating social cohesion, however, adding the disclaimer that it 
is dependent upon certain criteria. These pre-requisites will determine whether the 
space will operate successfully in bringing communities closer or serve to further 
polarise people as a result of the sentiment and discourse echoed within that space. 
  
One respondent elaborated on the criteria in such criteria by arguing that rather than 
the majlis itself, it is the individual who frequents that space who is ultimately going to 
determine whether that space can play a positive or detrimental role. The participants 
mentioned that if the individual for example is more inclined towards harbouring 
sectarian views, then it is far more likely they will solely attend sect-based majalis. This 
was the example they cited of how majalis in some cases undermine initiatives toward 
social cohesion as the majalis then acts as a platform to bringing like-minded views 
together, by which they are amplifying divisive or sectarian sentiment that is then being 
reverberated in wider society. Again, it could be suggested how in such a scenario, 
how these spaces would inevitably pander to the state narrative, that is attempting to 
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confine opposition groups/societies to sect, as opposed to being a national or cross-
sect movement.326 
 
Respondents at this majlis highlighted their diversity in the various political positions 
they upheld but shared some common ground in that they were all seeking to 
emphasise national unity. When probed further as to what shared interests exactly 
entailed, one respondent mentioned;  
“Yes, we share interests with how to move the country forward, how to try 
combat sectarianism, how to bring people together, how to work through 
differences, these are some of the aims here at this majlis.”327  
 
Furthermore, there was a clear distinction with regards to the point around contentious 
topics (pertaining to sectarianism) being too sensitive to discuss, which was the claim 
made by the previous majlis in Saar. Indeed, the host of this Majlis, stressed that “no 
issue is too sensitive to discuss here, there is no ceiling for any discussion, it is open 
for any subject.”328  
 
One research participant also cited another politicised majlis where such discussions 
take place, showcasing that there are spaces (including their own) that are being used 
as a direct front to the ISA in Bahrain, however they did acknowledge that such open 
discussions would not be able to take place in many majalis, as traditionally speaking 
and this is still applicable to majalis on the whole (likewise with diwaniyyat in Kuwait) 
that they primarily serve as a space for social functions and networking, not political 
discussions per se, and those that do discuss politics are typically found to be sect-
based. So, they recognised they could be by and large an exception to the rule in that 
regard, as alluded to by one participant.  
“The majalis that are principally against sectarianism are rare and hard to come 
by, mostly the groups sit together, Shias sit together, Sunni sit together, and 
they talk against the other, for the most part.”329  
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The host and former MP, however, slightly disagreed with this assertion by one of his 
guests, arguing that sectarianism was all politically instrumentalised to garner support 
during election time as opposed to there being an actual issue on a communal level in 
daily life.  
“Just to be clear with you, there is no sectarianism between ordinary people. 
Shia can visit Sunni areas and vice-versa. There is no such conflict between 
people, politically motivated however there is sectarianism with those elites 
looking to dominate the political arena. They use sectarian rhetoric (i.e. rhetoric, 
sentiment) for political votes in elections.”330 
 
After being questioned as to whether the 2011 uprisings exacerbated sectarianism in 
the political sense, the host admitted however that some reactions to the protest 
movements were testament to the efficacy of the regime’s ISA which proved 
successful in scaremongering segments of Bahrain’s Sunni population.  
“What happened in Lu’lu (Pearl Roundabout) where protestors were raising the 
slogans of toppling the government and establishing republicanism, those 
slogans made some Sunnis wary that if the current government is abolished, 
the Shias will receive power, then they will be marginalised.”331  
 
This had its impact even on the informal civic space, as the host mentioned how such 
trumped up fears exacerbated not banal but instrumentalised sectarianism where you 
once had progressive, mixed-sect majalis, but in light of the 2011 uprisings, some 
prominent political figures were now confining to their own groups, possibly signalling 
a growing trust deficit between communities, purposely orchestrated by the state. This 
was the case with one space called majlis al-Mash’aal which was once renowned for 
lively inter-communal political discourse and being open to all denominations but 
following events in 2011 it effectively became sect-based. This point will be expanded 
on further when observing regional/transnational events, and how the regime has 
played on paranoia over supposed threats of “Iranian expansionism” in the region and 
then conflated that with opposition groups. This was a convenient strategy by the 
Bahraini regime to deflect criticism from the state’s own sectarian policies that resulted 
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in an increasing economic disparity and the denial of basic civil rights, which, amongst 
other factors, instigated those protests in the first place.  
 
Another interesting observation that directly relates to the issue of whether informal 
spaces are actively countering or playing into the state’s hand is the issue of “Wasta’” 
(internal favours, incentives). One participant noted that due to the current political 
climate, most of the majalis are in fact inclined to be pro-government, with some 
receiving financial benefits and opportunities because of their pro-government 
lobbying. This could potentially be regarded as a broader government strategy to try 
to permeate and influence those informal spaces where pro-government figures are in 
attendance, which in turn could again be influencing the discourse within such spaces 
and tailoring it to a pro-regime narrative. For certain respondents, this realisation 
highlights the need for more independent majalis to come to the fore, otherwise the 
informal arena will share a similar fate to the formal civil society sector which is to be 
dominated, co-opted and effectively made redundant by state interference.332  
 
On a more optimistic note, respondents agreed that the majlis was still very much 
influential politically speaking particularly in its unique feature of being a key starting 
point for social mobilisation.  
“All political activism started in majalis, before parties or political societies, it 
was the majlis that established the political environment in Bahrain, as majalis 
are important in that they reflect and can gauge what people’s opinions are and 
the effects in society. Even protest movements from the 50s, 60s and 70s 
begun in majalis before TV etc.”333 The host corroborated that statement by 
offering a more contemporary example. “The 1990s Intifada started in majalis, 
the political movements against naturalisation policies started in majalis…all 
these important issues are discussed and raised here, and they are still 
significant today and they will be in the future.”334 
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Suffice to say, the majlis holds an important position both in the past and until the 
present day, and despite current issues that serve to undermine its social utility, the 
respondents were confident that should more independent majalis come to the fore 
this would be able to address some of Bahrain’s longstanding issues, including the 
state mechanisms that are seeking to undermine inter-communal relations for its own 
gain.  
“Access to free opinions, assessing the political situation in the country, what 
can be done going forward, if there is an election, who will look to participate or 
boycott and on what grounds, all these things and more are discussed here to 
prepare for the future.”335 For the attendees of such majalis, this is what the 
traditional space outside the state’s remit can still provide.  
 
This sentiment was also reflected in another political majlis, where the host is a 
prominent religious scholar whose father had first established the space and, his 
brother (also an attendee at the majlis) is the chief editor of an important semi-
independent Bahraini daily newspaper. He mentioned how particularly during the 
1990s when the Intifada took place, “This majlis was a venue for many important 
gatherings and meetings at the time, it still is…”336  
 
This, and previous comments showcase the majlis’s illustrious history and tradition of 
being an important centre point for social mobilisation to take place. The majlis, in this 
regard, can therefore confront the state by orchestrating and co-ordinating protests 
and demonstrations, but to what extent that would necessarily translate into fostering 
inter-communal rapprochement in opposing the state narrative is again dependent on 
the space itself and the people in attendance. If it is a cross-sectarian independent 
majlis then it has this capacity, but the predominant sect-based only spaces in Bahrain 
may not have this ability and subsequent actions levelled at the state will only be 
reflective of the people it can attract.  
 
One politicised majlis that was willing to partake in interviews was particularly 
interesting in that it predominantly comprised of Shi’i attendees, however the host 
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made a point of emphasising how it was open to anyone and the majlis receives guests 
from various backgrounds every Monday, particularly during Ramadhan when 
newspapers would publish that majlis (and others) every day for people to attend.337 
This point is significant because, unlike the formal CSO sector, the majlis is a 
cherished traditional space in its own right which even state supporters as 
aforementioned, utilise to their advantage. It is known that irrespective of the political 
affiliations of the space, the majalis can receive open support in the form of advertising 
across Bahrain. With regards to the overriding question of ways to circumvent the ISA 
and promote an alternative image, this helps because it offers independent majalis a 
voice in that they can potentially attract attendees who perhaps would not normally 
attend or be aware of this particularly majlis. With that in mind, more accessibility to 
various majalis can only be a plus when it comes to fostering rapprochement and 
hearing an alternative message to state-sponsored narratives.  
 
Another point with regards to attracting a broader range of potential attendees is that 
the majlis, because of its makeshift nature can operate on a more formal and informal 
level depending on the event (something that shall be covered more extensively in 
chapter seven) which can be one effective mode to bringing together both younger 
and older generations, as well as people from various backgrounds. As research 
respondent X stated;  
“If we announce to have a speaker, then usually we attract a very good 
audience and the youth can even dominate the space at these times…when 
we have a guest speaker, we invite him to speak and announce him to the 
public, it will be a more formal setting, as in there will be someone to chair the 
meeting, perhaps an introduction to the speaker, he will deliver his speech, then 
we will allow people to comment or put forward their questions.”338 
 
Another important point to consider is that even though some former MP’s are hosting 
majalis, that is not to say that the venue itself cannot operate as a non-affiliated space, 
as it does not have any intrinsic ties to political societies which many formal civil society 
groups do have. This lack of membership or affiliation if you like, to any political 
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society, is important in undermining the state by attracting people from various 
backgrounds to come and attend and in turn it enables the majlis itself to then operate 
as a platform for public debate and scrutiny from all sides.  
“There is no such thing as an affiliation here, however you could say most 
attendees here belong to opposition of some sorts, they are supporters of 
opposition…but it is important to stress that we as a majlis do not have any 
explicit links to al-Wefaq or any other political society for example, in fact some 
of our guests have some negative views of my party, al-Wefaq, and in 
discussions they are welcome to express their views and do so.”339 
 
Arguably, one of the most significant features of the politically-orientated majalis in 
bringing a diverse spectrum of people together resides in the fact that they can have 
an open discussion on various social and political issues that are of concern to the 
people attending. The majlis fosters inter-communal understanding and tolerance by 
stressing or highlighting common concerns that people across the political spectrum 
and across denominations are faced with. This is important because not only do they 
attract large numbers as evidenced when participating in focus groups within several 
majalis, but they are collectively undermining the state by highlighting government 
policies that are largely viewed as negative across the board.  
“People prefer the majlis where current affairs and social events are part of the 
discussion, and people want to talk about their common concern, and having 
said that if we talk about subjects like housing, the general welfare of the people 
this is also a very important subject and it is shared by so many people, and 
they like it, therefore they attend and discuss.”340  
 
Talking about topics that resonate with people across the board, this is one of the key 
mechanisms of the majlis that can foster unity and undermine the state by directly 
scrutinising policies that have impacted all. Pertinent examples would be as mentioned 
by the host of the majlis in Isa Town, the current housing crisis in Bahrain and the 
impact of naturalising migrant workers at the expense of the indigenous population 
that struggle to get on the employment and housing ladder; a direct result of instituting 
                                                          
339 Ibid.  
340 Ibid. 
184 
 
sectarian policies. “If we talk about unemployment and such matters, people find this 
very popular and they want to attend.”341 
 
So, in that respect the politically-orientated majlis can act as a lobbying space, to air 
grievances and share common concerns and it can also gain media traction.  
“We can gather support for certain issues, this is especially the case when we 
have a speaker and if we invite people to come for a speech from somebody 
then we usually have coverage from the press, usually it is from Al-Wasat 
newspaper…even before in 2001, during the referendum, that’s the time we 
voted for the National Charter, even Bahrain TV (state controlled media) used 
to interview the common people and they would even come to this majlis and 
others…at that time we had some sort of access to put our views forward to the 
government…but after voting for the National Charter then we became a 
Kingdom and things started to go on the decline, more draconian measures, 
more authoritarian tendencies.”342  
 
When the host was asked about whether the majlis can serve as a platform to 
strengthen relations between communities, he was particularly adamant that they 
could perform this role, even when relations came to a head following the 2011 
uprisings.  
“If I talk about al-Wefaq, we have a program of visiting different majalis of 
different groups, those who are backing government, and those who are from 
different areas, and we are all well received there and in exchange they also 
visit us here and we receive them…after the events in 2011, this almost 
disappeared but recently it is re-emerging, we kick-started this initiative to visit 
those people and they were happy and some people from other majalis they 
called up and said they would also like to welcome us…so if we go back, in 
Bahrain there is a tradition of people actually being open with one another, the 
problems of what we saw in 2011, actually it was the press that played a major 
part in making people confront each other, they tried to attribute everything to 
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being a sectarian issue, but if we go back to the pre-2011 setting, it was not like 
that between people.”343  
 
The impact the media overall has had in undermining sectarian relations will be 
discussed in greater length, however what this goes to show is that even when 
tensions became visible and inter-communal relations were generally seen to be 
rather dire due to the toxic political climate in and outside the country, and the state 
utilising the sectarian card as a means for survival. The majlis however can serve as 
a platform to restore relations by again having the ability to have open and frank 
discussions, and to be able to generate empathy and understanding by highlighting 
shared concerns in the country.  
“I am talking about most people, they are open and want to receive us, does 
not mean that this will have a permanent change about their views, but it is a 
start, we as Bahrainis like to receive one another.”344  
 
However despite the social customs and mutual respect afforded within the majlis (as 
is the case in the diwaniyya) the question could be asked of whether they are bringing 
in people from more radical religious and political persuasions which is yet to be 
proven and could be a testament to one of the majalis limitations. In that case, it could 
be highlighted that promoting common concerns would still be the best approach for 
such spaces both in terms of fostering mutual understanding and cohesion, particularly 
of people who would be in most cases indifferent or even apprehensive of turning up 
to such spaces, and more importantly it deflects from the regime’s narrative which 
seeks to polarise opinions as a means to deflect criticism of its own policies.  
 
What is furthermore important is that discussions are taking place between 
communities even despite some disagreements or having different takes on events 
and issues inside the country. “Even here, we have some Sunnis who come from time 
to time, they show their respect but sometimes they say a different opinion and we 
respect them, but others will also them how we look at the narrative.”345 The host had 
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resigned to the fact that post-2011 relations did regress and this was telling in 
decreasing numbers of Sunnis attending his majlis, although he believes it will 
normalise once again.  
“I must say particularly after 2011 until now, very few Sunnis came here and 
only rarely, but it occurs from time to time that some Sunni guests still attend, 
they want to share their opinions with us and sometimes they are completely 
opposite, but it is fine, they are given the opportunity to talk, whether we accept 
what they say or not.”346  
 
It is important to note that opposing arguments are still entertained in the majlis, 
because as a traditional space, the place demands its own respect, and there is a 
social etiquette that to follow. Rooted in Islamic customs of hospitality, this entails that 
the host of the venue tries to accommodate to guests where possible, which includes 
an opportunity to voice their opinion. The host alluded to the fact that despite evident 
disagreements the opinion must still be tolerated and stand. In the grand scheme, this 
can contribute to countering the ISA as it still offers a medium by which participants 
could potentially find common ground or forge agreements, whereas when sensitive 
issues are not discussed it only makes way for the state to dominate the narrative as 
to how communities ought to be portrayed.  
 
Based on the observations, it could be suggested therefore that several challenges 
lay ahead for informal Bahraini spaces to try circumventing the state’s narrative. 
Indeed, cross-communal politicised majalis are making headway in various parts of 
the country and are growing in popularity. However, it must also be stated that this has 
come at the expense of some majalis that once entertained inter-communal dialogue 
and are now feeling more apprehensive to partake in such discussions due to the 
political climate that ensued following the 2011 uprisings. Further cause for optimism, 
meanwhile, could be the development of sect-based spaces opening their doors to the 
participation of new visitors to denominational-only majalis from various communities. 
Acknowledging that wide-spread support to countering state propaganda requires an 
agenda that promotes common issues on a national scale as opposed to socio-political 
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issues being expressed via a sectarian discourse or rationale, which may explain 
where informal spaces in the past could potentially be lacking cross-communal appeal.  
 
6.2 Local, Transnational and Regional Events – Kuwait 
In the Kuwaiti case, there are some notable similarities and differences with the 
Bahraini Majlis, with regards to whether the diwaniyya serves to mitigate or perpetuate 
the state narrative and moreover whether it helps or hinders inter-communal relations. 
It is important to note firstly, that the Kuwaiti ISA is somewhat different to the Bahraini 
context, where in Bahrain the sectarian card is explicitly used to actively try polarise 
communities by the state as a survival mechanism347, the Kuwaiti state on the other 
hand, portrays its communities somewhat differently in that it tries to play the role of a 
necessary mediator between different political and religious factions in society, so on 
the outset at least the state appears to accommodate more to its various communities 
where the monarchy is relatively speaking much more stable than in Bahrain.348  
 
However, as key outside observers note, implicitly the Kuwaiti government has 
enabled radical, Salafist factions who often espouse sectarian viewpoints in order that 
the monarchy can maintain its authoritarian character and portray itself as a necessary 
force to safeguard society from extremism even though it simultaneously empowers 
it, again another survival mechanism which enables the state to cement its rule. With 
this in mind, it can thus be observed whether informal spaces in the Kuwaiti case are 
exacerbating sectarianism or whether it is rather other factors that are at play in 
determining the trajectory of inter-communal relations.  
 
Based on observations from key diwaniyyat and informed outside observers349 it could 
be suggested that the diwaniyya (like the Bahraini majlis) has the requisites, as a 
space for free and open discussion, to become an ideal platform for facilitating cross-
communal dialogue on a host of political issues that impact both Sunni and Shia 
communities. However, the diwaniyya as an unregulated space does have its 
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drawbacks which are compounded by the perception and reaction to regional events 
and the proliferation of traditional and social media outlets. These factors collectively 
have enabled some of these spaces to only impede if not exacerbate tensions by 
acting as an echo chamber for increasingly polarised opinions, particularly in terms of 
sectarian discourse as shall be evidenced below. 
 
Expanding on this observation, one of the research participants from the diwaniyya of 
a prominent Kuwaiti journalist, offered a breakdown of some of the discussions that 
often take place within that setting. “Normally we talk about regional politics, local 
Kuwaiti politics, sometimes social events, in all diwaniyyat in Kuwait, this is the typical 
discussions.”350 Like the majlis, the Kuwaiti diwaniyya plays an important role 
particularly during election time, but just like the majlis in order to measure its influence 
and in this regard its political clout, as one respondent mentions, “one is influential, the 
other may not necessarily be, it largely depends on who is the host of the 
diwaniyya.”351  
 
When it came to discussing whether diwaniyyat can serve to facilitate social cohesion 
between communities, the responses from the participants all differed from one 
another, citing that they could because many diwaniyyat are mixed-sect, however as 
one respondent noted, “that politics in general can be talked about, but we do not talk 
about what Sunnis or Shias are thinking, they are trying to avoid such discussions.”352 
This was corroborated by another family member that they are “trying to avoid such 
discussions even in the cross-sectarian diwaniyyat just to maintain respect for one 
another…yes they do activities and sit down together, but the two communities by and 
large have huge differences moreover about the politics of the region, especially with 
what has happened in Syria now. You find many Sunnis in the region support rebels, 
the clear majority of Shia are supporting the government and another point of 
contention is over Bahrain.”353 
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Sensitivity surrounding sectarian discourse are important to note in this context, not 
only because in some cases, it illustrates the diwaniyyat’ current incapability to hold 
such discussions. It could also be suggested that the tensions at the political and 
communal level in other parts of the region are spilling over and are overall having a 
detrimental impact on sectarian relations in Kuwait, and in this context, informal 
spaces such as the diwaniyya are enabling such divisive rhetoric to go unchallenged, 
as opposed to in the Bahraini context at least, where there are concerted efforts to try 
challenge some of the prevailing misconceptions regarding opposition movements 
and to create an conducive environment for open discussion. Furthermore, this also 
manifests at the government level particularly in the Kuwaiti parliament in recent years 
where public disputes namely between Shia and Ikhwani/Salafist political blocs have 
boiled over namely on the issue of the Syrian civil war.  
 
However, it should be mentioned that like the cross-communal politically active majalis 
in Bahrain which are growing in popularity yet still relatively scarce, the observation 
regarding the impact of the diwaniyya would likewise still require further substantiating. 
Depending on how domestic and regional political affairs play out, if the political 
situation in Kuwait and moreover in the region appears to become increasingly bleak, 
then it would become even more difficult for the diwaniyyat to play an important role in 
fostering inter-sect solidarity and countering the regime narrative that the state is 
required as an integral mediator almost between religious factions, when it is only 
using such rhetoric to buttress its own rule. Respondents at this particular diwaniyya 
were also quick to point out that regional or transnational events cannot be 
disregarded when observing the trajectory of inter-communal relations inside Kuwait 
itself. “So many jihadists killed in Syria came from Kuwait, so it is evident they 
sympathise with the rebels, especially the Salafi radicals.”354 
 
Coming back to the diwaniyya itself, respondents did note, however, that the potential 
is there for the Kuwaiti diwaniyya to play a more socially constructive role in that there 
is a heightened degree of freedom of speech and unlike in other gulf states, the 
diwaniyya - as mentioned in the background chapter - is legally enshrined and 
safeguarded in the Kuwaiti Constitution itself.  
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“With regards to discussions it is in fact, more open, especially after the Arab 
Spring, nowadays in Kuwait you can criticise whoever you want except the 
Emir, from the Crown Prince right through to the PM and other minsters, yes 
you can criticise them. I, myself am an economist, and many articles I have 
written have criticised political figures, even those direct to the royal family…I 
sometimes even refer to the Crown Prince but implicitly not direct.”355  
 
Although this does offer some positives in terms of being able to critique government 
policies and showcases the performative functions the diwaniyya offers as a platform 
to air concerns or grievances over a host of political issues, it does not necessarily 
indicate that the space is being utilised to address issues pertaining to sectarian 
identity and national unity.  
 
Although the diwaniyya has this capacity should individuals be more willing to open 
debates inside cross-sectarian settings to help bridge against the current propensity 
toward social division, however as mentioned once before the trajectory of sectarian 
relations in Kuwait are much more determined by external events, as oppose to in 
Bahrain where it is local, domestic politics that is having a direct impact.  
 
“It really deteriorated around a year ago (approximately 2013) when the Syrian 
civil war reached its climax, at that time it deteriorated the most, Syria had a 
massive impact…the tensions became apparent, clashes in parliament, 
through twitter (social media exacerbating tensions), through newspaper 
articles, even the Minister of Justice was one of the key supporters and had 
publicly financed Syrian rebels, and he only resigned just last week…there were 
several MP’s from Kuwait, both Sunni and Shia that went to Syria personally to 
offer their support on either side.”356 For these participants, the diwaniyya was 
therefore a reactive as oppose to a pro-active space in trying to mitigate 
sectarian tensions, “The diwaniyya is merely the response or a reflection of the 
media discourse as oppose to anything participants actually discuss.”357 
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In this regard, there is a discernible distinction therefore between the traditional 
informal spaces in Kuwait and Bahrain, whereas in Bahrain you do at least have some 
concerted efforts to try counter the ISA, the Kuwaiti state trying to portray itself as 
neutral has in turn made the diwaniyya largely ineffective when it comes to addressing 
the issue of sectarian relations, as in the cases known, it appears to have become a 
sort of echo chamber for what has been mentioned before across transnational media 
outlets that have their own vested interests, which shall be discussed at further length 
in the following section.  
 
Respondents had also noted that despite over last few decades that sectarian 
relations have been by and large cordial since Shias showcased their loyalty to the 
Kuwaiti state in fighting for the resistance against former Iraqi dictator Saddam 
Hussain, it is evident that with ongoing regional events and influences it is regressing 
once more. “Anytime there is something Sunni-Shia related anywhere, even in 
Pakistan, it has an effect here. It was so influential following the invasion of Iraq from 
2003 onwards.”358 Alluding to when sectarian relations were arguably at their worst in 
Iraq from 2006-07 with the proliferation of suicide bombings and reprisal attacks that 
were taking place.  
 
As a result, journalists such as Lindsay Stephenson have observed an ahistorical 
sectarianism becoming increasingly prominent within Kuwait itself, with media outlets 
in part acting as a catalyst for provoking sectarian sentiment, and the social 
implications coming to fruition, sowing inter-communal discord and creating a sense 
of mistrust between communities. 
 
“The open Kuwaiti media has proven itself to be an incessant instigator of 
sectarianism and a forum for outlandish comments that were previously only 
said in private and often written off as nonsense…Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shia alike 
have commented that once the TV is on, there is no escaping sectarian 
discussions…the state of Kuwaiti newspapers is similar…. There are two issues 
for which talking heads have raised unfounded questions; namely Shia origins 
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and loyalty. Polemical comments about "weird things Shia do" have played into 
deliberate othering tactics in efforts to drive a wedge between Sunni and Shiite 
communities and have unfortunately been picked up by the masses. Setting 
aside the historical fact that many Kuwaitis of Arab origin are Shia and Kuwaitis 
of Persian origin are Sunnis, many programs are propagating an idea that Shia 
have Iranian origins and are thus an alien presence. This has seeped into 
common rhetoric and fostered suspicion amongst some Sunnis that they don’t 
really know who their neighbours are anymore.”359 
 
Furthermore, one outside observer, a columnist for several Kuwaiti dailies, mentioned 
how failed previous initiatives towards rapprochement were indicative of the 
relationship between the communities worsening in the country, and the diwaniyya 
was ineffective in this regard at harmonising relations.  
“Some of the ideas or initiatives would often come from relatively liberal voices, 
but whenever they started a project, it would soon come to fail in practice. We 
had set up a journalist diwaniyya dedicated to addressing sectarian relations 
and after a few meetings it had broken down, what was ironic is that many of 
those journalists who participated in that diwaniyya were in fact the most 
sectarian voices in the media. The meetings were aimed at discussing how we 
can overcome the sectarian problem, and some ideas would go around, but 
those who used to discuss it, when it came to practice, they would be the ones 
who would enflame it. They would say nice, accommodating words in public to 
us during face to face discussions in the diwaniyya, but the initiative ultimately 
broke down because they were (referring to some of the other journalists who 
attended) still passing derogatory or sectarian remarks in their publications to 
cater to their own readership, so others, including myself, naturally started to 
realise that their supposed efforts to try reconcile were by and large 
disingenuous.”360  
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The diwaniyya, therefore, acting as a platform for the initiative, would therefore only 
be pandering to the state narrative of aiding token efforts at national unity, as the 
government still wanted to exploit the existing sectarian cleavages to safeguard its 
own survival but would need such initiatives in order to counter-balance sectarianism 
potentially spiralling out of control to the point of violence particularly with events in 
Iraq just on the border. Even though this initiative was held within a private capacity 
between colleagues from the same profession and was in no way a state-sponsored 
scheme, despite this, the diwaniyya was inadvertently doing the work of the 
government at the grassroots level.  
 
As this one journalist had noted that “even for the individuals (in this case 
journalists) predisposed or inclined towards sectarianism in Kuwait, it is still not 
in their interests for sectarianism to actualise into active modes of violence, and 
for it to regress into a national security issue like it has done in Iraq, rather they 
would entertain such initiatives just for PR more than anything else, the 
rationale being that they still want the social and economic advantages of 
sectarianism, however they do not want to see the community have to pay a 
price for it in the form of violence.”361 
 
Expanding on the Kuwaiti ISA, distinct from Bahrain’s assertive or ostensibly sectarian 
approach, the observer noted how the political system although on face value can 
condemn sectarianism, it is de facto enabling it and one way is through legislation, or 
the lack thereof.  
“There are no laws which aim to circumvent sectarianism, except one that came 
out lately on curbing extremist financing but even that is not all encompassing 
and is not even enforced…also, if the government started to have a genuine 
initiative toward re-educating people about sectarianism, if they start to have a 
real agenda in the schools, get rid of the prevailing misconceptions about Shia 
and address the real issue effecting the country, this would be go a long way in 
harmonising relations, until now, this has not happened.”362   
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The observer highlighted how the state has implicitly aided and abetted sectarian 
sentiment over years by enabling Salafist factions to dominate key government 
ministries, particularly the Ministries of Education and Religious Affairs.  
“See, in public schools, until today they teach that Shias are apostates for 
example…because the education ministry from the 60s and 70s was given to 
Wahhabis, who were the ones who put out the schoolbooks, they could 
monopolise religious education in schools, and the government was fully aware 
and to this day has not done anything about it for a long time.”363  
 
The state enabling Salafist factions to hold key ministries has undoubtedly had its 
adverse impact on sectarian relations and brings into question the sincerity with which 
the Kuwaiti state wants to effectively counter sectarian sentiment and in turn counter 
extremism. However, this observer was somewhat reluctant that any significant 
changes would occur unless there was significant pressure levelled from Western 
powers.  
“I do not think it will change unless the official message or rather the official 
agenda actually changes, and I do not think the official state agenda will change 
unless there were significant pressure from outside forces (i.e. from Western 
powers).”364  
 
Again, this reemphasises the idea that traditional informal spaces (in this context the 
diwaniyya) are unable at least at present to counteract the disingenuous state 
narrative that openly acts as a mediator between denominations and political factions 
but on the ground, it serves to exacerbate sectarian division to maintain its rule by 
eliminating the prospects of a cross-sect national opposition coming to fruition. Part of 
the failures surrounding the Arab Spring uprisings that took place in Kuwait was in 
large part down to its inability to attract a broad coalition of supporters given that it was 
dominated by the Sunni Islamist blocs, despite the movement itself calling out the 
popular slogans of wanting an end to the pervasive corruption and government 
incompetence at the heart of Kuwaiti politics.  
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Although a similar observation can be made in the Bahraini context at least in terms 
of reasons for mobilising and orchestrating protests, there are some key discrepancies 
when observing state-opposition discourse, as the ISA to sow social discord is more 
palpable in Bahrain, and in some cases therefore the informal space can respond 
accordingly, hosting inter-faith dialogues, creating initiatives toward social mobilisation 
that are directly challenging the state narrative.   
 
6.3 Local and Transnational Media in Kuwait and Bahrain 
As alluded to in previous sections of this chapter and as demonstrated when focusing 
on how the ISA principally manifests in both countries, it is crucial to observe the 
prominent role that media outlets across the board have played in perpetuating 
sectarian rhetoric on a communal level. Moreover, it is important to recognise that as 
an instrument of the ISA, the role of media is the focal point of the theoretical 
framework when it comes to understanding the positioning and role informal spaces 
possess when it comes to ongoing sectarian debates, and where the two (both 
informal spaces and media platforms) intersect at the discursive level, serving as 
platforms for political discussions.  
 
One theme that would re-emerge time and time again from the interviews and has 
already been noted as a key instrument of the state’s ideological state apparatus is of 
course the media at its disposal, and this is applicable in both the Kuwaiti and Bahraini 
contexts. What was remarkable is that it was almost unanimous across the board, that 
media (in its various forms) was by and large having a significantly detrimental impact 
on the trajectory of inter-communal relations, furthermore, they are even seen to be 
one of the key obstacles to informal spaces in being able to challenge the dominant 
narratives that circulate various media outlets.  
 
This also extends to alternative media that operates outside the state’s remit. One 
Kuwaiti journalist had noted, that online media, and in this regard social media (Twitter, 
Facebook etc.) has exacerbated tensions. Not only was disinformation being 
propagated with relative ease and then being widely disseminated, but in addition, 
because of the degree of anonymity that social media affords, sectarian abuse and 
slanderous remarks have become increasingly discernible where they were not 
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previously a common phenomenon, either in daily interactions between communities 
or even by the traditional wing of state media outlets. The participant also shared his 
fears of how impressionable youth were particularly prone to online radicalisation 
material that they may not usually be exposed to.  
“Of course, it is easy to access them, without this media, their parents may not 
allow for them to go see such people, it would be much harder to meet for 
example, but now it is easier to gain access to them.”365 
 
Another external observer (a political science professor at Kuwait University who ran 
as an independent candidate in previous parliamentary elections) had also resigned 
to the idea that external and regional events, compounded by the emergence of state-
controlled and new medias has put an increasing strain on inter-communal relations 
more recently, citing that relations were much more harmonious in earlier generations, 
despite the rapid growth of diwaniyyat including youth diwaniyyat, which could be 
testament to their ineffectiveness in this regard. There is however, no  substantial 
evidence to suggest that the recent emergence of youth diwaniyyat will come to fill the 
void where their older counterparts failed in dealing with the increasingly pressing 
issue of sectarianism and the salience of sectarian identities that can be witnessed 
today; if anything, they could be worse.  
“I have to admit that socially speaking, if you are to talk about tolerance, if you 
are to talk about cohesion, then no doubt the older generations were far better 
than today.”366  
 
He also goes on to mention how traditional and moreover new media platforms have 
gone through a process of sectarianisation themselves, and this feeds into the 
sentiment/attitudes that people carry into the informal space when having discussions.  
 
“Everybody watches his own so to speak, whatever he is closer to culturally, 
ideologically, religiously, this is still going on, it may be true that people are not 
too interested or not as engaged with watching TV channels, the effect is now 
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via instant media like WhatsApp, articles being sent to one another…and yes  
the information is still also by and large based on whether I am Shi’i so I 
circulate my links to fellow Shias and vice-versa, and that is now becoming true 
with segments of the youth who are the most frequent users of new I.C.T’s.”367 
Combining the elements of external/regional events and highly polarising use 
of traditional and new media, this has consequently had its impact on the 
diwaniyya. As observers cited how four Salafi candidates in 2011 were elected 
into parliament as they used the diwaniyyat and media together (i.e. uploading 
videos from diwaniyyat) as a rallying point to get them elected. “You may only 
see fifty people inside but outside in the online sphere there maybe 50,000 
audience who listen to the lecture and hear them expressing their religious and 
political beliefs.”368 
 
You also find the similar issues were raised in the Bahraini context as to how media 
was serving the ISA and attempting to undermine the initiatives and efforts of informal 
civil society.  
“If you go back in Bahrain’s history you find people are open with each other, 
but what we saw in 2011 was actually the press playing a major part in making 
people confront one another and they tried to attribute everything in the country 
and outside to being a sectarian issue.”369  
 
The former MP also noted how at the height of the protests in 2011, the Bahraini 
government were effective in its implantation of the ISA by effectively scaremongering 
the indigenous Sunni population with the sectarian card and again utilising external or 
regional events to its advantage by claiming that Iran was an existential threat to 
Bahrain, and in turn many offered their loyalties, despite them having shared concerns 
with their fellow Shi’i countryman, particularly with regards to housing and 
employment. “Many believed the press, they read the propaganda that those people 
are backed by Iran and have some foreign agenda.”370  
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Again, utilising regional events to its advantage, the Bahraini state went a step further 
by trying to highlight how Bahrain would become another post-2003 Iraq were the 
protestors to be successful.  
“They bought into the government’s notion that there is some sort of influence 
and often they try to relate events here in Bahrain with what happened in Iraq, 
they try to depict a picture of regime change that will entail Sunnis losing 
everything and so the government is only trying to protect you by reminding 
them that they will find themselves out of government offices and jobs.”371 
 
This was a pertinent example of how the state utilised both regional events (i.e. post-
intervention Iraq and Iran as a convenient scapegoat), its own media wing and the 
media outlets of its GCC allies at its disposal (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Al-Hadath, Sky 
News Arabia etc.) in order to retain control of the country, alongside the CSA or 
coercive state apparatus of inviting GCC allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE to directly 
intervene by sending troops into the gulf kingdom to supress protest movements. 
However as mentioned previously, the informal spaces of majalis, albeit few but 
increasing, have been able to gradually improve inter-communal relations and is still 
widely regarded as a convenient platform for cross-sectarian dialogue and social 
mobilisation. Whereas the Kuwait diwaniyya may be particularly influential during 
election time, however when it comes specifically to the state of sectarian relations, 
the use of media and regional events have trumped the informal space making it by 
and large redundant or if worse, contributing to polarise communities further. As the 
example of the journalist diwaniyya or radical Islamist factions using the space as a 
lobbying post to gain more political influence would signal. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, there are several claims that can be posited considering the following 
observations. In the Bahraini context, the majalis can play both a positive or 
detrimental role dependant on several variables, one being the induvial that frequents 
the space, what views do they harbour and what can they bring to table with regards 
to discussions. Then, it is also important to note that the type of majlis is also a key 
determinant, as the non-politicised social majalis have proven to be apprehensive 
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when it comes to discussing sectarianism however the politicised cross-sectarian and 
some sect-based majalis place emphasis on such discussions and see it as imperative 
to establishing national unity. One objection to the Bahraini majlis is that it can be part 
of the problem in that many majalis traditionally gravitated towards the government, 
benefiting from financial incentives the government may afford to them for voicing their 
loyalty in their respective spaces.  With that in mind, it is only the few but emerging 
independent political majalis that can make a breakthrough in directly confronting the 
state narrative. Furthermore, those independent majalis have historically been 
instrumental as a starting point for effective cross-communal social mobilisation. This 
majalis does not subscribe to any political affiliation and may also be advertised which 
can attract attendees from various backgrounds.   
 
Bringing the RBA and multi-dimensional framework into account, it would appear the 
majalis rank high in terms of impact, at least from the perspective of empowering 
citizens, but as alluded to, it is primarily dependent on the type of majlis as to whether 
it would serve a beneficial or detrimental means. Furthermore, due to its loose 
structure, like the dewanniya, there are no guarantees or safeguards that these spaces 
shall foster better interrelations. However, as noted in the observations, they have 
proven to be effective in that regard historically. All in all, the jury is still out there as to 
their future role in Bahraini social and political formations.  
 
Again, the Kuwaiti diwaniyya has also proven to display mixed results, on the one hand 
it has been by and large ineffective with regards to creating a platform for cross-
communal dialogue and in some cases, has in fact preserved or has been used to 
facilitate state-sponsored rhetoric or policies. However, it must also be stated that the 
diwaniyya with its long tradition of being a house for free speech, its makeshift nature 
and legal protection from the state (a feature which the Bahraini majlis does not have), 
does allow for individuals in the future to create more concerted efforts in bringing the 
country closer together, and still offers the potential capacity to forge a broad network 
of opposition movements by having discussions on how to take the country forward 
and bring communities closer together, something that the Bahraini majlis has done 
once before and is continuing to preserve as a viable tradition and an effective mode 
of civic, grassroots activism.   
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7. Formal vs. Informal Civil Society and the Sectarian Narrative 
Having discussed the positioning and activities of the informal space as well their 
influence on state-societal and consequently inter-communal relations, this chapter 
seeks to explore traditional and emerging informal spaces under the broader rubric of 
civil society within Kuwait and Bahrain and where informal spaces can be positioned 
within this broader framework. In addition, this chapter will set out to examine at what 
juncture informal spaces could be influencing sectarian discourse, and what active 
steps are being taken at the grassroots more broadly in addressing the increasingly 
pertinent issue of sectarianism in both countries.  
 
Based on the observations, the chapter will also seek to highlight the transient and 
fluid nature of the informal space and where its lack of institutionalisation has served 
it well and at times been a disservice when it comes to addressing the broader picture 
of sectarian relations. As alluded in previously, this chapter will also observe where 
traditional informal spaces have sought to reinvent themselves with a more formal 
outlook, yet still providing the case for why they are more conducive for inter-
communal discourse in comparison to the registered/formal CSO.  
 
The chapter will then finally proceed with a comparison of both formal and informal 
civil society, highlighting their potential strengths and limitations and will come to 
advocate for a case by case analysis of each individual informal space as oppose to 
making generic claims about any one particular group, the informal space’s scope for 
success vis-à-vis sectarian relations is contingent upon several variables which is 
discussed in the following sections. As demonstrated in the previous data chapters, 
success or a positive role can be quantified by the way in which that space facilitates 
social cohesion, forms cross-communal coalition initiatives emphasising citizenship-
building, and looking to defy or challenge state-sponsored narratives in a bid to reform 
some of the countries prolonged socio-economic and political issues that have long 
been impeded by a discernible lack of or ineffective co-operation across populations 
and to challenge the sectarian polarisation that has manifest in the formation of 
political groupings. 
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7.1 Informal Civil Society in Context 
In order to put informal civil society into perspective within the broader remit of civil 
society in both case studies, it is important to acknowledge, as alluded to in the 
background chapter, what the specific hallmarks of informal spaces are in relation to 
formal NGOs, where they differ from one another in terms of functions and how this 
subsequently has an impact on inter-communal relations and sectarian discourse.  
One common theme that did arise from the data when partaking in discussions with 
participants from informal youth groups is their ability to forge networks, ties, contacts 
and liaise with similar groups. Particularly in the case of the cultural workshops, so 
one respondent noted how;  
“we often work together when it comes to the projects that we run, myself as 
chair of Tasa’oul, as well as the members of Mawana and the Bahrain Debate 
for example, all co-operate and co-ordinate on programs and offer our skills 
and assistance wherever possible, again I feel this is more accessible because 
it has such a strong youth component, in that it is easier to communicate with 
one another, and because of our shared interests, it is already cross-communal 
because of the members shared interests, whereas with the older generation 
getting a cross-communal coalition of civil society networks maybe more 
difficult.”372 
 
A distinctive marker for some of the emerging informal spaces, is therefore this ability 
to forge these networks and co-operate with other like-minded groups, which could be 
telling of a positive sign that these groups do have a capacity where registered or more 
formally organised groups (as popular as they may be) struggle to attract a broader, 
more diverse grouping of people to attend their activities, and if they do, people are 
still aware of their predisposed biases, be it that they are evidently a government 
loyalist group or siding with opposition circles.  
 
Another key distinction from formal societies for the non-registered youth societies in 
the human rights sector, was their emphasis on working independently (as oppose to 
in a coalition of networks as is the case with the pop-up workshops) and more 
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importantly in the sense that they were not acting as a subsidiary for a political 
organisation or doing the states’ bidding. As one such research respondent noted “We 
do not have any relations with political societies/parties”.373 There are several potential 
benefits of this independence from formal civil society for informal groups. Firstly, the 
group or space is able to retain its independence in terms of strategies it employs to 
carry out its work effectively, by this what is meant is that the group is not beholden to 
any other organisation’s demands or objectives or by the state itself, nor is it doing the 
bidding of any other group under the auspices or guise that it is just another CSO. 
Were it to be co-opted by the state or a formal CSO, it would only ultimately serve to 
perpetuate state-sponsored rhetoric by repeating a similar mantra and to be monitored 
closely, inhibiting the work and activities it needs to carry out as an effective human 
rights organisation, in this particular regard. Moreover, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter on regime-societal relations, in the Bahraini context, it has been a 
pivotal catalyst for social mobilisation against the state as highlighted by one Bahraini 
research respondent: 
“Our idea is to mobilise and to give young people motivation rather than 
just using them, I see political parties use the youth, they exploit them and 
do not give them real representation…and this is the one thing in our 
society, we do not have a real hierarchy, we do not have an office, as you 
can see we’re sitting in this coffee shop, we’re discussing how we can do 
x or y, and anyone who is new we try to get them involved, we do not just 
designate roles to people.”374 
 
What is suggested here is that there appears to be a tangible benefit to informal 
groups’ lack of any form of institutionalisation. Indeed, the non-associational feature 
affords the group a fluctuation by which they can both forge relations with 
groups/networks of their choosing and dissociate themselves from any political 
parties/societies (in this case state-sponsored) that would in typical circumstances be 
looking to co-opt such groups. In this regard, their ability to operate clandestinely with 
no formal record (i.e. membership to a state ministry) acts as a useful deterrent from 
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state interference and in turn enables the groups’ activism to produce an alternative 
narrative to the regime, which actively seeks to exacerbate inter-communal divisions.  
 
With that in mind, having no formalised affiliations to state-sponsored groups or 
societies offers informal groups an outlet to criticise the authorities or any other group, 
either via publications or through various forms of civic activism, in turn reinforcing 
their own narrative and influencing sectarian discourse on a communal level which 
does not have a predisposed bias to the state or opposition forces but can be 
influenced either way. Again, as one respondent asserted  
 
“First of all we have no office, so the government cannot close us down, 
we are not in the Ministry of Social Development, we do not have funding 
from any governments or organisations, we are not subservient to 
anyone, so basically our hands are not tied, we can criticise any 
government, any organisations, anyone because they are not involved in 
our work, we are totally independent and we are not funded.”375 
 
This observation links onto another important common trademark that can be 
evidenced across both traditional and emerging informal spaces in Bahrain and 
Kuwait, which is funding. State funding of these organisations would entail some sort 
of service in return by offering material and logistical support, and so for independent 
groups who do not want to be doing any state bidding, so they often search for 
volunteers who they themselves target as viable or ideal contributors to the group. As 
one respondent from Bahrain notes:  
 
“We’d rather we didn’t receive funding, we are participants with people on 
the ground, helping on the ground, having speeches on the ground, that’s 
an activist. We work with everyday people, most of the international human 
rights organisations (reference to formal CSOs) are office-based, whereas 
we are on the front lines…They have their phones and their e-mails calling 
people just to make a statement, we are not sitting in an office telling 
people to come to us, we go to the people, ask them, what they want, what 
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they need how we can help them, we tried to provide lawyers, we started 
a project to train and teach people about human rights and using non-
violent techniques.”376 
 
Expanding on this, a key trait of the informal youth groups in Bahrain, concerns their 
selectivity when it comes to potential contributors/activists. According to one of the 
‘Bahraini activists, for instance;  
“we know many of the youth in the villages so if we want some members we 
just talk to specific people, we do not publish a vacancy or something of the 
sort…because we do not want our society to be infiltrated, nor do we want any 
members using the society for their own gains, some of the youth may do it to 
raise their own status or publicity or use our society to get money or donations 
out of it, we are strict on this. (…) We do not want to give anyone a chance so 
I use my twitter account every time I announce that anyone coming to try collect 
money on our behalf is not our member.”377 
 
Once again, all these mechanisms, including when it comes to recruitment of potential 
members, does not go through a bureaucratic process as it would in normative 
circumstances were it a registered CSO, again diluting or minimalizing the potential 
for institutionalisation of the group. What you find instead are rather carefully selected 
handpicked personnel. This helps in mitigating the potential trust deficit, in that existing 
members are choosing from people they know within a personal capacity, as oppose 
to a random person that could later turn out to be working for the government and 
using their position as an opportunity to subvert or to gather intelligence on the group. 
It also helps in not being compelled to be transparent in its dealings, thus being 
susceptible to government monitoring, were it a formal group, it would have to disclose 
its activities to the relevant state ministry that it is registered or assigned to.  
 
Another interesting case example was an upcoming Bahraini youth group that sought 
to directly address sectarianism whilst retaining its independence as a non-registered 
group and its diverse political and denominational make-up of active members.  
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“We are humanitarian in principle, we are not thinking about religion, but we still 
want to highlight and bring to attention the issue of sectarianism…we have 
connections to other human rights organisations but no links to any political 
societies…we are mixed and consider ourselves as neutral intermediaries 
between all political positions, we are operating independently to look at 
addressing the sectarian issue. We are not following the agenda of either the 
government or formal opposition movements, we have no external influence on 
us.”378  
 
Moreover, what was particularly striking is how they would look to use traditional 
platforms such as majalis as a means to obtaining information as a form of grassroots 
activism when it came around to publishing their reports. “We go to visit some majalis, 
anywhere we can find people who want to be heard, any resource we shall use to 
shed light to try solve the issue.379 This could be a potential avenue that could be 
explored further whereby emerging and traditional informal platforms are directly co-
operating in one form or another at the expense of formal societies, especially when it 
comes to addressing the issue of sectarianism which this research participant felt 
requires much more clarity for the general public. Explaining the in-part failings of 
formal political societies, the participant claimed that; 
“political societies can only express opinions, we need to have exact numbers 
and statistics that is much more effective for people to hear and also for other 
organisations who can use our statistics as a point of reference. Political 
societies do not also express a clear picture, they can demonstrate the sheer 
scale of the problem in Bahrain, what we can do is specialise and pinpoint 
where.”380  
 
Even in this regard, the president of the group felt that in terms of future scope, more 
grassroots activism needs to be invested in addressing the ramifications of sectarian 
policies within various sectors.  
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“If there is an issue over unemployment, or with parliament, or cases of 
dissidents being tortured, it would be more productive if we had an organisation 
specialising in each sector. In each of these cases for example you will see an 
underlying issue of sectarianism, so we want to act as an organisation that 
collates vital information from other activists and human rights groups.”381 
 
Not only does this highlight the pressing demand by emerging groups to take an 
extensive look at alleviating some of the core issues driving sectarianism by the 
regime, but once again, illustrates the scope for further collaboration or co-operation 
between informal groupings and spaces that again, operating outside the state’s remit, 
could be more effective in collating information that could provide a more coherent 
case. Unlike formal societies which at best, have proven to express concerns in the 
rhetorical sense, without substantiating on claims and how sectarian policymaking has 
impacted Bahrain in several sectors.  
 
Expanding on this pressing desire to address sectarianism in a more tangible sense, 
was another informal youth group comprising of unemployed university graduates. 
They came together online in 2010 trying to highlight the problem but it soon became 
evident to one another that unemployment needed to be addressed under the broader 
rubric of sectarianism.  
“This committee was formed to solely address unemployment, and remains 
open to anyone struggling to find work, we did not form this group looking to 
address how disparity in job prospects is dependent on sect, but it turned out 
the vast majority of members and people who show interest in our group come 
from a Shia background, naturally it ends up looking like we comprise of one 
background despite our motives being otherwise. It is telling however that even 
in the very formation of this group, only Sunnis in most cases can get graduate 
occupations.”382  
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It is interesting to note the obstacles still facing emerging youth groups that are seeking 
to specialise in addressing specific issues are often being influenced by sectarianism 
at the top. Again, this could be potentially impeding cross-communal efforts to disclose 
the issue given that active members/participants almost inevitable come from one 
denominational background. Furthermore, what was interesting from observations 
was how government officials acknowledged the unemployment issue (as alluded to 
in the next quote) being directly attributed to sectarianism but were somewhat 
indifferent in their response. What also becomes evident is how such informal groups 
were the cornerstone of political mobilisation long prior to the 2011 uprisings even 
gaining traction.  
 
“Well we used to protest and before that we also used to send letters to 
ministries, ministry of labour for example, for a whole year in 2010, and we 
ultimately started protesting because the written pleas were falling on deaf ears. 
We met with Sunni MP’s, and some in a private capacity accepted our 
assessment but they still did nothing…We have no links to political societies 
but during February 14th Marches they arrested three of our members. We 
started protesting in the road, asking for jobs, we conducted a silent protest 
simply holding slogans saying we are unemployed, but the police came and 
arrested us, this actually took place on the 13th February 2011, a day before it 
all commenced.”383 
 
They also went on to address how the impact of naturalisation is having an adverse 
effect in terms of prospects for employment in several sectors including within 
education, once again playing out in sectarian terms.  
“Even in the education sector, you find that the government recently hired 800 
teachers from Egypt yet there are 6,000 Bahraini graduates in educational 
studies who cannot find work.”384 
 
What also became apparent from the observations is the discrepancy in the scale of 
autonomy between Bahraini youth groups. One Bahraini youth group affiliated to the 
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political society Al-Wefaq acknowledged that although they themselves are not 
registered, they still considered those emerging spaces that are completely 
independent to be more effective in some regards.  
“Yes I would consider those independent to be effective as we cannot go 
everywhere in Bahrain, if I want to do a big event, I need to obtain permission 
from Al-Wefaq, and sometimes Al-Wefaq want us to do an event and the 
government oppose, so the government then try to put limitations, the 
government did not grant us permission to be registered despite being affiliated 
to al-Wefaq, even Wa’ad who used to regularly hold events are finding it 
increasingly more difficult for them given their own position.”385  
 
With this in mind, it is therefore imperative to view informality on a scale as oppose to 
a binary of having either formal or informal groups – such observations have proven 
to show that these groups are much more fluid in the ways they operate which in turn 
has an impact on their effectiveness at facilitating cross-sectarian coalitions and 
rapprochement.  Groups that are beholden to broader political societies may see 
themselves being by and large futile in this regard, being made to replicate the broader 
agenda of the political society.  
 
One research respondent who is a co-chair of the Bahrain Debate also echoed similar 
comments as to the utility of operating in an informal manner, at least in comparison 
to the formal CSOs. However, the respondent does acknowledge that there may be 
limits for any group irrespective of how formal or informal it is if the state perceives it 
to be receiving too much attention or influence, however the state will often turn a blind 
eye if it does not feel the group in question is a perceived threat, which if anything 
could potentially be indicative of informal civil society’s weakness, that in some 
respects, the state does not recognise it to be a tangible threat.  
 
“I think just being informal gives you more space to do activities without having 
to check with government every now and then because that is how NGOs 
function, you have to report back to the Ministry every now and then and tell 
them we did x, y and z. So, in that sense, it does give you more of an opportunity 
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to think and have your own discourse that is removed from state-approved 
narratives, but even working both within or outside the state structures, I do 
believe the state by and large turns a blind eye to what we do, and if at some 
point we made too much trouble, even informal groups like ourselves or other 
more radical groups let us say, the state will eventually be on their case.”386 
 
In the Kuwaiti context, it is also important to recognise the distinction in terms of the 
scope of institutionalisation between formal CSOs and the traditional informal space 
of the diwaniyya, in order to point out where a lack of organisational structure can 
simultaneously acquire a detrimental impact on inter-communal relations. Whereas in 
the Bahraini case, emerging and traditional spaces such as some majalis have sought 
to dispel or at least challenge the top-down narrative of sectarian relations; it appears 
the freedoms, loose structure, and lack of self or imposed regulation (given its ability 
to have an open public discussion, invite any speaker as it is at the host’s discretion 
and is safeguarded and legally enshrined by the Kuwaiti constitution) attributed to the 
diwaniyya can in some cases have a detrimental effect on communal building 
initiatives which in turn undermines sectarian relations. As the current regional climate 
and the salience of increasingly polarising viewpoints via social and traditional mass 
media has only enabled the diwaniyya to be used precisely as a platform for such 
sentiment as opposed to actively campaigning against it, as evidenced in the previous 
chapter with the election of Salafi MP’s via diwaniyyat and the failures of reconciliation 
via a journalists’ diwaniyya.  
 
One key trait within many diwaniyyat is that they operate in a public domain. “Friends, 
colleagues, political officials, you can call it any of these names and these people all 
participate…everyone is welcome”387. In this regard, like informal civil society in 
Bahrain they do not possess any form of membership. However, another charge that 
has been levelled at the diwaniyya, is that much as it has its benefits particularly in the 
past as a substitute for parliament, but it could also be operating as an echo chamber, 
not only in reproducing sectarian rhetoric/prejudices that is already pervasive in wider 
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society but reproducing the same results as the institutions is had meant to replace 
when parliament was suspended.  
“Diwaniyyat unfortunately have become a tool for corruption, because how this 
works you come here, you know this person, you go to the government 
tomorrow and he sorts me out this job, it has become a place for collections or 
Wasta’ – which can be loosely translated as favours.”388  
 
Pressing issues such as corruption and political incompetence can be indirectly 
impeding more cordial sectarian relations as the Orange Movement of 2013 
showcased the failure to bring about a comprehensive cross-sectarian coalition that 
could mount a significant challenge to the government and the way it handles its 
checks and balances. One outside observer went as far as saying that the Orange 
movement or Dignity March although was not addressing any explicitly sectarian 
issues per se, the movements reception with different segments of Kuwaiti society was 
a testament to how pervasive sectarian sentiment had become.  
“There was almost a perceived sectarian element to the demonstrations, that is 
why Shias became cautious of this movement, paranoid about what type of 
Sunni was involved, as a large contingent of the protestors were supports of a 
parliamentary bloc that consisted of 35 MPs, 16 of whom were Ikhwani or 
Salafist…so Shias having assessed the situation, felt it was best to just get 
closer to the government, for the Shias it was not the protests they had issue 
with but rather who was protesting?”389 
 
Relating the issue of corruption and political ineptitude back to informal civil society, it 
could be suggested that the diwaniyya could inadvertently be serving to exacerbate 
such problems as the non-institutional, unregulated mode of networking enables 
political cronyism to manifest. The detrimental impact corruption is having and its 
intrinsic link to the diwaniyya was also noted in observations from research participants 
where certain MP’s may be refused an invitation.  
“Sometimes in exceptional circumstances when there is an election and they 
do not like the candidate they may request he does not come to a specific 
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diwaniyya, it happened one time before when they accused some MPs of 
bribery…in the 2009 elections for example.”390 
 
However, what is particularly discernible with the politicised diwaniyya in Kuwait is that 
there is a degree of formality concerning the rules of engagement. The host of the 
diwaniyya can often play a key role in the discourse that plays out, he can control the 
topics that are being discussed and often acts as a mediator between guests. In some 
cases, even having the authority to call out people if they voice opinions that he 
regards as particularly sensitive or controversial and can even request they do not 
contribute to further discussions.391 This unspoken rule that is customary at many 
diwaniyyat, is important when observing informal spaces more broadly as it 
demonstrates how the host can in part control or influence the discussions taking 
place. This directly harps back to whether diwaniyyat are inhibiting or promoting 
sectarianism as it demonstrates how the host has the means to determine the 
conversation and depending on his attendees or the type of diwaniyya (political, non-
political, social, religious-orientated), that could all have a definitive influence on the 
ways in which sectarianism is being discussed. I.e. is the language antagonistic and 
hostile or more accommodating or appeasing of the other etc. 
 
Furthermore, what is particularly intriguing with regards to such spaces being 
unchecked or unregulated was that the proliferation of Kuwaiti diwaniyyat in recent 
years has brought about potential problems vis-à-vis sectarian relations on a 
communal level. Like the role played by social media, it has offered a platform to once 
marginalised, and potentially radical, voices that could seek to antagonise and play on 
communal divisions. As one Kuwaiti respondent asserted; 
 “The majority of diwaniyyat do bring people together…but some diwaniyyat and 
increasingly it is known they are causing problems, causing sectarianism and 
tribalism, because the expansion of the diwaniyyat is out of control…it has 
become a space to spread disinformation and rumours.”392  
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Furthermore the fact that the diwaniyya is safeguarded by Kuwaiti law and insulated 
from state interference, unlike social media platforms which are closely monitored, 
could only offer further incentive for more radical and/or divisive voices to use such 
venues to propagate their views and this has already been evidenced with ultra-
conservative MPs using the diwaniyya as a lobbying post to get ahead during election 
campaigning. A prime example of how the diwaniyya has served to further sectarian 
goals, was with the activities of the four Salafi MPs who were elected to the Kuwaiti 
parliament in 2011. 
 
“Diwaniyyat played a big part in their success, they had so many gatherings in 
their diwaniyyat for Al-Falluja, for Ramadi and they were collecting money for 
jihadists in Syria, and they would appear on channels to ask for donations to 
give to the rebels in Syria...that is why when it comes to the sectarian issue, the 
diwaniyya has more cons than pros.”393  
 
However, this was not the depiction of diwaniyyat in its entirety, as for one mixed-sect 
diwaniyya in a relatively new district of Kuwait, the observations from some of the 
participants offered a slightly alternative perspective with respect to the diwaniyya 
essentially being a social gathering. Most diwaniyyat operating informally as a meeting 
place would demonstrate that in most cases at least on the surface the diwaniyya does 
serve to bring communities together, even for people within politics. “Last Sunday, we 
had many Sunni visitors and neighbours, there was a gathering for a municipality 
member and it was mixed between Sunni and Shia.”394 Although interestingly when 
the issue of Sunni-Shia relations was raised the responses amongst participants 
somewhat varied. Some guests attributed sectarian tensions in Kuwait to the 1970s 
and 1980s when many Saudi residents were being granted citizenship which 
dramatically altered Kuwait’s sectarian demographics, an observation that has 
similarly been made once before by an outside observer.395 Whereas another guest 
conceded that there was still “an implicit tension between communities.”396  
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So on the contrary to previous observations of the diwaniyya potentially operating as 
an open platform for those looking to disseminate their own views which could in turn 
be perceived as counter-intuitive in terms of sectarian relations, it could be suggested 
from this perspective that in most cases, the diwaniyya acting as a social gathering 
place could if anything be seen to be restraining or at least preventing tensions coming 
to the fore.  
 
Whether this is considered to be a positive or negative development regarding inter-
communal relations remains to be seen, but what is apparent is that many participants 
appear to be apprehensive to have quite frank, candid conversations about sectarian 
politics within a mixed-sect environment in order to not potentially cause offence, 
which may offer credence to the latter suggestion that there are some implicit tensions 
that go undiscussed. Again, this could raise questions as to whether the diwaniyya 
has any utility in deconstructing sectarian discourse and whether sectarianism as an 
impediment to more conducive governance and an ISA tool can be overcome when it 
comes to the broader picture for Kuwait’s domestic and foreign policies.397  
 
When probed as to whether the participants thought sectarian sentiment and attitudes 
between communities had increased/sharpened/risen, the research respondents 
seem to agree that it is apparent on the institutional level, but it is restrained within an 
informal remit such as the diwaniyya.  
“It is especially in the public eye in the parliament and during election time you 
see such tensions.”398 “They (prospective MP’s) use sectarian language, to get 
more votes and popularity…because he is touching on a sensitive subject and 
again because of the implicit tensions and the reality that regional events have 
a major impact on Kuwaiti society.”399  
 
This, alluding to the idea that the transnational impact of sectarianism is becoming 
increasingly pervasive across denominational communities. This observation could, if 
anything, be demonstrating how the informal space of the diwaniyya is becoming 
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increasingly redundant as a grassroots mechanism to countering such narratives at 
least on a communal level. The participants also noted how prospective politicians 
(across religious denominations) therefore utilise regional events and the sect-based 
only diwaniyyat as a platform to propel their own political careers by playing on 
sectarian rhetoric in the process. Just as Salafi MP’s used the case of the Syrian civil 
war to whip up votes, one participant cited Shia politicians such as Abdul Hamid 
Dashti, who is no stranger to courting controversy not least for the Kuwaiti authorities 
who have found his comments on the Saudi and Bahraini governments to raise alarm. 
One participant had mentioned for example, “I think he got his seat by evoking the 
Bahraini revolution”.400  
 
This of course would knowingly resonate with potential Shia constituents he was 
looking to garner votes from and is further testament to how regional politics and the 
utilisation of sectarian sensitivities has enabled candidates to enter the political frame, 
which just goes to show how sectarianism is being instrumentalised to further certain 
political goals.  
 
To further substantiate such claims, one diwaniyya host demonstrated how sectarian 
sentiment has permeated even within Bidoon communities and demonstrates the 
futility of diwaniyyat in that are not being used productively to try mitigate this 
increasingly pressing problem, which again is seen to be a by-product of broader 
regional conflicts and events that are making their way in Kuwaiti public discourse and 
serving to polarise communities; again facilitated by open media platforms (e.g. 
proliferation of religious satellite channels and social media) that have made 
traditionally fringe opinions more pronounced and accessible than in previous 
generations. “The hate is palpable…in their eyes, even if people do not mention, there 
is tension in the atmosphere, the books that were once printed in Saudi and other 
countries, now anybody, even the religious illiterate or uneducated can hear such 
rhetoric on their tv or phone, it does not require a cleric to say anything, people will 
believe anyone with a platform…with my neighbour for example who is from Saudi 
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Arabia, he has been my neighbour for 30 years, I do not recall a single time he 
attended my public diwaniyya.”401 
 
To summarise, in the Bahraini context, it is evident there are several reasons behind 
the perceived disparity between formal and informal CSO’s and it is telling in their 
hallmarks. A key point of departure for the emerging informal space from the registered 
CSO is in the way it can retain its autonomy, possess the ability to forge networks and 
coalitions with like-minded groups with no leverage and their considered selection 
when it comes to recruiting members. For the more traditional group of the majlis, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, it possesses a flexibility in that it can occupy a dual 
role of both hosting informal discussions as well as taking on a more formal role by 
hosting lectures, Q&A sessions that do not require official permission. It must be stated 
however that though these groups possess a potential to harmonising inter-communal 
relations they are still relatively few and it only becomes harder given the existing geo-
political climate.  
 
Taking the individuals and their responses into context, what becomes evident 
however, is that although there appears on face value to be marked differences in the 
organisational features of formal and informal civil society, the very make-up of such 
spaces is in large part credit to the recognised associations as many participants who 
host or frequent such spaces belong to existing CSOs and specifically political 
societies themselves. The participants and their capacity for cross-communal 
mobilisation therefore, is in large part not down to solely formal or informal civic 
spaces, but rather the mutual dependency and cross-fertilisation between platforms 
and its members to network, discuss and organise.   
 
It appears in the Kuwaiti context the diwaniyya possesses several traits almost akin to 
the majlis, however the proliferation of social media coupled with the sectarianisation 
of localised politics has only served to exacerbate tensions and the diwaniyya had 
become one outlet, just like media, to channel such sentiment, particularly during 
election time.  
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7.2 The Limitations of Informal Civil Society: How is it influencing the Sectarian 
Narrative? 
As the thesis is primarily concerned with informal civil society, it is important to highlight 
the potential limitations of such spaces and how those deficiencies may be having an 
influence on sectarian discourse. This is particularly significant as it enables us to 
pinpoint the gaps that informal spaces could be filling in terms of determining inter-
communal relations and bringing contentious issues to the forefront of political debate, 
be it with the aim of political rapprochement or to foment further divisions.  
 
It should be noted that the more formal, institutionalised modes of activism, including 
recognised political blocs and CSOs, have only served to exacerbate tensions in the 
way they operate and how they in turn could be inadvertently reinforcing the perception 
of the state as being a mediator between communities, as oppose to an implicit 
instigator. Again, this was none more evident than in the way the dignity marches of 
2013 played out as mentioned before, and in the fact that registered civil society 
groups are often dominated, co-opted, monitored and interfered by the state, as has 
been noted in existing literature on the civil society in the Middle East and in the 
background chapter where a historical commentary on civil society in Kuwait and 
Bahrain is documented.  
 
Likewise, in the Bahraini context, which has one of the longest standing relationships 
with civil society actors, it becomes evident that the co-opting of registered civil society 
organisations by the regime has ultimately played out in sectarian terms, none more 
so than in the form of transnational events and placing emphasis on charitable causes. 
As one Bahraini respondent asserted: 
 
“They [CSOs] tend to attract support from public officials, people from 
municipal councils, people from parliament, because many of them in 
particular people belonging to Sunni Islamist groups tend to organise 
events that are centred around humanitarian relief towards Syria or 
Palestine…in this respect, they have adopted a transnational Sunni 
identity, because they feel a sense of connection to what they always call 
their brethren in Syria, Palestine…there is one person, Ahmad Al-Ansari, 
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who is a municipal representative from Bahair, which is in Riffa’ district, 
and he does a lot of work with the registered youth groups, particularly 
youth from Al-Assala or from Al-Minbar Al-Islami and their respective 
youth groups.”402 
 
This could potentially suggest that recognised groups and their respective youth wings 
are only reinforcing the sectarian narrative perpetuated by the state, and where lack 
of resources may be indispensable to many informal societies who look to retain their 
independence, you find on the other hand and in this case it is pivotal for formal CSOs 
to attract funding from state donors to sponsor their activities which of course does not 
come without its conditions and underlying political motives.  
 
In terms of structure, one outside observer noted how informal spaces are better 
catered to more interactive, open and conducive dialogue on a host of issues including 
sectarian politics and how the state has sought to polarise communities, as opposed 
to the formal organisations where there is a set routine in terms of activities and 
speeches one may encounter.  
“So with majalis you could say there is a greater potential or scope for social 
cohesion there because people directly speak to one another, they get to know 
the person, their name, their face, where they live etc…whereas with registered 
groups for example they may bring in a speaker and people will sit there and 
listen, they might talk briefly with a few other members and so they are not 
necessarily interactive, however the majlis and some of these emerging 
informal groups, you find they are more tailored for discussion, for debate and 
for people to get to know one another.”403  
 
This is a testament to the fact that the emergence of informal youth 
groups/workshops/exhibitions and the reinventing of the traditional spaces can be 
partly attributed to an existing gap that registered and formal CSOs have previously 
failed to offer as an outlet, a place to openly discuss that does not result in pandering 
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to or regurgitate the state’s polarising narratives on denomination. When asked as to 
whether the majlis has been used as an outlet to bring political discourse into life and 
with it the existing discourse on sectarianism, the outside observer noted that; 
 “along with that movement of primarily youth-led groups feeling like there is 
something missing in Bahrain, a lot of people feel like there is a lack of 
appropriate spaces or venues to discuss and debate so many of these people 
who most likely have been running their majalis for a long time, but more 
recently have decided to reinvent their majlis, for example, advertising their 
majlis with a custom-designed poster, inform people of which guests are 
coming and what topics will be discussed/on the agenda.”404 
 
That was the initial cause of optimism, and granted the informal space still has this 
potential to facilitate greater cross-communal dialogue and mobilisation, however to 
locate that potential it must be identified what its limitations are. With that in mind, 
there is a growing fear that the majlis could fall into the same trappings as formal civil 
society, in that it is gradually incorporating more of a formal, institutional role in the 
way it has sought to reinvent itself as an effective lobbying and networking space.  
 
“More and more recently, particularly after 2002, they have become more of an 
institutionalised aspect or feature of election campaigning, many candidates 
use majalis and now they are organising majalis in a non-traditional set up, 
putting out chairs they often use at party conferences/meetings, bringing 
microphones, having guest speakers with presentations…”405  
 
However, the outside observer contends that despite the remake they will still be 
effective, and it is largely due to public perception of the space and what it represents.  
 
“Being a majlis, people think of the space differently, and the way people think 
or perceive something is important, so although one particular majlis invites an 
opposition speaker or someone from parliament or a former minister, people 
still think of it is a majlis, meaning that they do not think of it as a political 
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meeting, in some respects, the fact that people organise events at a majlis has 
actually assisted in people from across the political divide to come and discuss, 
because in everyone’s view it is not seen as x or y groups space. It is a 
majlis.”406  
 
The point of emphasising the strength of the informal space being first and foremost a 
communal space for anyone who frequents it, as oppose to a CSO conference 
meeting which is confined to those who subscribe to the organisation itself, which 
would be an indication of the formal CSO having popular but not necessarily the same 
cross-communal appeal when it comes to discussions on Bahraini politics and the 
wider region. It could therefore be tentatively assumed, that one of the potential flaws 
in formal CSOs is not acquiring greater cross-communal accessibility and how it is 
easier and presumably more effective for people across the political divide to just 
attend a majlis as oppose to just listening to a lecture at a society’s headquarters.  
 
But the question in more recent times is whether cross-communal mobilisation in of 
itself is effective when it comes to bringing about real, practical measures on the 
ground. As the majalis could too be falling into the same trappings as formal CSOs if 
recent developments are anything to go by.  
“The majalis that were once active have not touched on politics lately, however 
after Al-Wefaq was suspended in June 2016, a few months later there was a 
lot of activity to try to bring political opinions closer, to shorten the polarisation, 
so you had proposals where many majalis were inviting people from the other 
side of the political and religious spectrum to ask what can they do to reverse 
this decision. There were the likes of Ali Saleh (MP for Wa’ad society) who went 
around various majalis talking and emphasising national solidarity and national 
society, but practically speaking nothing manifested from it, and on the contrary, 
the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs (who are responsible for all political 
societies) had moved to dissolve Wa’ad and it is still going though court now.”407 
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407 Outside Observer 2, Chairman of Tasa’ol, Independent Bahraini initiative that aims to raise questions on 
conflict and identity, 7th March 2017, Skype Discussion. 
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This is evidence that even the relatively successful informal spaces still have long to 
go before they can even consider bringing about some practical political changes on 
the ground and alter communal perceptions on sectarianism. It also throws into 
question the extent to which the informal space is as immune from state authorities as 
once perceived and moreover whether it can legitimately respond to state policies or 
is inter-communal discourse simply the limit for these groups. This remains to be seen. 
 
7.3 The Strength/Limitations of Informal Spaces: How is it influencing Sectarian 
Discourse? 
As aforementioned, it appears that several of the existing flaws within formal civil 
society do point to a need to explore alternative modes of civic activism – in this case 
informal spaces. It has also become apparent, meanwhile that, the extent to which 
they are having a positive impact on inter-communal relations is all dependent on the 
context of the space itself and what are its performative functions. 
 
Furthermore, as previously evidenced there are the mixed-sect majalis and the 
workshop in Bahrain which appears to be leading the way both in terms of opening up 
sectarian discourse and striving to mitigate tensions perpetuated by the state, “we talk 
about shared interests, how to move the country forward, how to fight against 
sectarianism, how to bring people together, to put aside their differences, this is one 
of the aims here.”408 Albeit growing in number, the multi-sect majlis that focuses on 
emphasising national interests is still a minority voice, given the ever increasing 
salience of sectarian identities across the region. The question to what extent are there 
aims reflective of broader Bahraini opinion remains to be answered, and this could be 
a potential shortfall if it fails to meet its aims, likewise with more recent developments 
and how the dissolution of Al-Wefaq played out, the majlis had proven to be ineffective 
this time out. 
 
However, one potential positive coming out of the commentary on majalis is its new-
found ability to attract participants across generations. This could potentially make the 
way for traditional and emerging informal networks to co-operate together around 
similar aims and objectives. One majlis highlighted how their typical age range now 
                                                          
408 Bahrain Former MP (Wa’ad) Majlis 2, Muharraq region, Friday 30th May, A2. 
221 
 
varies, “it is a mix, if we decide to announce that we have a speaker then usually we 
attract a very good audience and then the youth will be dominant usually.”409 This is a 
significant development in the long term as cross-associational co-operation between 
informal groups and spaces can potentially help forge stronger opposition ties and 
networks becoming an ever more effective mode in countering top down sectarian 
narratives. With one outlet serving as the ideal platform to discuss and exchange ideas 
whilst the youth group looking to retain its independence can showcase this by being 
able to effectively mobilise and orchestrate demonstrations.  
 
We also come to find the majlis can act as a facilitator, bridging communities together 
once again in the aftermath of a key turning point; 
“We have a program of visiting different majalis of different groups, those who 
are backing government, those from different areas, and we are all well 
received there…after 2011, this almost disappeared but recently, it is a re-
emerging trend.”410  
 
This could also suggest that genuine long-lasting rapprochement between 
communities is feasible despite ISA tools such as media outlets stipulating otherwise 
and with it the realisation that top-down regime narratives of sectarianism are 
unsustainable when people have the means to reach out on a cross communal level, 
and the majlis in most cases can provide that.  
 
In the Kuwaiti context, a slightly alternative picture emerges based on the 
observations, you find transnational events moreover are playing a key role if not 
dictating the dynamic of sectarian relations within the country and this is none more 
reflective than how the diwaniyya is being utilised by certain individuals to further their 
own motive, which in many cases seeks to polarise and cause friction between 
communities. The four Salafi MPs who were voted in 2011 for example. It could be 
suggested in this case how the diwaniyya serves to have a detrimental impact, an 
unregulated sphere which in some respects could demonstrate how its lack of any 
institutional hallmarks is rather problematic when thinking in terms of how the space 
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could be utilised, empowering radical fringe circles that seek to undermine any 
prospect of cordial relations between religious denominations. Which could suggest 
that at least in some part and as demonstrated above, the diwaniyya is not wholly 
influential in facilitating social cohesion, but rather acts as an echo chamber and as a 
broader reflection of Kuwaiti society itself, rather than being more of an active agent 
for political mobilisation or change like in the Bahraini context with the majlis. 
 
However, it could be noted that one of the evident issues facing informal civil society 
across the board is that it is reactionary and not pro-active in mobilisation against the 
state. A more conducive way therefore to analysing the diwaniyya and other informal 
spaces moreover is to take them on a case by case basis and to look at the variables 
that influence the discourse. I.e. who frequents the space and their loaded opinions 
which they may or may not divulge is equally as important as the space’s functions in 
which they can relay their viewpoint. It was assumed that these four MPs would never 
have had any real chance at entering politics were it not for having political whips and 
the diwaniyya acting as a lobbying post, coupled with an audience they had access to 
that did not necessarily have a strong political understanding… “in that respect when 
it comes to the sectarian issue the diwaniyya has more cons than pros.”411 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
As mentioned in the previous sections, given no coherent results have emerged from 
the empirics to analyse informal civil society it would be most conducive to observe on 
a case by case example of each space and what factors can be of benefit or a 
disservice when addressing them in relation to the increasingly pressing issue of 
sectarianism within both countries, albeit to varying degrees in terms of how it 
manifests on a social and political level.  
 
Based on the analysis, it becomes evident that informal spaces’ strengths are 
contingent upon their versatility, so their ability to network and/or create close ties 
whilst retaining their own autonomy. Extending on this premise, they therefore have 
no compelled affiliations and can therefore not be influenced or manipulated by state 
                                                          
411 Ibid. 
223 
 
instruments of power, this is specifically pertinent to emerging informal groups such 
as non-registered cultural societies, youth societies and human rights groups.  
 
Furthermore, the apparent lack of funding or material resources appears to be a 
strength more than anything in that they are not in some way or form doing the state’s 
bidding, again retaining their autonomy. However, on the other hand, depending on 
how it is utilised the informal space can reproduce the same results as institutions 
themselves e.g. how the diwaniyya became a tool for corruption and its subsequent 
links to communal divisions. Again, an important factor for the traditional spaces is that 
they are first and foremost social gatherings, in that respect they can bring people 
together via shared interests but then the question arises as to what extent they are 
restraining the types of discussions they have i.e sectarian discourse for 
guests/participants to save face and to ask whether this is beneficial going forward.  
 
Finally, it becomes evident that throughout the empirical chapters the mixed-sect 
national majlis seeks an open dialogue on sectarianism and are gradually expanding 
albeit they are still a few in number and can potentially commit the same blunders as 
a registered group. All of this, is indicative of the fact that Bahrain and Kuwait still have 
some significant challenges on a domestic and regional level before they can 
overcome sectarian politics within both countries, whether the informal space can play 
a pivotal role in facilitating cross-communal understanding will be largely dependent 
on external forces and factors outside the remit of the informal space itself. 
 
8. Conclusion  
To summarise, there are several core propositions that can be drawn out from the 
empirical data, which link back to the overriding thesis of a diverging trajectory gaining 
traction in sectarian relations in both Bahrain and Kuwait. Top-down instrumentalising 
in the case of Bahrain which in some cases is actively being challenged and 
scrutinised at the grassroots via informal civil society, whereas a bottom-up pressure 
that has appropriated an imported sectarian discourse from other regional countries 
and previous generations in Kuwait has made for an increasingly polarising outlook in 
the dynamic of inter-communal relations in the country. Informal civic spaces, effective 
or otherwise futile in their aims and objectives, do however offer an important template 
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by which to gauge and serve as a broader reflection of public sentiment when it comes 
to some of the most contentious issues about the nature and role of sectarian politics 
and how banal sectarianism has come to effect communities in various ways.  
 
Rapprochement, or the apparent lack thereof, can be indicative in these spaces’ ability 
to try attempt to facilitate cross-communal dialogue, form sustainable political 
coalitions and actively mobilise against state policies and state-sponsored discourse 
on Sunni and Shia communities respectively. The results, as evidenced throughout 
this thesis have demonstrably proven that informal spaces can at least initially 
perceived to be a mixed success and in some cases, can also serve to perpetuate 
regime narratives, depending on several variables, namely the type of space itself, its 
scope for autonomy, and in what context is it positioned on i.e. Bahrain or Kuwait. 
Again, when it comes to thinking about further areas of exploration, these variables 
are certainly areas that warrant further investigation for future fieldwork into the role of 
informal civil society in the Gulf states.  
 
Where informal civic spaces have showcased their potential is where their locality is 
taken into consideration. Emerging youth groups such as the cultural 
workshops/exhibitions have been influential in bringing communities together with 
their focus on hosting events in impermanent, transient and moreover sect-neutral 
locations. However, such potential or optimism must be measured when factoring in 
the logistical challenges these pop-up initiatives face, which is often a lack of 
resources to orchestrate such events on a regular basis. Given that they are not like 
their formal counterparts that receive state sponsorships.  On the other hand, more 
traditional spaces such as the Kuwaiti diwaniyya have demonstrated their 
susceptibility in repeating a similar mantra to governments response to regional events 
and conflicts, like some of the formal CSOs, acting as an echo chamber for those 
respective governments if nothing else. On a more optimistic note, it should be stated 
that diwaniyyat as proven in earlier periods in Kuwaiti history do however possess the 
capacity to be utilised for more effective means when approaching the issue of 
sectarianism at the communal level.  
 
225 
 
Like the diwaniyya therefore, the majlis in Bahrain can likewise play a positive or 
detrimental role depending on several variables, namely the individuals who frequent 
the space and the views they harbour, furthermore the type of majlis is just as 
paramount in deciphering, whereby politically mobile cross-sectarian and some sect-
based majalis are an essential requisite to establishing unity and fostering inter-
communal solidarity in the face of government reprisals. E.g. Addressing issues that 
impact and resonate with both Sunni and Shia communities. However, one potential 
limitation to acknowledge is that the majlis can fall into the trappings of formal CSOs 
in that they may be prone to co-optation by the Bahraini state should they be able to 
influence them in some manner.  
 
Once again, incorporating the theoretical instruments to analyse the findings, those 
being the RBA and its mutli-dimensional framework as well as the potential impact ISA 
tools have on communal discourse, it would appear the findings display mixed results 
on several fronts and depending on the type of space, as well as the timing and context 
in which it functions. All these spaces, both traditional and more contemporary informal 
spaces share a common feature in that they have a dual capacity to pander or counter 
state-led discourse and subsequently can mitigate or exacerbate sectarian tensions. 
The cross-fertilisation of key individuals who operate in both formal and informal civil 
society settings is a testament to the fact that formal CSO’s retain some form of utility 
in both societies. This is further evident, in the informal spaces’ deficiencies as 
signified by the multi-dimensional framework, be it the lack of popularity to gain huge 
numbers in some cases or its inability to facilitate both state-civil society and inter-
communal dialogue in some respect. Suffice to say, in both the Kuwaiti and Bahraini 
contexts, formal and informal avenues of grassroots activism and associational life are 
fundamental pre-requisites to acquire any sense of leverage on state authorities, be it 
in the form of opposition groups mobilising or Sunni and Shi’i communities and/or 
groups coming together in countering the state ISA.  
 
Having said all this, one must be constantly reflexive, and despite the thesis 
maintaining that up until 2015 when the interviews were conducted, the findings did 
indicate the potential capacity for informal spaces to go either way in the trajectory of 
sectarian relations. The political situation since 2017 has looked increasingly bleaker 
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in Bahrain and relations between Sunni and Shi’i communities are increasingly 
resembling the ruptures of 2011, which would signal one of two possibilities, either 
informal spaces’ inability at this moment in time to harmonise communal relations, or 
worse, having an adverse impact on relations altogether. That is not to say or to totally 
dismiss their potential to assist down the line, as they had done historically.  
 
More broadly, it also becomes evident that there is an intentional disparity between 
the formal and more informal CSOs and this is reflective in their functions. A common 
observation can be made across the spectrum of informal civic spaces is their retaining 
of more autonomy (relative to the formal counterparts and to varying degrees, whether 
that space is affiliated to another broader political society or not is another determinant 
that can influence its scope of autonomy).  
 
Taking all the aforementioned into account and going forward within this line of 
research, it could be suggested that informal civil society ought to be observed more 
meticulously, whereby the focus is on the typology of spaces and the key variables 
that set them apart. Given the cross-fertilisation between civic spaces, one way could 
be a theoretical apparatus that could gauge the spectrum of formality and informality, 
something akin to the multi-dimensional framework but it be even more perceptive in 
trying to pinpoint at what stage informal civic spaces are positively or negatively 
impacting sectarian discourse and the trajectory of sectarian relations in both 
countries.  
 
It is arguably from below, in the relation between the informal spaces and its interaction 
and engagement with the more open, formal avenues of political formation that 
sectarian relations could take a different trajectory and enable cross-sectarian 
coalitions to pose a significant challenge to top-down narratives that are used to 
buttress the state’s authoritarian reach. This change is yet to come, but there is likely 
to be a continuous pressure from below, be that of amplifying or challenging sectarian 
tensions and narratives. Departing from the scholarly debates of instrumentalists who 
primarily focus on the utility of sectarianism for regime elites and how it subsequently 
plays out at the societal level, this paper has re-introduced the discussion on 
sectarianism in the two cases specified. By highlighting the agency of informal civic 
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spaces, this not only elucidates on the non-official modes of participatory politics in 
those countries but with respect to the sectarian dynamic, these spaces have 
showcased their capacity to challenge state-led discourse via the soft-power 
mechanisms (ISA) that are at the state’s disposal. As is the case more recently 
however, informal spaces serve a dual function in that they do not necessarily confront 
or challenge state narratives. In sum, such spaces can influence and mobilise people 
across sectarian backgrounds but can also be regarded at certain points to be 
obsolete and ineffective depending on several other factors being played out, including 
the policies and laws the state has implemented and the international environment. 
 
This thesis has therefore proven the comparative merit in observing both Bahrain and 
Kuwait in relation to informal civil society and sectarianism; in terms of further scope 
for research, this could manifest in several ways.  
 
As alluded to, a more discerning approach to observing typology of spaces would be 
particularly conducive given the more recent events in both countries when 
considering field research. How will impressions have changed vis-à-vis sectarianism 
for research participants in the last couple of years? Which links to another avenue for 
exploration which is to broaden the case selection to the wider Gulf region, as 
mentioned in the introduction, it was acknowledged there is an informal civil society of 
sorts that operates in several other countries and it would be interesting to observe 
what comparisons can be drawn out in relation to their Bahraini and Kuwaiti 
counterparts. What is their scope for influencing communal trajectories and must those 
respective regimes take them into consideration when projecting their own discourse, 
orchestrated through their ISA’s? It has yet to be touched upon, but the theoretical 
broadening of the spectrum of civil society in the Gulf and its relationship to sectarian 
politics, particularly given the current geo-political climate and the salience of sectarian 
identity in several sectors, certainly warrants it further investigation in that regard.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: Sample Interview Questionnaire – Informal Gatherings 
(Diwaniyyat/Majalis) 
1. What is the common basis of this diwaniyya/gathering? I.e. On what grounds do 
you come together on a regular basis? (e.g. familial/work ties) 
2. What is the typical age range of this diwaniyya, does it consist of both youth and 
older folk?     
3. How would you compare/describe your diwaniyya to other diwaniyyat in 
Kuwait/Bahrain? 
 Examine language used to describe the diwaniyya – where does this fit on spectrum 
of diwaniyyat (when asking outside observers about the various types of diwaniyyat) 
4. How formal or informal is your diwaniyyat – are their basic membership criteria? 
 If there is a membership service – ask how it works, and on what grounds can 
people become members. 
5. Does your diwaniyyat have any political associations? If so, can you give me a 
concrete example of any political affiliations you have? 
 If there are MP’s who sit in on particular diwaniyya – ask does this give it more 
political clout/importance? Examples – how does political links make your diwaniyya 
more influential in Kuwaiti society/politics? 
 If it doesn’t have any explicit political associations – ask what role your diwaniyya 
plays and if they think there are other more politicised diwaniyyat that have a greater 
impact – and what are the reasons for this?  
Questions pertaining to inter-communal relations 
1. I wanted to begin by asking, do you think diwaniyyat have a role to play in 
facilitating/bringing about ‘societal cohesion’ and if so why and how? 
 If not effective, why not? Are there specific obstacles/impediments in the way 
that is restricting this? 
2. How do you (members of this diwaniyyat/gathering) see the nature of inter-
communal relations in Kuwait/Bahrain? 
 If good/favourable – ask for examples that would demonstrate this and has your 
diwaniyyat had an impact on this outlook? 
 If deteriorating/complex – ask for examples where has this deterioration/ill-
feeling originated from and see whether these relations affect the way their 
diwaniyyat is managed/orchestrated (perhaps it’s denominational only because of 
past incidents?)  
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3. Moving onto discussions within diwaniyyat, have you ever touched upon issue 
of inter-communal relations within your diwaniyyat?  
 If yes – what are the basis of those discussions – why do you address inter-
communal relations? What is the purpose for this – by them addressing issue how 
does this have an effect on the diwaniyyat and vice-versa? 
 If no/not really – Probe with example of post 1990 Kuwait invasion – do they 
think inter-communal relations are harmonious as Shia rights to practice their 
religious beliefs had expanded as result of their active participation in Kuwaiti 
resistance or have they deteriorated in recent years – how does this effect inter-
communal relations within Kuwaiti society if at all?  
 Do they think that more politicised diwaniyyat would be addressing inter-
communal relations or not necessarily? – Ask for examples for either response or 
why they think this is? 
4. Do you see diwaniyyat as key agents/factors in determining the relationship 
between religious communities in Kuwait/Bahrain? 
 If are influential – how, examples where they displayed their 
effectiveness/efficacy. 
 If not necessarily – probe with example of Saudi Arabia, but I read from 2006 
onwards intellectuals across communities had adopted more informal strategy to 
building cross-sectarian ties. With ultimate goal of creating ‘a space for the 
moderate middle’ and to diminish radicals within all religious communities. One of 
the key foundations of this initiative was by modelling it on weekly ‘diwaniyyat’ here 
in Kuwait – Is it a different case here in Kuwait/Bahrain to Saudi diwaniyyat? Do you 
see them as effective at all in Kuwait/Bahrain in building ties between communities 
and how is this achieved?  
5. Would you agree with the claim that different attitudes between communities 
have become more prevalent/more visible within your country? 
 How does your diwaniyyat go about portraying your community’s 
identity/interests (e.g. if large Shia or cross-sectarian contingent do they host Shia-
orientated events in their diwaniyyat i.e. Majalis for commemorating Imams) if they 
don’t – why? Mutual respect, preserving impartial outlook on diwaniyyat etc?    
 Ask for examples – have there been past instances of animosity/hostility 
between communities within your neighbourhood/area or does your diwaniyyat try 
to downplay any contentious issues by focusing on shared interests? 
6. Whenever you come to discussing political issues or matters pertaining to 
politics, can you think of any examples or activities where you reached out across 
local communities, also known as processes of ‘taqarub’ or rapprochement? (e.g. 
set up inter-faith dialogue meetings or cross-sectarian political forums) 
 If they have and offer examples – ask them why this was important for their 
diwaniyyat to partake in such activities?  
 If they have not – ask them why, is there any particular reason you do not reach 
out to other communities, have there been instances in the past and now it is    
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Questions regarding relationship with other informal societies 
1. From your experiences, do younger generations take part and get involved in 
diwaniyyat/Majalis or are they often concerned with other matters? 
 If they do – do younger people regard diwaniyyat important to them, for what 
reasons do they see their important?  
2. What do you think of the emerging groups like youth societies, do you think they 
are leading the way in coming up with ways to tackling issues regarding inter-
communal relations? 
 If they don’t see them as effective – what do they think are their limitations; can you 
provide examples to illustrate this?    
3. Have you ever co-operated or are actively engaged in other informal 
associations, particularly youth societies, and if so, what are the main differences 
between activities within diwaniyyat circles and activities between youth groups? 
 Are there any co-operative activities you do that impact the way inter-communal 
relations function?  
4. Are there any other organisations/groups in Kuwait/Bahrain that are addressing 
issue of inter-communal relations other than diwaniyyat? 
 If none, ask why they think no other groups may not be, ask them what separates 
diwaniyyat from other social spaces? And ask how could this differentiation affect 
the dynamics of inter-communal relations?  
5. Finally, what are the ultimate goals for your diwaniyyat? If anything, what do you 
aim to achieve by establishing these meetings?  
 Is there anything in particular they aim to achieve with regards to inter-communal 
relations or with other informal societies or both – follow up on it why they think 
there is a need for this goal/activity?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Sample Interview Questionnaire – Youth Groups/Societies 
1. What are main purposes of this youth organisation/group and how does it function? 
(I.e. Online or a via a group of dedicated members) 
2.  What were the background reasons to setting up this youth organisation was it 
aimed at vocalising youth demands or was it a reaction to other events taking place 
within the country?   
 If it was youth demands – what were they in particular – do they feed into issue of 
inter-communal relations? 
 If reaction to other events – What were they again – do they have any link to inter-
communal relations and how did they go about tackling this issue? 
3. Which area of Bahrain/Kuwait would you say many of your members come from, 
would you say they are from specific areas or are they based across the country? 
4. In terms of membership, do people have to become members of your society and 
are there any common denominators that existing members of your group already 
share? (I.e. from same location, ethnicity, gender, or sect).  
 If members from particular sect – ask why, is there a particular reason for this? 
 If cross-communal, do you emphasise that you’re a cross-sectarian/communal 
group – what are the reasons for this as a youth group? 
5. Is this youth group linked or affiliated to a larger organisation or society? 
 If so, do you comply with their views or do you have a degree of 
independence/autonomy in terms of your proposals and the way in which you 
operate distinct from the broader group? (Depending on the response)  
 Ask for examples that highlight your independence/dependability on other 
organisations?   
 If they are affiliated to larger organisations – does this affect the way you approach 
inter-communal relations in terms of membership etc or not necessarily? 
 If not affiliated, ask what separates them as independent youth movement – i.e. do 
you have more ability to voice minority rights for instance as oppose to other youth 
groups?  
Questions pertaining to inter-communal relations 
1. At present, are there any issues your particular group is addressing that relates to 
inter-sect/communal relations and what steps/measures does it take?  (e.g. 
publicise the issue/case online, orchestrate quick demonstrations) 
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 If doesn’t address issue of inter-communal relations at present - why not, does it 
not need to be given precedence at the moment? Is this suggesting that relations 
are harmonious? Probe further 
 If they are – what are those specific cases, why do they think they are becoming 
more of a prevalent issue in Kuwait/Bahrain? 
2. Would you say your youth group is a cross-communal initiative i.e. does it 
encompass all sectors of Bahraini society? 
 If not, why not, need particular reasons, as to why they have been exclusive in 
the issues they address? Why not encompass as many sectors of society? 
 If they do, why is it important for them to be a cross-communal group? 
3. How have the identities of different communities in Bahrain affected the way 
your youth group operates, is it relatively easy to get sympathisers/supporters of 
your cause from across denominations and across different sectors of society?  
 If relations are strained and have been difficult etc - Ask for examples where 
differences in opinion between local communities have impeded/restricted on the 
goals you set out to achieve as a youth organisation.  
 Ask why is this becoming an increasing issue? 
4. Do you see your youth society/organisation personally affected by internal 
strife, because of different views between communities or do people from across 
Bahraini society co-operate effectively by and large within your organisation?  
 If it isn’t a cross-communal youth group, can they see any problems in other 
youth groups that take in members from all religious communities?    
 If they are cross-communal, can you offer examples that would suggest 
relations are harmonious or have deteriorated because of inter-communal 
relations?   
Questions regarding relationship with other informal societies 
1. Do any members of your youth society partake in diwanniya/majalis 
discussions? How regularly would you say?  
 If they do – what are the reasons for your participation in diwaniyyat – as a 
member of a youth group do you feel they hold any political significance or is it more 
for trivial issues?  
2. How do you see the influence of diwaniyyat and other traditional gathering 
places in Kuwaiti and Bahraini society?  
 Do they think they carry importance in the political sense or do they carry less 
influence/importance compared to other groups like you? Ask for reasons why. 
 Ask whether they hold any influence on inter-communal relations – do you feel 
Youth societies are better equipped at tackling issues between religious 
communities or are the politicised diwaniyyat and why so?  
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3. Have you ever co-operated or are actively engaged in other informal 
associations, particularly diwaniyyat, and if so, what are the main differences 
between activities within diwaniyyat circles and activities between youth groups? 
4. Are there any other organisations/groups in Kuwait/Bahrain that are addressing 
issue of inter-communal relations other than youth societies? 
 If none, ask why they think no other groups may not be, ask them what 
separates youth groups from other social spaces? And ask how could this 
differentiation affect the dynamics of inter-communal relations? 
5. Finally, what are the ultimate goals for your particular group/association? 
Where do you see the future for yourselves and other youth groups in the country?  
 Ask whether their future proposals have any effect on inter-communal relations 
– if they do, probe further, why do you need to highlight this issue in particular?  
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Appendix C: Sample Interview Questionnaire – Outside Observer 
Questions relating to youth societies 
1. I wanted to begin by asking, do you think youth societies/ group have a role to play 
in facilitating/bringing about ‘societal cohesion’ and if so why and how? 
 If not effective, why not? Are there specific obstacles/impediments in the way that 
is restricting this? 
2. Are there any youth groups you are aware of that specifically cater for particular 
religious communities or are the ones you know all cross-communal? 
 If they are denominational only- ask reasons as to why these have emerged? 
 If not- does this highlight strength in communal diversity of emerging youth groups 
today? 
3. What do you think of emerging youth groups in Bahrain do you view them favourably 
or do you see them to be having a detrimental impact in terms of relations between 
religious communities? 
4. What do you think of the relations between youth societies and diwaniyyat? 
 If harmonious/good – ask for reasons why, do they co-operate on certain initiatives? 
Any relating to inter-communal relations? Need Examples. 
 If not visible – ask why perhaps there is not a strong bond between youth societies 
and diwaniyyat – are traditional forms of participation out of touch with the youth? 
5. Generally, do you think the ways youth groups operate (either online or in public) 
are effective in achieving their goals?  
 Ask for examples as to how effective youth groups are in either bridging gap 
between communities or a having a divisive effect on Bahraini society? Do you think 
they are too weak to gather support throughout society, or are they fragmented 
amongst themselves etc?  
Questions relating to diwaniyyat/Majalis 
1. Same question again as before, do you think diwaniyyat have a role to play in 
facilitating/bringing about ‘societal cohesion’ and if so why and how? 
 If not effective, why not? Are there specific obstacles/impediments in the way that 
is restricting this? 
2. What types of diwaniyyat/majalis are there in Kuwaiti/Bahraini society?  
 How do they differentiate from one another? 
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 Are there any diwaniyyat that specifically focus on inter-communal relations – i.e. 
the more political diwaniyyat? If so – why do you think there are diwaniyyat that 
specifically deal with such issues? 
3.  Have you ever taken part in a diwaniyya discussion? How regularly? What type 
of diwaniyya was it? 
 What was reasoning/reasons behind participating in diwaniyyat? 
4. How effective in your opinion are diwaniyyat in Kuwaiti society with regard to 
inter-communal relations? Need examples of their effectiveness or limitations.  
5. Are the diwaniyyat more effective modes of political participation compared to 
other informal groups like youth societies?  
 Reasons as to why they are more or less effective in Kuwait/Bahrain? 
 
 
 
 
